Global Politics - Thinking Ahead

Puzzling Midterm Malaise in Taiwan

2010-03-14T15:46:00.000-07:00

It has been two years since Ma Ying jeou was elected president of Taiwan. As he approaches the mid-term milestone, President Ma’s record is puzzling. On the one hand, he has made significant progress toward his most important goals. First, he’s stabilized cross-Strait relations. The tension that gripped Taiwan and China during the Chen years has abated, high-level visits have become routine and the two sides are engaged in energetic negotiations on a wide range of issues. Also, after taking a hard hit in the global economic downturn of 2008, Taiwan’s economy is bouncing back. Exports in December 2009 were almost 50 percent greater than December 2008, and economic forecasters predict a 2010 economic growth rate between 4 and 5 percent, although unemployment remains high. Ma has also rebuilt the all-important Taipei-Washington relationship, culminating in the Obama administration’s recent announcement that it would complete a long-awaited arms sale to Taiwan.

What is puzzling is that these successes have failed to endear President Ma to his constituents. On the contrary, his popularity has plummeted since the election, and today his personal approval ratings hover below 30 percent. The dissatisfaction extends to his party as well, and it’s been manifested concretely in elections. Ma’s party, the Kuomintang (KMT), won a far smaller share of the vote in December’s local elections than it captured in the previous round, and it lost 6 out of 7 legislative by-elections in January and February. Municipal elections at the end of this year already are being touted as a bellwether for the 2012 presidential race, when Ma is expected to seek a second term, and the trends do not look good. Hence the conundrum: Why are Ma’s successes in areas believed to be important to voters – reducing cross-Strait tension and reviving the economy – not boosting his approval ratings or his party’s political fortunes?

When Ma Ying-jeou was elected president two years ago, there was a widespread feeling that Taiwan would “get back to normal.” From 2000 to 2008, relations between Taipei and Beijing stagnated, mainly because PRC leaders refused contact with Taiwan’s Sino-skeptical president, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leader Chen Shui-bian. For eight years, neither Taipei nor Beijing was interested in taking the political risks that reaching out to the other side would have entailed, and in the absence of progress, tensions increased. Thus, the return to power of the KMT, Taiwan’s long-time ruling party, was a welcome development in Washington and Beijing – and in Taiwan, where voters gave Ma 58 percent of the presidential vote as well as a legislature in which his party controlled almost 75 percent of the seats.

If Ma’s election meant things were “getting back to normal,” two years into his presidency we have a clear picture of what “normal” really means in the Taiwan Strait. In Taiwan’s domestic politics, “normal” is a highly-competitive democracy in which the executive is forced to accommodate an active and activist legislature while defending its positions from an energetic – and politically viable – opposition. In cross-Strait relations, “normal” means little overt tension, but no great breakthroughs to permanently resolve the conflict between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China.

To understand the state of play in the Taiwan Strait it is helpful to keep in mind Robert Putnam’s “two-level game” metaphor for international negotiations. Beijing and Taipei are working together to design a framework for relations that allows for mutually-beneficial economic and people-to-people interactions while balancing the two sides’ long-term goals regarding international status and potential unification. Some of this work is conducted by representatives of the two governments in high-level, formal negotiations. The content of those negotiations is shaped and constrained by what Putnam calls “level two” interactions – more commonly known as domestic politics. In Taiwan’s case, Ma’s domestic weakness constrains the pace and content of cross-Strait rapprochement.

Under President Ma, elite-level interactions have been smoother than ever before, but that only accentuates the ways domestic politics limit Taiwan leaders’ options. Those limitations are more evident today in part because the game was suspended for most of the Chen era. When Chen took office, PRC leaders paused the game because they perceived little benefit in negotiating with Chen, whom they believed was irreversibly committed to a pro-independence line. In their view, a small group of “stubborn independence elements” had wrested political control from the pro-China mainstream. They hoped that refusing to deal with Chen would help to restore the mainstream to power.

When Ma was elected, Beijing was happy to resume play. In the view of Chinese leaders, Ma was an improvement, not only over his immediate predecessor, but over the previous president, Lee Teng-hui, too. To give Ma a solid start, Beijing was prepared to concede important points. Rather than repeating their demand that Taiwan agree to their One China Principle as the basis for reopening negotiations, PRC leaders accepted Ma’s endorsement of the 1992 Consensus (a bit of verbal hand-waving in which the two sides agreed to set aside the problem of defining the “one China” they both claimed to believe in) as “close enough.”

Once it restarted the game, Beijing quickly discovered that having the right elite-level interlocutor was only the beginning. Many Taiwanese found Chen’s Sino-phobic policies unnecessarily provocative, but that did not mean they were ready to support blindly whatever policy the next administration proposed. As the pace of elite-level interactions accelerated, the focus of the domestic political debated shifted from restraining Chen’s provocations to scrutinizing Ma’s performance. At first, voters gave Ma the benefit of the doubt, but new government’s record was disappointing, and voters began to lose confidence.

A number of factors contributed to the public’s waning trust in Ma. The lack of transparency in decision-making has been a particular concern. DPP leaders suggest high-ranking KMT cross-Strait specialists might be willing to compromise Taiwan’s autonomy in order to reach an agreement with Beijing. They argue that the government’s closed cross-Strait decision-making is dangerous, because these specialists, whether out of perfidy or naïveté, might fail to protect Taiwan’s interests.

To protect Taiwan from a badly-negotiated deal, Ma’s critics are demanding ECFA be subjected to formal ratification, either by popular referendum or in the legislature. Legislative speaker Wang Jin-pyng, a KMT member, has said the legislature might overrule the ECFA deal if it does not meet lawmakers’ standards. President Ma chairs the KMT, so the lack of support for his policies within the party reinforces the sense that he and his inner circle lack a firm hand for dealing with opponents – and a firm hand is exactly what they need to deal effectively with the ever-tough negotiators from Beijing. Several of the KMT’s recent electoral set-backs resulted from local politicians rebelling against Ma’s attempts to clean up local politics, a development that further reinforces this impression.

Declining confidence in the Ma government also reflects the public’s sense that their leaders have not responded well to domestic crises. The government’s reaction to the disastrous typhoon last summer attracted enormous criticism, much of it focused on the perception that Ma had failed to register the impact of the disaster and react swiftly and proportionately. The government also has been hammered for dismissing popular fears about H1N1 vaccine and beef imported from the U.S.

Paradoxically, Ma’s political weakness at home may help him protect Taiwan’s interests in negotiations with Beijing. Taiwan’s economic, political and military power all are declining relative to the PRC, so the negotiations are in danger of becoming perilously uneven. The practical difficulty of ratifying a cross-Strait deal in Taiwan’s nervous domestic climate helps balance that asymmetry. In his discussion of two-level games, Putnam argues that authoritarian states are at a disadvantage in international bargaining for precisely that reason: they cannot plausibly claim that certain agreements will fail the test of domestic ratification. Leaders from democratic states can make that case, and they can extract concessions from the other side on those grounds. The dynamic that Putnam describes may benefit Taiwan, but it is no fun for the man caught in the middle: President Ma Ying-jeou.

Beijing is unlikely to find any Taiwanese leader easier to deal with than Ma, so it is in China’s interest to keep the relationship on a positive track – even if that means accepting slower progress than it would like. That logic helps to explain why, even as Chinese leaders fulminated against the U.S. for its decision to follow through on arms sales to Taiwan, they chose not to direct their venom at Taipei. Likewise, the PRC continues to send high-level representatives and delegations to Taiwan despite large protests, including one in November 2008 that trapped PRC representative Chen Yunlin in a hotel for hours. And in December 2009 the two sides signed three technical agreements, even after Taipei nixed a fourth proposal.

Beijing has even made limited concessions on Taiwan’s demand for international space, which Ma stated last year: “There is a clear link between cross-strait relations and our international space. We’re not asking for recognition; we only want room to breathe.” The two sides are conforming to a tacit “diplomatic truce” proposed by Ma shortly after his inauguration; neither has poached a diplomatic partner from the other since that time. In 2009, Beijing even withdrew its opposition to Taiwan’s efforts to secure observer status at the UN World Health Assembly. The Ma administration touted that development as a breakthrough, but his political opponents took him to task for the opacity of the process and for overstating the benefits Taiwan derived from the deal. In fact, the WHA decision was less a precedent-setting breakthrough than a one-off deal that could be revoked in the future – but the alternative was continued exclusion and isolation.

In sum, Beijing is so far tolerating the measured pace of cross-Strait engagement imposed by Taiwan’s domestic politics. PRC leaders seem confident that over time, their position will strengthen, so there is no need to push for faster progress now. The slow pace works well for Taiwan, too, where even baby steps make many people nervous. Still, there is a sobering side to this picture. If the process slows too much, PRC leaders may determine that no Taiwan leader, including Ma, is capable of delivering any of what Beijing is seeking and so lose patience. That would mean game over for the Ma Ying-jeou approach to cross-Strait rapprochement.

Pashtunistan and The Tournament of Shadows

2009-12-15T20:14:00.000-08:00

The plan Obama unveiled last week for Years 9 and 10 of the war in Afghanistan left a basic question begging for an answer: If Al Qaeda is the threat, and Al Qaeda is in Pakistan, why send another 30,000 troops to Afghanistan?

In his address Tuesday night, Obama mentioned Pakistan and the Pakistanis some 25 times, and called Pakistan and Afghanistan collectively “the epicenter of the violent extremism practiced by Al Qaeda.”

But he might have had an easier time explaining what he was really proposing had he set the national boundaries aside and told Americans that the additional soldiers and marines were being sent to another land altogether: Pashtunistan.
That land is not on any map, but it’s where leaders of Al Qaeda and the Taliban both hide. It straddles 1,000 miles of the 1,600-mile Afghan-Pakistani border. It is inhabited by the ethnic Pashtuns, a fiercely independent people that number 12 million on the Afghan side and 27 million on the Pakistani side. They have a language (Pashto), an elaborate traditional code of legal and moral conduct (Pashtunwali), a habit of crossing the largely unmarked border at will, and a centuries-long history of foreign interventions that ended badly for the foreigners.
Whether Obama will have better luck there than Bush, the Soviet Politburo and British prime ministers back to the early 19th century remains to be seen. But it is there that the war will be fought, because it is there that the Taliban were spawned and where they now regroup, attack and find shelter, for themselves and their Qaeda guests.

Today, the enemies of the United States are nearly all in Pashtunistan, an aspirational name coined long ago by advocates of an independent Pashtun homeland. From bases in the Pakistani part of it — the Federally Administered Tribal Areas toward the north and Baluchistan province in the south — Afghan Taliban leaders, who are Pashtuns, have plotted attacks against Afghanistan. It is also from the Pakistani side of Pashtunistan that Qaeda militants have plotted terrorism against the West.

And the essential strategic problem for the Americans has been this: their enemy, so far, has been able to draw advantage from the border between the two nation-states by ignoring it, and the Americans have so far been hindered because they must respect it.

That is because Pakistan and Afghanistan care deeply about their sovereign rights on either side of the line, but the Pashtuns themselves have never paid the boundary much regard since it was drawn by a British diplomat, Mortimer Durand, in 1893.
And that has enormously complicated the war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The Taliban can plan an attack from Pakistan and execute it in Afghanistan. Their fighters — or Al Qaeda’s leaders — can slip across the border to flee, or to rejoin the battle. At the same time, the Americans can fight openly only in Afghanistan, not in Pakistan, and the Taliban know it.

That has been changing all year, however, and it is about to change even more, as the Americans gear up for an intensified war on both sides of the line simultaneously. The dispatch of 30,000 additional Americans to the Afghan side of the border will occur simultaneously with more intensive missile strikes from drone aircraft and Pakistani army offensives on the other side.

Ever since Osama bin Laden escaped American forces in December 2001, crossing the mountains of Tora Bora from Afghanistan into Pakistan, American strategists have spoken of a “hammer and anvil” strategy to crush the militants. Until now, the border has proven so porous, and Pakistani governments so squeamish about a fight, that the American hammer in Afghanistan was pounding Taliban fighters there against a Pakistani pillow, not an anvil.

Now, Obama’s added troops are likely to be concentrated in the Taliban stronghold in Helmand and Kandahar in southern Afghanistan, and near Khost in the east. At the same time, the president has approved a major intensification of drone strikes in Pakistan, even as the Pakistani army continues a campaign against the militants launched this fall in South Waziristan, following on a counterattack that swept militants last spring from the Swat Valley.

For years, in fact, Pakistani intelligence has played a double game with Islamist extremists, nurturing them as a force to use against Pakistan’s archrival India in the disputed territory of Kashmir and helping create the Taliban as a buffer against Indian influence in Afghanistan.

But as the mujahedeen who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s later turned on their American benefactors, so some militants in Pakistan have begun attacking the state that once encouraged them. Many in the Pakistani elite were stunned by the emergence in 2007 of the Pakistani Taliban and by the subsequent campaign of terrorist attacks against Pakistan’s power structure, including the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, suicide bombings in cities and an attack on the army headquarters in Rawalpindi in October.

These slaughters has changed the attitude of many Pakistanis, including government officials, about the wisdom of tolerating radical groups. And since last year, Pakistan has offered quiet but crucial support for the C.I.A.’s use of missile-firing drones, including intelligence on militants’ whereabouts.
Still, Pakistan is deeply divided, conditioned for decades to focus its security concerns on India. Popular opinion runs strongly against the United States. And Obama administration officials say they have not yet won Islamabad’s support for major elements of the new war strategy.

Most significantly, Pakistan has yet to agree to go after the leaders of the Afghan Taliban, or to permit American drones to hunt them in the province of Baluchistan, across the border from their former Afghani base in Kandahar. Mullah Muhammad Omar, the cleric to whom even Mr. bin Laden has pledged fealty, operates now from near the Pakistani city of Quetta, as he helps oversee the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan.

And history offers unnerving precedent for the Americans. In Waziristan, the patch of Pakistan where the Central Intelligence Agency now kills militants with missiles fired from drones, the British conducted what may have been history’s first counterinsurgency air campaign, bombing from biplanes between 1919 and 1925.

In the shifting American policies We see an echo of the British experience; the British found themselves caught for decades in a cycle of rebellion, brutal suppression, payoffs for tribal leaders, and then a period of peace followed by a new rebellion.

Given the realistic time limits to American involvement,the best possible outcome may be modest- to force the Taliban to come to terms and allow the U.S. an exit.
But even the prospect of an exit has hazards for the United States. The long Pashtun experience with war has taught them to favor those who look like winners, which is why the Taliban’s successes in the last few years have lured fighters to their side.

In other words, the fate of Obama’s surge depends a lot on the hearts and minds of the Pashtuns — and who seems a winner.

A Taliban victory could give Al Qaeda not just a physical haven but a philosophical victory with profound consequences. The lesson of the Taliban’s revival for Al Qaeda is that time and will are on their side, that with a Western defeat they could regain their strength and achieve a major strategic victory. Rolling back the Taliban is now necessary, even if not sufficient, to the ultimate defeat of Al Qaeda.

Nuclear Energy Commerce - No effect of economic recession

2009-12-05T04:30:00.000-08:00

At the beginning of 2008, the nuclear power industry's euphoria over the much-hyped "nuclear renaissance" was in full swing. But as that year drew to a close, the hopes for a revival seemed delayed, if not derailed, due to faltering world economies. Little has changed this year to alter that prospect. As the global financial crisis has continued, demand for energy has plummeted along with the world's stock markets. Such news may help calm international security experts, who fear that a proliferation of nuclear energy know-how could lead to nuclear weapons proliferation. Yet in the current economic environment dangers persist and there are still plenty of reasons to worry.

Nuclear distrust. Even if the majority of new nuclear plans never come to fruition, mere high-level discussion of the nuclear energy option can lead neighboring states to develop nuclear technologies themselves. The links between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons create strong incentives for states to respond to any nascent nuclear weapons capability in a rival by preparing against that eventuality. The rival may merely be interested in nuclear power--but it might also be acquiring a weapons capability. Whether a single centrifuge ever spins or a single kilowatt is generated, the lurking fear of the dual-use option will lead to regional mistrust.

It already has.

The Middle East is a prime example. Iran, with each revelation about the extent of its ostensibly peaceful nuclear program, has given its neighbors more reasons to acquire their own dual-use capabilities. For instance, Egypt has announced plans to build a reactor at El-Dabaa on the Mediterranean. Similarly, the Gulf Cooperation Council (consisting of the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait) decided in 2006 that its members would cooperate on civil nuclear power with the first joint plant to be announced next year. Additionally, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates each have signed agreements to cooperate with the United States on nuclear energy. Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco also have shown interest in nuclear power—all after Iran's program came to light.

Aware of the growing concerns in the Persian Gulf, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton hinted earlier this year that Washington would be willing to offer security guarantees to help reassure its regional allies (e.g., upgrading allies' defenses and extending the U.S. nuclear umbrella). Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, however, brushed off this suggestion pointing out that such an agreement would necessitate foreign troops in Egypt and implicitly accept Iran as a regional nuclear power.

South Asia's nuclear arms race is a case in point of what could happen in the Middle East. In 1974, India tested its "peaceful" nuclear device in the Rajasthan desert (manufactured partly by diverting technology and material from its civilian nuclear program). Prime Minister Indira Gandhi contacted her Pakistani counterpart Z. A. Bhutto, dismissing fears that the move had destabilized regional security. She wrote that the energy crisis, especially acute at that time, made it vital to exploit the potential of nuclear energy, which she described as a "ray of hope for mankind." Bhutto, however, had already begun a Pakistani military nuclear program, and the Indian detonation only added impetus to Islamabad's quest for the bomb. The race for a Pakistani nuclear weapon in the decades that followed allowed A. Q. Khan to create his nefarious proliferation network that sold nuclear secrets to North Korea and Iran.

New Delhi's leadership long claimed that its nuclear program was part of its economic development efforts. (Tehran has echoed such claims.) This rationale, along with Cold War considerations, enabled New Delhi to successfully cajole donor countries that were worried about the diversion of civilian technology to military aims. Linking the country's nuclear program to development also allowed New Delhi's nuclear energy establishment to build domestic support and harness the combined strength of the country's democratic institutions, nationalism, and hopes for upward mobility.

Today India continues to use such arguments to defend its nuclear program, even as it has emerged as a major world economy. The U.S.-India agreement on civil nuclear cooperation--which is widely seen as tacit U.S. acceptance of India's nuclear arsenal--was promoted by New Delhi as a recognition of the country's technological sophistication and a way to ensure its future energy supplies and sustain its economic growth rate.

Blasts from the past. Beyond the security threats posed by individual countries seeking dual-use nuclear technologies, the international nonproliferation system itself has proven weak at stopping proliferation--specifically the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

When the NPT and the IAEA were created, they weren't given the full powers they needed to do their jobs effectively. In the decades after World War II, countries viewed nuclear power as an incredibly positive discovery, which was why developing countries fought to retain the right to nurture it indigenously. It was believed at the time that nuclear fission offered these countries the potential for a revolutionary leap into the future, enabling them to skip several stages of development. Thus developing nations fought long and hard to secure the inclusion of Article IV in the NPT, allowing the development of nuclear energy for specifically peaceful purposes.

And so, the pillars of the nonproliferation regime were founded with a divided mandate--both to control the spread of nuclear weapons through safeguards and verification regimes and to encourage the peaceful development of nuclear energy and science. The IAEA's founding statute vows that it "shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health, and prosperity throughout the world." At the same time, the agency was intended to verify that there would be no "diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." Yet such a distinction is difficult to make since knowledge of nuclear technology can be used both for good and for ill.

At the same time, certain non-nuclear weapon states wanted to guarantee that the agreement wouldn't deny them the potential to build a viable nuclear deterrent if it was some day required. Accordingly, the NPT doesn't restrict the size of civilian fissile material stockpiles. The treaty also has an exit provision that is relatively simple--a state can withdraw with 90 days notice if it judges that continued compliance would harm its "supreme interests." These flawed institutions and their mandates continue to stymie effective international nonproliferation efforts today.

Many have recognized the faults in the existing nonproliferation regime, and as such solutions have been proposed. Technical answers include so-called proliferation-resistant reactors. Other solutions involve institutional fixes, with different strategies for parceling out the various processes of the nuclear fuel cycle so that no one country can control or divert fissile material. These proposals PDF include arrangements for guaranteeing nuclear fuel supplies, international fuel banks, and multilateral control of reactors. While some nations are willing to accept such arrangements, others have balked.

A safer nuclear revival. If the international community truly hopes for a safe nuclear revival responses must go deeper. First, the international community must spare some time from tackling full-blown proliferation crises in Iran and North Korea to work with states like Egypt that are just starting civilian nuclear programs. To help build and sustain a coalition interested in keeping the application of nuclear energy strictly peaceful, the international community should:

Invite diplomats and scientists from nuclear aspirant countries to international forums and appeal to their professional and national interests by offering genuine technology transfers. The nuclear industry has a role to play here as well, once it recognizes that proliferation in one state or region will ruin its business prospects elsewhere.
Reduce the prestige associated with nuclear technology. Iran's pursuit of nuclear technology has been motivated by a desire to raise its regional and international profile as much as it has been about providing energy and, potentially, weapons.
Candid and objective discussion about the reality and feasibility of nuclear power plants (e.g., whether national electricity grids can accommodate them, whether a sophisticated and trained workforce exists to build and operate them, and whether countries can handle the long time frames that nuclear power entails from construction to eventual decommissioning) would help sort those that are genuinely interested in pursuing nuclear energy from those that are simply interested in raising their prestige and/or developing weapons.
A genuine commitment from the dominant nuclear powers to the security concerns and requirements of weaker states. This would involve admitting that such states have genuine security needs, and viewing their nuclear choices not in isolation, but as responses to regional and global decisions. In the Middle East, for example, it would be a mistake to evaluate each attempt at nuclear development individually. Egypt seeks to frame the problem in terms of the denuclearization of the entire Middle East, thus drawing attention to both Israel and Iran, which is the focus of global attention.
The nuclear weapon states should seriously rethink the wisdom of signing bilateral nuclear energy deals with supposedly "safe" allies in light of the persistent security challenges that nuclear technology poses and the ramifications of its development.
Scholars and policy makers worry about the threat of nuclear fuel or facilities diverted to military uses by governments (or worse, by a terrorist group), however, the strategic consequences of mere high-level discussion of the nuclear energy option can threaten regional and eventually global security as well and should not be ignored.

Would Britain and US let Africa be Nuclear-weapon-free?

2009-12-05T03:00:00.000-08:00

On July 15, the Pelindaba Treaty, which established Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, finally entered into force. The treaty is the latest regional agreement to ban nuclear weapons in its area of application.

The Pelindaba Treaty--named for the former South African nuclear weapons facility near Pretoria--requires each party "to prohibit in its territory the stationing of any nuclear explosive devices," while allowing parties to authorize visits or transits by foreign nuclear-armed ships or aircraft. It also prohibits nuclear weapon tests and radioactive waste dumping. Two supplementary protocols to the treaty provide for non-African nuclear powers to agree that they won't "contribute to any act which constitutes a violation of this treaty or protocol." The United States co-signed the treaty's protocols under the Clinton administration in 1996, but after a heated political debate, Washington didn't submit them to the Senate for ratification. China, France, and Britain have ratified them, however,
ostensibly supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency's enthusiastic claim that the treaty made the "entire Southern hemisphere free of nuclear weapons."

Underneath this international support for an African nuclear-weapon-free zone, however, is a low-profile but high-stakes dispute over the status of the Chagos Archipelago, which includes Diego Garcia. This coral atoll in the British Indian Ocean Territory happens to be the site of one of the most valuable (and secretive) U.S. military bases overseas. Both Britain and Mauritius claim sovereignty over the archipelago.

According to the map appended to the Pelindaba Treaty, the nuclear-weapon-free zone explicitly covers the "Chagos Archipelago--Diego Garcia," with a footnote (inserted at the British government's request) stating that the territory "appears without prejudice to the question of sovereignty." Although all of the participating African countries agreed that the Chagos Islands should be included in the treaty parameters, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) did not, stating that it had no doubt as to its sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory, and upon signing the protocols noted that it did "not accept the inclusion of [the Chagos Islands] within the African nuclear-weapon-free zone" without consent of the British government.

While Russia refused to sign the Pelindaba protocols because of the ambiguity created by that unilateral statement, Britain's interpretation of the footnote was supported by the United States and France, with a representative of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency explaining that it was adequate to "protect U.S. interests because any resolution of the [sovereignty] issue will occur outside the framework of the treaty."

But what are the U.S. interests and what exactly does this sovereignty debate have to do with Africa's nuclear-weapon-free zone? In the last 40 or so years, thanks to a series of U.S.-British bilateral agreements (some of them secret), the expulsion of the atoll's indigenous population between 1967 and 1973, and a $2.5 billion U.S. military construction program, Diego Garcia has developed into a robust naval support facility, satellite tracking station, and bomber forward-operating location. It played a central role in all offensive combat missions against Iraq and Afghanistan from 1991 to 2006 and was used as a staging area for 20 B-52 bombers prominently deployed as a "calculated-ambiguous" tactical nuclear deterrent against any possible chemical or biological weapons used by Iraq against U.S. forces. The Diego Garcia internal lagoon--a gigantic natural harbor, measuring 48 square miles and dredged to a depth of 40 feet as a turning basin for aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines--is currently being upgraded to accommodate the U.S. Navy's new nuclear-powered, guided missile attack submarines. Considering the base's strategic location, current U.S. needs in the Middle East and Central Asia, and what is known about past uses of the base, it would be irresponsible to rule out the potential for nuclear weapons at Diego Garcia.

That the United States found the Pelindaba footnote to be adequate protection against the "bite" of the treaty protocols may have been overly confident. Now that the treaty has entered into force, Mauritius and Britain are legally bound by its provisions--though the British FCO would vehemently disagree, citing the footnote as disclaimer. A recent editorial in the Mauritius Times called on the government to broaden its ongoing bilateral negotiations (which will resume in London in October) with the FCO on the Chagos Archipelago to include U.S. authorities (pointedly referring to President Barack Obama's Prague speech), with a view toward making Diego Garcia nuclear-weapon-free. Until that time, in the eyes of Mauritius and the other African signatories to the Pelindaba Treaty, Mauritius will not be able to meet its treaty obligations.

One key to these talks may be the precedent of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which also contains a disclaimer for sovereignty issues. Thus far, nobody has interpreted this disclaimer as excluding the British Antarctic Territory from the geographic scope of that treaty. As such, Britain may be forced to confront some inconvenient internal contradictions lurking in the wake of the Pelindaba Treaty. To the embarrassment of the FCO, the Diego Garcia base also has been confirmed by the CIA as a destination or transit point for several "extraordinary rendition flights" for suspected terrorists--branding the island as yet another "legal black hole" à la Guantánamo Bay, where neither the British Human Rights Act nor Britain's ratifications of the Geneva Conventions, the U.N. Human Rights Covenants, or the U.N. Convention against Torture apply.

The Pelindaba Treaty should mark the beginning of a momentous new era in Africa, including regional cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology through a new African Commission on Nuclear Energy. But there is the possibility that the Diego Garcia footnote could stand in the way of progress. If Britain, the United States, and Mauritius cannot resolve this debate, then the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty hasn't truly made Africa free from nuclear weapons after all.

Obama and India

2009-11-27T05:21:00.000-08:00

It was fitting that the first state visit to be received by the Obama administration, with a formal dinner held Tuesday, would be that of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Relations between the United States and India are of critical and increasing importance to both nations.

India is the world's second most populous country, a rising economic power and a functioning and stable democracy. It is also perfectly positioned - geographically, economically and politically - to be of help with a number of issues important to the United States. While hardly identical, U.S. and Indian interests intersect in ways that, for now at least, make the two nations natural allies.

The longstanding animosity between India and Pakistan is a festering problem that from time to time threatens to erupt into full-scale war. Given that both have nuclear weapons, this has the potential for disaster.

But the tension between those two nations also means India has an even greater interest than the United States in keeping the Taliban or al-Qaida from gaining more power in Pakistan, and in working toward stability in Afghanistan. In that Pakistan's leadership apparently sees continued unrest in Afghan-istan as in its interest, India has all the more reason to back U.S. efforts to stabilize that country. India is already one of Afghanistan's biggest donors.

Plus, so long as Pakistani leaders are wary of India, they are deterred from making too many demands of the United States, such as more vehemently insisting on an end to U.S. drone strikes that have proven so effective in killing al-Qaida leaders.
India is also the only country in Asia with the political will and the economic heft to serve as something of a counterbalance to China. It is already a major U.S. trading partner - to the tune of $61 billion in 2007 - and is rapidly emerging as a global leader in technology.

And in an important subtext, the visit also marked the furtherance of a civilian nuclear agreement between India and the United States, entered into by then-President George W. Bush. That treaty ended India's nuclear isolation - a policy enacted in response to its testing of a nuclear device in 1973 - and could allow it to set up a regional center for reprocessing spent fuel from nuclear power plants. Again, the alternative would appear to be China, a country the United States considers guilty of helping to spread nuclear weapons technology.

At the televised press conference, Obama referred to the United States and India as “nuclear powers," phrasing that signaled both recognition of that reality and U.S. acceptance of it. Obama wants India's help in a nuclear security summit he reportedly wants to hold next spring in Washington.

“As nuclear powers," the president said, “we can be full partners in preventing the spread of the world's most deadly weapons, securing loose nuclear material from terrorists, in pursuing our shared vision of a world without nuclear weapons."
India is home to one of the world's greatest and most ancient civilizations, as well as the birthplace of several of humanity's most influential religions. The clear message of this meeting is that India is now also recognized as one of the world's great powers.
There is every reason to hope that common issues and values will also allow India to be this nation's great friend.

India and the CTBT: The debate in New Delhi

2009-11-18T16:30:00.000-08:00
An article by By A. VINOD KUMAR in Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in Nov 2009

President Barack Obama's decision to revive the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has triggered a flurry of discussions in New Delhi, where individuals in the strategic and scientific communities are now vigorously debating India's options. One notable outcome of the debate so far is the realization that India's approach to the CTBT today will be radically different from its approach in 1996, when New Delhi was unanimously opposed to the treaty (and was not yet a de facto nuclear weapon state). This time around, India is divided over the feasibility of joining a test ban when the credibility of its minimum deterrent is still in question and when acceding to the CTBT might mean appearing to abandon its stance on a deadline-linked disarmament process.

From the very start of the nuclear age, India was a vociferous proponent of a nuclear test ban. To wit, in 1954, India initiated a global call at the U.N. Disarmament Commission for an end to nuclear testing and a freeze on fissile material production. Likewise, in 1978 and 1982 at the Special Sessions on Disarmament, India proposed measures for banning nuclear testing, and in 1988, it introduced the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. These proposals were shaped by the belief that banning nuclear testing would be an irreversible step toward the elimination of all nuclear weapons within a specific time frame. However, after co-sponsoring a resolution for a test ban treaty in November 1993, India reversed course and tried to block the treaty text that was negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament. This stance was actually ideologically consistent, since India felt that the treaty was flawed because it wasn't linked to a time-bound disarmament plan.

Another crux of India's argument against the CTBT was the perilous security environment in South Asia, in which India had limited options as a non-nuclear weapon state to deal with the lurking challenges from China's nuclear arsenal and Pakistan's nascent weapons program. By signing the CTBT, India would have foregone the right to test nuclear devices, yet its primary nuclear-armed adversary, China, would be able to retain its nuclear weapons under the treaty and could even upgrade them through subcritical experiments. Pointing to this disparity, an Indian representative told the U.N. General Assembly in September 1995: "[We note that] nuclear weapon states have agreed to a CTBT only after acquiring the know-how to develop and refine their arsenals without the need for tests. . . . Developing new warheads or refining existing ones after [the] CTBT is in place, using innovative technologies, would be . . . contrary to the spirit of [the] CTBT." Later, New Delhi demanded a "complete cessation of nuclear tests in all environments and for all time" and "a binding commitment . . . within an agreed time frame, toward the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free world."

Specifically, New Delhi felt that the CTBT was inadequate in terms of securing disarmament commitments from the nuclear weapon states under declared deadlines. It saw this as a discriminatory replication of the imbalance inherent in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, in which nuclear weapon states are weakly obligated to disarm and non-nuclear weapon states are strongly obligated to remain non-nuclear. The lack of commitments by the nuclear weapon states to eliminate their nuclear weapons under a declared time frame also compelled India to oppose Article XIV of the NPT, which stipulates the CTBT's entry into force after 44 "Annex 2" countries sign and ratify it.

Clearly, much has changed since then. India's 1998 nuclear tests, growing nuclear arsenal, and partial integration into the nonproliferation regime via the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver that was part of the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear deal--along with the Obama administration's moves to revive the treaty--have caused New Delhi to reconsider its approach to the CTBT. Although opposition to the treaty remains, several domestic justifications for a nuclear test ban have emerged. For example: In addition to the pressure likely to be placed on India to join the ban if the United States and China ratify the treaty, there is also apprehension in New Delhi that prospective supplier states will stipulate India's commitment to a test ban as a precondition for nuclear trade. Such concerns are underscored by the fact that many NSG members, while granting the India-specific waiver, wanted India to convert its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing into a legal pledge by signing the CTBT.

Many in India do continue to cite the lack of sufficient disarmament commitments as central to their opposition to the CTBT, but today this argument is weaker--especially because India is now a de facto nuclear weapon state. The shift from being a nuclear "have-not" to a nuclear "have" dramatically altered the Indian perspective on the CTBT. Consequently, it will no longer be tenable for India to hold on to the old argument of discrimination against have-nots. Instead, like other nuclear weapon states, India will have to ensure that the CTBT (and any other nonproliferation mechanism) will not impinge on its strategic weapons program. In other words, India's status as a de facto nuclear weapon state now places it in the same mode of thinking that the NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states held during CTBT negotiations in the mid-1990s.

Test ban opponents in India defend this position by arguing that its strategic program needs to be safeguarded until a credible disarmament process begins. On a sublime note, some in India will contend that the CTBT remains improvident until the nuclear weapon states commit to a time-bound disarmament framework. Yet to get the ball rolling on eliminating nuclear weapons, India passes the responsibility to the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council (the five nuclear weapon states recognized under the NPT). India has few justifications for its disinclination to propose any initiatives for a phased, definitive disarmament process--although a reasonable rebuttal would be its June 1996 statement to the Conference on Disarmament: "Countries around us continue their weapon programs. . . . India cannot accept any restraints on its capability if other countries remain unwilling to accept the obligation to eliminate their nuclear weapons."

Such arguments notwithstanding, the strongest hindrance to Indian support for the CTBT today revolves around two questions that have perplexed Indians over the past decade. First, does India really have a credible minimum deterrent that would allow it to continue to abstain from further tests? And second, is India's nuclear establishment capable of improving its existing arsenal without the aid of nuclear testing? Though the public is assured that a credible minimum deterrent does exist, some analysts passionately contend that India's purported deterrent has not yet matured to that point in terms of number or yield. India's arsenal, they argue, must be improved--especially its thermonuclear devices--via further testing, and hence, a global test ban cannot be joined. Similarly, an influential third party in the scientific and strategic communities assumes that full-scale nuclear testing will be needed for future weapon designs and argues for keeping the testing option open. That Chinese military modernization is in full swing empowers this faction to obstruct progress toward an Indian test-ban commitment.

During the debate in New Delhi over the U.S.-India nuclear deal, worries about India's freedom to conduct future nuclear tests and potential complications in nuclear commerce were prominent. To soothe these fears, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's government assured the Indian Parliament that the nuclear deal wouldn't preclude India's ability to undertake nuclear tests. Singh reportedly also assured a group of disgruntled nuclear scientists that the strategic nuclear program was safe and promised to secure the wherewithal for its future augmentations.

Such promises have hampered the scope for positive political action in India on the CTBT; the government now will have a tough job convincing parliament of the prudence of signing the treaty. Even a mere political call to abdicate the right to future testing will happen only after the nuclear scientific establishment, as well as the national security establishment, certifies the credibility of the existing arsenal, and the former verifies that the nuclear complex is capable of subcritical testing and simulation-based improvisations. Getting the nuclear establishment's support for the CTBT, however, may not be difficult, considering that by endorsing the CTBT it is basically confirming its capability to refine the arsenal without full-scale nuclear testing and its confidence in the Indian minimum deterrent. Further, a forceful political push could neutralize the naysayers even within the establishment.

A greater political challenge could be how to justify stepping away from New Delhi's past history of disarmament advocacy, because India's accession to the CTBT in its present form could imply an abandonment of its disarmament ideals or even contradict its own disarmament activism at previous CTBT negotiations. As a result, it will be difficult for New Delhi to support the CTBT unless the treaty adopts structural changes with new, clear linkages to a time-bound disarmament process.

Any Indian decision ultimately will be influenced by the ratification process in the U.S. Congress. Many in India profoundly believe that some in the U.S. military and Republican Party might resist and stall the ratification process. The reported proposal to reinstate the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program is seen as an illustration of the U.S. military's mindset on nuclear weapons. There is a dominant feeling among New Delhi's strategic analysts that the U.S. military will use the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review to push for the modernization of its nuclear forces, an effort that could have implications for the CTBT ratification process.

However, if Congress manages to resist such pressures and ratifies the CTBT, it could trigger a domino effect among other non-signatories. India would then be left with few options but to truly reconsider its official stance regarding the CTBT.

After Kim Jong-il ?

2009-11-18T16:20:00.000-08:00
On June 1, members of the South Korean National Assembly's Intelligence Committee received some clarity about who would replace Kim Jong-il as North Korea's leader. A high official in Seoul's National Intelligence Service informed them that Kim had designated his 26-year-old third son, Kim Jong-un, as his successor. According to the National Intelligence Service, Kim Jong-il had ordered the North's military, politicians, and officials in overseas missions to swear allegiance to Kim Jong-un after Pyongyang's May nuclear test. This succession plan wasn't entirely surprising. In his 2003 memoir, Kenji Fujimoto, the Kim family's longtime chef, predicted that Kim Jong-un would replace his father, explaining that he was Kim Jong-il's favorite. According to Kim Jong-il's Chef, Kim Jong-nam, the eldest son, lost his father's confidence after being deported from Japan for using a false passport in May 2001, and Kim Jong-chol, the second son, was seen too weak to lead.

A few months earlier, Kim Jong-il supposedly had appointed Kim Jong-un as inspector of the country's prominent National Defense Commission, which supervises Pyongyang's national defense and which Kim Jong-il chairs. The inspector is a low-level position, but Kim Jong-un's position is expected to soar--much as his father's did in the 1960s and the 1970s. (Kim Jong-il was named inspector of the Workers' Party in 1964, and eventually, he was appointed to its second highest position.) To further bolster his son's standing, prominent Kim family members were named to the commission at about the same time. Specifically, Jang Song-taek, Kim Jong-il's brother-in-law and a department director of the Workers' Party, became a member of the commission and appears to be Kim Jong-un's patron, and O Kuk-ryol, another department director of the Workers' Party, became the commission's vice chairman.

To say the least, Pyongyang has a unique political culture that's hard to understand by any outside standard. It is a pre-modern dynastic state founded in 1948 by Kim Jung-il's father, Kim Il-sung, who ruled the country for the next 46 years. As a result, most of its prominent political and military appointments are intertwined and based on family networks. For instance, Kim Kyung-hee, Kim Jong-il's younger sister, controls the country's Department of Light-Industry, which directs ministries in the cabinet related to the production of smaller industrial goods; her husband, Jang Song-taek, oversees an important department in the Workers' Party; and Kim Pyong-il, Kim Jong-il's half brother is ambassador to Poland. Meanwhile, Choe Ryong-hae, the chief secretary of the Workers' Party North Hwanghae Provincial Committee, is the son of a former minister of the North Korean Armed Forces; and Hong Sok-hyong, the chief secretary of the Workers' Party North Hamgyong Provincial Committee, is the son of a former vice prime minister.

Such familial networks extend across the North Korean government and help explain its recent provocative behavior--such as its April rocket launch, May nuclear test, and June threat to enrich uranium.

The country's elites constantly worry about the security of their positions if a successor were to arise from outside the Kim family. At the moment, their fears are particularly acute because Kim Jong-un's position isn't secure. His ascension to power has been rather quick, leaving little time to consolidate support, unlike Kim Jong-il who spent decades following a detailed succession plan outlined by his father. (Kim Jong-il's succession had three stages--first, in 1974, an informal decision was made that he would succeed his father; second, in 1980, he became a standing member of the Workers' Party Political Bureau; and finally, in 1993, he took his father's place as chairman of the National Defense Commission.) To ensure a smooth transition, the North's elite is willing to do whatever it takes to strengthen Kim Jong-un in the eyes of those in the country's government and military who aren't blood relatives. The result is a deliberately tense atmosphere intended to strengthen internal solidarity and bolster the succession. This tension will remain until Kim Jong-un is accepted by the military, Workers' Party, and cabinet.

In this way, it's not unlike the final moments of Kim Jong-il's ascension to power, where confrontation with the outside world was used to forge favorable conditions for domestic political change. In April 1993, a month before Kim Jong-il succeeded his father as National Defense Commission chairman, North Korea proclaimed a "state of semi-war" after disputes with the International Atomic Energy Agency and Washington concerning special inspections of its suspected nuclear sites. Two weeks later, the North declared it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The importance of the North's nuclear weapons.

If the North cannot secure long-term regime stability by manufacturing external strife to engender internal solidarity, it will do so by continuing its nuclear program. Although Pyongyang's nuclear activities date back to the 1950s, the 1994 Agreed Framework curbed its nuclear ambition with promises by the United States to provide light water reactors and by seemingly offering a path toward normalized U.S.-North Korean relations. But once George W. Bush took office and preemption became an official U.S. policy, the North renewed its push for nuclear weapons. And while U.S.-North Korean relations seemed to warm late in the Bush administration's tenure, in the summer of 2008 any and all perceived political gains disappeared when Pyongyang met its Six-Party Talks obligations and demolished the cooling tower at its Yongbyon nuclear site but the Bush team demanded still more concessions before it would fulfill its own obligations.

A few days later, Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke, and the regime's interest in nuclear weapons intensified. Now regime survival was the primary issue. In particular, the North's second nuclear test in May was interpreted by experts in South Korea as a sign that Pyongyang was determined to keep its nuclear capability unless it received a guarantee that the regime's future was secure. Moreover, after the U.N. Security Council issued a resolution condemning the nuclear test and expanding sanctions against the regime, Pyongyang vowed that it would never give up its nuclear program. Although the North's nuclear ambitions originally stemmed from external threats--e.g., the United States--it now has two additional functions: (1) to strengthen the regime's control over its people; and (2) to be used as a bargaining chip for continued international aid.

Ultimately, Pyongyang wants to be treated like Pakistan and India, both of whom possess nuclear weapons outside of the framework of the NPT while still maintaining normal relations with Washington. Pakistan, for instance, receives billions of dollars in U.S. aid despite its nuclear arsenal, and India's economic ties with the United States only grow stronger even as New Delhi remains firmly opposed to joining the nonproliferation regime in any formal sense. Last year, Washington even agreed to lift its 30-year moratorium on nuclear trade with India, allowing it to assist with New Delhi's civilian nuclear energy program. North Korea wants similar accommodations.

Whether or not it receives such a deal, history indicates that some sort of negotiations will restart eventually. In 1998, the North began talking with Washington about a missile moratorium even though it had just recently launched a long-range missile. Pyongyang also came back to the Six-Party Talks after another long-range missile launch in July 2006 and a nuclear test that October. The real difference today is the transition in leadership to Kim Jong-un. Because the 26-year-old isn't established domestically yet, he is probably more apt to rely on the military's support and back policies that it favors. To truly become a viable leader, though, he should focus on developing the country's economy, which is in shambles. Obviously, reengaging with the United States and South Korea would help achieve this end. (It's worth noting that unlike his father, Kim Jong-un was educated abroad, and therefore, he might be more open to negotiating with the international community.)

At the moment, the North appears interested in talking to Washington. In August, an official from Pyongyang's mission to the United Nations visited New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson to convey that the North wanted bilateral talks with Washington. This could be interpreted as evidence that Kim Jong-un has established himself in the domestic power structure.

How China and Russia fit in.

Beijing has been reluctant to comment on the North's leadership transition, hoping it can be accomplished without incident. This might explain why it strongly denied that Kim Jong-un had visited China in June, describing such reports as "a story like a 007 novel." Kim Jong-un's closest aide did visit China recently, however. It's likely that he was tasked with informing Beijing about the leadership change, as his visit coincided with Kim Jong-il's order for overseas North Korean officials to swear their allegiance to his son. Eventually, North Korea also will need Russia's help to facilitate Kim Jong-un's ascension.

Until now, Beijing and Moscow have tried to implement a balanced policy toward Pyongyang. But if the North remains reluctant to rejoin the Six-Party Talks or to take part in a meaningful dialogue with the United States, Chinese and Russian support will weaken. It's doubtful that North Korea could overcome such a split with its patrons, especially China. Beijing accounted for 73 percent of Pyongyang's annual foreign trade in 2008. China also provides enormous food and energy aid to the North. After North Korea's second nuclear test, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that Beijing was "resolutely opposed" to the test and demanded an end to any activity that might worsen the situation. Beijing is concerned that North Korea's aggression could cause Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea to develop either nuclear weapons of their own or elaborate missile defense programs--with the help of the United States, something that makes China particularly uncomfortable. In the meantime, Beijing is worried about the potential in North Korea for domestic tumult and the enormous influx of refugees it could bring. This helps explain China's reluctance to impose tough sanctions on North Korea.

In the context of succession, North Korea (and Kim Jong-un specifically) will need to rely on Beijing more than ever before, as it is the only economic and diplomatic partner Kim Jong-un has in the short-term--along with Russia, of course. Plus, Chinese and Russian support will be crucial to legitimizing him both domestically and internationally.

Barack Obama weighs in.

During its first year in office, the Obama administration has carefully watched the situation in North Korea. When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited the region in February, she specifically mentioned that a crisis was possible when the leadership transfer formally took place. Likewise, at a June conference hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, a U.S. official who was quoted anonymously said that he didn't believe North Korea would return to the Six-Party Talks until succession was settled. It would appear that the U.S. administration is taking a wait-and-see approach and adjusting its diplomatic strategies accordingly.

That could be part of the reason why the Obama administration has been sending contradictory messages to the North. On the one hand, it frequently talks about how it won't reward North Korea's provocative behavior; yet on the other hand, it states that it won't abandon diplomacy. An example of this helter-skelter approach in practice: In March, Washington offered to send its special representative for North Korea policy, Stephen Bosworth, to Pyongyang to discuss the nuclear issue. But once Pyongyang accepted, the United States reversed course, insisting that the North return to the Six-Party Talks first.

Obama must face one reality, however: It will take a long time to fully complete the leadership transfer from Kim Jong-il to Kim-Jong-un because the elder Kim's health isn't critical at the moment. (Kim Jong-il met with former U.S. President Bill Clinton in August for more than three hours, and he frequently visits industrial areas throughout the North.) Therefore, the current U.S. "wait-and-see" strategy could backfire, as Washington might be waiting for a very long time to see the younger Kim take control. In the meantime, the North Korean nuclear program could reach a point of no return.

Nuclear Notebook: Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons

2009-11-18T15:53:00.000-08:00
An article by By Robert S. Norris & Hans M. Kristensen in Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in Nov 2009

As of the end of 2009, we estimate that there are approximately 23,360 nuclear weapons located at some 111 sites in 14 countries. Nearly one-half of these weapons are active or operationally deployed.

By far the largest concentrations of nuclear weapons reside in Russia and the United States, which possess 96 percent of the total global inventory (91 percent if you count only operational nuclear weapons). In addition to the seven other countries with nuclear weapon stockpiles (Britain, China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan), five non-nuclear NATO allies (Belgium, Germany,Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey) host about 200 U.S. nuclear bombs at six air bases.

The United States.

At the end of the Cold War, the United States maintained thousands of nuclear weapons outside of its borders on land and on the high seas.2 Ever since, however, Washington has significantly consolidated its arsenal—a trend that is likely to continue. For example, the single remaining nuclear weapons storage facility in Germany is in stark contrast to the estimated 75 distinct nuclear weapons storage facilities that were located there in the mid-1980s. Today, U.S. weapons are stored at a total of 21 locations in 13 states and 5 European countries.

Russia.

We estimate that Russia stores nuclear weapons permanently at 48 domestic locations, a dramatic reduction compared to the roughly 500 storage facilities it used before the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Soviet Union’s collapse and the end
of the Cold War triggered a withdrawal of Soviet nuclear weapons from forward locations in Eastern Europe, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. In all, Moscow consolidated to less than 250 sites by the mid-1990s, fewer than 100 sites by 1997, and about 90 sites by 1998.

Since then, additional consolidation has taken place because of (1) the declared completion of the movement of all nonstrategic warheads to central storage locations by 2002; (2) consolidation of warhead production at two facilities; and (3) additional strategic force reductions under the Moscow Treaty.4 (Russia provides information about the location of deployed strategic nuclear weapons accountable
under the 1991 START treaty. The locations of other categories of nuclear weapons and their warheads, however, are not disclosed.)

Many sites that once stored weapons are still maintained because a nearby base—such as bases for Tu-22M Backfire and Su-24 Fencer bombers or Il-38 anti-submarine aircraft—continues to have a nuclear strike mission. The Russian Black Sea Fleet based in Ukraine also has a nuclear capability, but the weapons probably have been withdrawn to central storage in Russia. If the fleet relocates to Novorossiysk
when the lease of the Sevastopol area expires in 2017, a nuclear weapons storage facility might be built there as well.

Russian permanent nuclear weapon storage locations fall into three main categories: operational warheads at Strategic Rocket Force, air force, and navy bases; reserve/retired warheads at national-level storage sites; and warheads at assembly/disassembly factories.

One uncertainty when counting Russian nuclear weapons storage sites is whether the number includes overall sites or individual storage facilities co-located within a site. For example, the Defense Department’s Threat Reduction Program statement in 2000 indicated that Russia had 123 nuclear weapons storage locations where it has requested security assistance, apparently counting separately fenced
areas within large national storage facilities. As a result, a large storage site with eight separately fenced areas would have been counted as eight sites instead of one.6 Using similar counting methods, the National Nuclear Security Administration recently listed 73 Russian warhead sites, including 39 navy sites, 25 Strategic Rocket Force sites (on 11 bases), and nine 12th Main Directorate sites.7 Our best estimate is 48 permanent nuclear weapons storage sites, many of which include several individually fenced storage bunkers.

Britain and France.

London and Paris have reduced the size of their arsenals and limited where their weapons are deployed. Britain only has one type of nuclear weapon, the Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), since nuclear-powered ballistic submarines located at two facilities in Scotland. Facilities that previously housed navy strike and depth bombs and air forcebombs have been closed. France has retained two types of nuclear weapons: SLBMs at a submarine base in Bretagne and air-to-surface missiles for aircraft located at three air force bases and one
naval base.

China, Pakistan, and India.

Beijing, Islamabad, and New Delhi are quantitatively and qualitatively increasing their arsenals and deploying weapons at more sites, yet the locations are difficult to pinpoint. For example, no reliable public information exists on where Pakistan or India produces its nuclear weapons. Thus, we have used commercial satellite images, expert studies, and local news reports and articles to make the assumption that nuclear weapons are likely to be at, or near, wherever nuclear-capable weapon systems are deployed.

Whereas many of the Chinese bases are known, this is not the case in Pakistan and India, where we have found no credible information that identifies permanent nuclear weapons storage locations. (Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are not believed to be fully operational under normal circumstances; India is thought to store its nuclear warheads and bombs in central storage locations rather than on bases with operational forces.) But, since all three countries are expanding their arsenals, new bases and storage sites probably are under construction.

Israel and North Korea.

Israel is a wild card because of the opacity of its nuclear weapons program. In other words, it’s difficult to know whether or not there are any changes in its nuclear arsenal. If so, they seem to be modest and probably rely on existing facilities. Either way, Israel’s nuclear weapons are not believed to be fully operational under normal circumstances. We are not aware of credible information on how North Korea
has weaponized its nuclear weapons capability, much less where those weapons are stored. We also take note that a recent U.S. Air Force intelligence report did not list any of North Korea’s ballistic missiles as nuclear-capable.

Can Tiger attack Dragon?

2009-11-18T13:42:00.000-08:00

There are scores of articles in every major newspaper and every major magazine comparing India with China on various economic progress indicators. There are even books written about Tiger of India pitted against Dragon of China. To those who base their opinions on such reports, articles and books, it looks as though India is posing a strong completion to China, when in fact every measurable economic indicator suggests that China is clearly leading India on all fronts. Moreover the gap between these two countries is only widening with each passing year. And yet, many Indian commentators continue to complacently believe that India has some edge somewhere when in fact none exists.

The tone of these reports and analysis comparing India with China suggest that India is actually inching towards China. That is not the case. In reality China is leaving behind India by a bigger margin every year. It is becoming tougher and tougher for India to catch up. In the last few years, Chinese have built the biggest dam on the planet, built the longest bridges, built the fastest cities, built their own planes, submarines, ships, magnetic trains, and even the highest railways while India continued to lay another layer of asphalt on its decrepit roads after each rainfall.
India is not even showing a promise of catching up. None of its policies suggest this. None of its initiatives give a glimmer of hope. Even the Indian industry is not thinking big. It is still content to play a small game.

Is English really India’s edge?

Indian commentators continue to tell us that all this China-leading-India comments are based in myth, because Indians have English which Chinese don’t have.
Is English really India’s edge? Only when India looks at itself as servicing the West using its BPOs then yes, English gives India the edge. However, if the competitor is bent on actually creating its own technology product industry to take on the West, does English still matter?

When was the last time a Japanese car company could not sell its cars because the makers were not good at English? When was the last time someone in Europe balked at buying a Sony Walkman because its makers couldn’t speak English? When it comes to China, how come their lack of good English not stop Huawei from becoming world #2 in telecom equipment? How come it did not stop Lenovo, Haier and ZTE from becoming leading global brands? Just to give a perspective to Indian readers – 2 telecom equipment companies of China, Huawei and ZTE put together made USD 30 Billion in 2008 while the entire IT-ITES industry of India put together made USD 58 Billion in 2008-09.

China is changing the rules of the games. It is taking on the West where the West has dominated so far, bringing the fight closer to the technology leaders, while India has conveniently told itself that it will not even play this game.
Indians are in self-denial. They foolishly believe everything Thomas Friedman tells them, and they are happy serving their European and American masters setting up BPOs, KPOs, LPOs, software services, helping them do their things in a cheap and cost-effective way, while Chinese are poised to take on these European and American masters head on. It’s as though the Chinese have completely overthrown their colonial inferiority complex.

For many years now, Indians gloated over the characterization that India is good at software services while China is good at manufacturing. This was a convenient characterization that only Indians believed because the books were written in English which only Indians could understand. Chinese blissfully unaware of what Friedman said were not constrained by this characterization and hence clearly violated all hierarchies.

Indians limited themselves to serving the West. When they looked in the mirror, they said, “I am an Indian. I am good at services. I should just stick to it”. That India is only good at software services became a cultural phenomenon with every major industry bigwig repeating it on various forums. Even Indian government fell into this trap where all incentives and subsidies were geared only to promote the software services companies. Go to a hardware park in India and compare it with a software park in India, you will recognize the step-motherly treatment meted out to the hardware companies.

India made no attempts at taking on China in manufacturing. Nor did they attempt to take on the West to go up the value chain to actually deliver technology and products. The Flat World theories told them that they can just concentrate on what they were good at, that is Software Services, KPOs, BPOs and LPOs, giving up on manufacturing forever thereby handing over the race on a silver platter to China, and giving up on technology products thereby continuing to serve the West.

China not only won the race in manufacturing and consolidated its position, it is now entering the technology product space, the domain held closely by the European, American and Japanese technology leaders. What more, it has started to beat these leaders at their own game. Huawei has recently won the contract to supply 3G equipment in Norway, the bastion of Nokia. While India made feeble attempts with C-DOT and ITI who are not even able to sell into BSNL, China has launched not one but two major telecom companies – Huawei and ZTE, that not only sells within their countries, they sell to BSNL also.

CK Prahlad in his closing comments at Nasscom Summit of February 2009 advised that Indian companies should foster more startups because they are the ones which bring vibrancy to the economy. His advice comes late, and even when it comes, it falls on deaf ears.

Infosys, TCS and Wipro, the giants of Indian software services which Thomas Friedman lauds, did not do much to sponsor or promote startups in India (barring few exceptions).

Their presence in India did not help any startup, except that many ex-employees went out and started companies on their own without any support or encouragement from these parent companies.

Meanwhile, China has launched extensive nationwide program to promote entrepreneurship in China. I was told that even a district head, equivalent to Indian District Collector, could invest up to half a million US dollars to a company that sets up shop in his district. Writing about China, a report says:
An analysis of documenting the tremendous growth of the Chinese entrepreneurial and cultural initiatives since the demise of Communist leader Mao Zedong reveals that this accounts for the Chinese economy’s double digit growth in the last couple of decades. [1]

It is clear to some countries that startups are essential for the growth in economy. Not so, thinks India. Indian has never believed in startups. They don’t think they add up to anything. The government is obsessed with giants because they look at them as employment provider – therefore the bigger the employer the better it is. Not a single major initiative has been taken in the last few years to promote startups in India. While the government boasts of loans to SMEs, when startups actually approach the banks, they feign ignorance of any such initiative.

All initiatives and decision making bodies in India are headed by people who have been good software services and therefore there is not a single policy that actually aids home grown brands, products and technologies. STPI still thinks that software is exported only as floppy, ftp or a CD. If you put that software in telecom equipment, a mobile handset, or a DVD player, then it does not recognize it as software and hence are not given the incentives. If Apple existed in India, there is not category for recognizing it. The prevailing mood is clear – you serve a foreign master you get the incentives; you try to become a master you don’t get any incentives.

Also, there are not many places a startup can raise funds in India. That’s why most startups continue to be family-owned or family-backed. First generation entrepreneurs find it impossible to raise money. The number of VC firms in India is limited while the government funds are small. Most government funds are small and therefore their mandate does not allow them to fund big ideas, while the miniscule few bigger size funds do not fund loss-making companies – which completely rules out startups.

China, on the other hand, is actively promoting startups through various forums and incentives. Though it is a communist country it hosts millions of entrepreneurs and VC firms which is aiding its economy.

China currently has over 200 million entrepreneurs and it houses 200 venture capital firms. The country accounts for 24.6% of the total entrepreneurship activities across the world, far ahead of Indian at 13.9% and the US at 14%, according to a survey by Global Entrepreneurship Monitor.

About 116 Chinese companies are listed on NASDAQ, as against 2568 US firms, Israel’s 63, and a handful from India, says the study. [1]
China is even popularizing entrepreneurship as a cultural attitude with various initiatives including TV programs.

…a Chinese reality TV show “Win in China” has received applications for entrepreneurial ventures from over 1,20,000 aspirants. Of these, 108 were chosen for prize money and working capital of $5 Million. [1]
Indians don’t know what to do. They are confused. They don’t know if they are socialist or capitalist. The reality is that they are clueless – they are neither capitalist nor socialist. China is both socialist and capitalist playing these two cards really well. The only floating hope for Indians has been their mastery of English. And the following observation should submerge that hope as well.

To give competition to India and other cost-effective English speaking countries like the Philippines, millions of Chinese students are learning English systematically. “China will become the largest English speaking geography in the world by the end of this year”, Compton added. [1]
What’s your opinion?

EU Presidency - Figurehead or Powerful Blair

2009-11-09T15:24:00.000-08:00
In the end, Tony Blair’s great European adventure seems to have been a balancing act too far. As prime minister, Mr Blair built a career on political acrobatics. He was the Labour politician who left in place great chunks of Thatcherism. As prime minister, he swore he was a true European (the “most European of Englishmen”, France’s Nicolas Sarkozy once said) even as he defended opt-outs from such policies as ending internal European Union passport controls. More than any British leader, he backed closer European defence co-operation—and then he split Europe by joining America in Iraq.

But high-wire acts hurt when they fail. And, at an EU summit in Brussels on October 29th and 30th, Mr Blair fell, watching his bid to become the first permanent president of the European Council collapse. Mr Blair needed leaders to agree that he was a sincere European, and they could not. He needed his fellow socialists to admit he was one of them, and they declined (the centre-left Austrian chancellor, Werner Faymann, said Mr Blair represented “Bush and the war in Iraq”.)

The post at issue is not “president of Europe” but a narrower job, created by the Lisbon treaty, to chair meetings of the union’s 27 national leaders, and speak for them abroad, for up to five years. It replaces a rotating system under which countries set the agenda for, and chaired, EU summits for six months.

EU jobs were not on the agenda of this summit. Mr Blair was not even in Brussels. But he dominated the corridor talk. Officially, EU leaders were waiting for final treaty ratification, which came a few days later on November 3rd, after the Czech president, Vaclav Klaus, ended a one-man campaign to resist Lisbon and signed it, paving the way for another summit to discuss top jobs. Yet even before Mr Klaus climbed down, leaders had found proxy means of debating Mr Blair.

At the October summit, socialists from Spain, Portugal, Austria and the European Parliament said their block should get the other big job created by Lisbon, that of high representative for foreign policy. Because the left controls a minority of EU governments and cannot claim both top jobs, that was code for ditching Mr Blair. Meeting socialist colleagues before the summit, Gordon Brown, the British prime minister, testily urged them to “get real” and back Mr Blair. His browbeating failed. Euro-socialists say their top candidates for high representative are David Miliband, the British foreign secretary (who may prefer to stay in national politics), and Italy’s Massimo D’Alema, a wily ex-communist who was quite a successful foreign minister.

On the right, Mr Sarkozy declined to repeat his endorsement of Mr Blair. Sphinx-like, he would say only that EU jobs rarely went to early front-runners. In late-night briefings, the French murmured that Britain’s EU opt-outs were “not an advantage” for Mr Blair. In truth, Mr Sarkozy’s chief concern is to stick close to the German chancellor, Angela Merkel. He announced proudly that France and Germany would jointly support candidates for the top jobs. Ms Merkel, a Christian Democrat, is more tribal than Mr Sarkozy. She reportedly feels the centre-right should provide the first council president, as it controls most national governments. The president should also come from a “small country”, she briefed German reporters, at least this time.

That will have big consequences for the EU and its image. Whatever people think of Mr Blair, making him president would have signalled that the EU wanted a spokesman with direct access to world leaders. Mr Blair’s apparent demise as a candidate (British officials loyally insist he still has a chance, once EU leaders ponder the unpalatable alternatives) signals the opposite. So does the rise of such alternative frontrunners as the Dutch or Luxembourgeois prime ministers, or the current darling of the corridors, Herman Van Rompuy, a clever, Haiku-writing ascetic who is prime minister of Belgium. Mr Van Rompuy, a Christian Democrat, is an Atlanticist and (a bit) less of a Euro-fanatic than previous Belgian prime ministers. He is endearingly modest: indulging in his first foreign caravan holiday this summer, he declared that at his age “you are allowed to go a bit mad”. But as prime minister, his main experience of international disputes is a Belgo-Dutch spat over the dredging of the River Scheldt.

Turning inwards, not outwards
When speaking jointly as the European Council, it turns out, EU leaders do not want to talk to the world. They want to talk to themselves. Pointing out that the new high representative will have lots of money and staff, as people in Brussels do, cannot hide this essential lack of ambition: he or she will be a peer of the world’s foreign ministers, not of its leaders.

The Blair saga also casts alarming light on Britain’s Conservative Party. Their foreign affairs chief, William Hague, told EU ambassadors in London that making Mr Blair president would be a “hostile” act. David Cameron, the Tory leader, called for a modest “chairmanic” head of the European Council. The Tories offered two arguments: that voters were denied a referendum on Lisbon so Mr Blair had no right to the job, and that Mr Blair would make the post too big a deal.

Britain was, indeed, denied a Lisbon referendum. But it is hard to see how Tory interests are advanced by helping a Belgian federalist into a top EU job. An even bigger Tory mistake is the belief that a modest president will mean a modest Europe. It will not. It means, rather, that the bit of the EU machine that directly represents national governments will have a weaker voice, to the advantage of the more federalist institutions: the European Commission and the European Parliament.

Europe is about balancing interests. Mr Blair knew that—just a little too well for his own, or Europe’s, good.

DEFENDING THE NUKE ARSENAL

2009-11-09T14:57:00.000-08:00
An article by Pulitzer Prize Winner Seymour M. Hersh in The New Yorker on 9th Nov 2009

"In the tumultuous days leading up to the Pakistan Army’s ground offensive in the tribal area of South Waziristan, which began on October 17th, the Pakistani Taliban attacked what should have been some of the country’s best-guarded targets. In the most brazen strike, ten gunmen penetrated the Army’s main headquarters, in Rawalpindi, instigating a twenty-two-hour standoff that left twenty-three dead and the military thoroughly embarrassed. The terrorists had been dressed in Army uniforms. There were also attacks on police installations in Peshawar and Lahore, and, once the offensive began, an Army general was shot dead by gunmen on motorcycles on the streets of Islamabad, the capital. The assassins clearly had advance knowledge of the general’s route, indicating that they had contacts and allies inside the security forces.

Pakistan has been a nuclear power for two decades, and has an estimated eighty to a hundred warheads, scattered in facilities around the country. The success of the latest attacks raised an obvious question: Are the bombs safe? Asked this question the day after the Rawalpindi raid, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, “We have confidence in the Pakistani government and the military’s control over nuclear weapons.” Clinton—whose own visit to Pakistan, two weeks later, would be disrupted by more terrorist bombs—added that, despite the attacks by the Taliban, “we see no evidence that they are going to take over the state.”

Clinton’s words sounded reassuring, and several current and former officials also said in interviews that the Pakistan Army was in full control of the nuclear arsenal. But the Taliban overrunning Islamabad is not the only, or even the greatest, concern. The principal fear is mutiny—that extremists inside the Pakistani military might stage a coup, take control of some nuclear assets, or even divert a warhead.
On April 29th, President Obama was asked at a news conference whether he could reassure the American people that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal could be kept away from terrorists. Obama’s answer remains the clearest delineation of the Administration’s public posture. He was, he said, “gravely concerned” about the fragility of the civilian government of President Asif Ali Zardari. “Their biggest threat right now comes internally,” Obama said. “We have huge . . . national-security interests in making sure that Pakistan is stable and that you don’t end up having a nuclear-armed militant state.” The United States, he said, could “make sure that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is secure—primarily, initially, because the Pakistan Army, I think, recognizes the hazards of those weapons’ falling into the wrong hands.”
The questioner, Chuck Todd, of NBC, began asking whether the American military could, if necessary, move in and secure Pakistan’s bombs. Obama did not let Todd finish. “I’m not going to engage in hypotheticals of that sort,” he said. “I feel confident that the nuclear arsenal will remain out of militant hands. O.K.?”

Obama did not say so, but current and former officials said in interviews in Washington and Pakistan that his Administration has been negotiating highly sensitive understandings with the Pakistani military. These would allow specially trained American units to provide added security for the Pakistani arsenal in case of a crisis. At the same time, the Pakistani military would be given money to equip and train Pakistani soldiers and to improve their housing and facilities—goals that General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the chief of the Pakistan Army, has long desired. In June, Congress approved a four-hundred-million-dollar request for what the Administration called the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, providing immediate assistance to the Pakistan Army for equipment, training, and “renovation and construction.”

The secrecy surrounding the understandings was important because there is growing antipathy toward America in Pakistan, as well as a history of distrust. Many Pakistanis believe that America’s true goal is not to keep their weapons safe but to diminish or destroy the Pakistani nuclear complex. The arsenal is a source of great pride among Pakistanis, who view the weapons as symbols of their nation’s status and as an essential deterrent against an attack by India. (India’s first nuclear test took place in 1974, Pakistan’s in 1998.)

A senior Pakistani official who has close ties to Zardari exploded with anger during an interview when the subject turned to the American demands for more information about the arsenal. After the September 11th attacks, he said, there had been an understanding between the Bush Administration and then President Pervez Musharraf “over what Pakistan had and did not have.” Today, he said, “you’d like control of our day-to-day deployment. But why should we give it to you? Even if there was a military coup d’état in Pakistan, no one is going to give up total control of our nuclear weapons. Never. Why are you not afraid of India’s nuclear weapons?” the official asked. “Because India is your friend, and the longtime policies of America and India converge. Between you and the Indians, you will fuck us in every way. The truth is that our weapons are less of a problem for the Obama Administration than finding a respectable way out of Afghanistan.”

The ongoing consultation on nuclear security between Washington and Islamabad intensified after the announcement in March of President Obama’s so-called Af-Pak policy, which called upon the Pakistan Army to take more aggressive action against Taliban enclaves inside Pakistan. I was told that the understandings on nuclear coöperation benefitted from the increasingly close relationship between Admiral Michael Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Kayani, his counterpart, although the C.I.A. and the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy have also been involved."

How US Can Prevent the Next Crisis?

2009-11-09T13:53:00.000-08:00
Even as efforts to recover from the current crisis go forward, the United States should launch new policies to avoid large external deficits, balance the budget, and adapt to a global currency system less centered on the dollar. Although it will take a number of years to fully implement these measures, they should be initiated promptly both to bolster confidence in the recovery and to build the foundation for a sustainable U.S. economy over the long haul. This is not just an economic imperative but a foreign policy and national security one as well.

A first step is to recognize the dangers of standing pat. For example, the United States' trade and current account deficits have declined sharply over the last three years, but absent new policy action, they are likely to start climbing again, rising to record levels and far beyond. Or take the dollar. Its role as the dominant international currency has made it much easier for the United States to finance, and thus run up, large trade and current account deficits with the rest of the world over the past 30 years. These huge inflows of foreign capital, however, turned out to be an important cause of the current economic crisis, because they contributed to the low interest rates, excessive liquidity, and loose monetary policies that -- in combination with lax financial supervision -- brought on the overleveraging and underpricing of risk that produced the meltdown.

It has long been known that large external deficits pose substantial risks to the U.S. economy because foreign investors might at some point refuse to finance these deficits on terms compatible with U.S. prosperity. Any sudden stop in lending to the United States would drive the dollar down, push inflation and interest rates up, and perhaps bring on a hard landing for the United States -- and the world economy at large. But it is now evident that it can be equally or even more damaging if foreign investors do finance large U.S. deficits for prolonged periods.

U.S. policymakers, therefore, must recognize that large external deficits, the dominance of the dollar, and the large capital inflows that necessarily accompany deficits and currency dominance are no longer in the United States' national interest. Washington should welcome initiatives put forward over the past year by China and others to begin a serious discussion of reforming the international monetary system.

Elephant vs Dragon

2009-11-08T13:23:00.000-08:00
Myanmar/Burma was once a part of British India. Does that make it ours again? Tibet once extended dominion over parts of China. Does that make China a part of Tibet today? Tibet once controlled parts of Arunachal Pradesh, albeit tenaciously and China today rules Tibet by force. Does that make parts of Arunachal Pradesh a part of China? Well, China indeed does think so. Logical? Yes and No.

No for the simple reason that such extrapolations and corollaries would confuse an already confused world. Logical, yes, because China is pricking India. Not just in Arunachal Pradesh , but elsewhere too. It is known to be stoking Maoist uprisings in Nepal--our neighbor. It is known to have supplied nuclear technology to Pakistan--our neighbor. It is supportive of the military Junta in Myanmar - our neighbor. It has close defence ties with Bangladesh, our neighbor. It is encircling India with a new sphere of influence. Why? Simple, the world is like its people. Countries are like people--groups of people, masses of people. Alone, a person would rule the world. Bring in two, and egos would begin to clash. Have three and politics will begin with one allying with the other of the remaining two. This is how humans behave and countries do. No one knows the future, yet everyone tries to control it. China is trying to control a future it knows will be an intensely competitive one. It will be competing against India for almost everything that matters. And it is trying to find friends and allies. And it is also trying to find issues and foes.

I don't want to sound nightmarish, but this is a blog and so I can say it. I believe that within our lifetimes we will see immense disturbance in the world we live in. Immense turmoil and upheaval, and all of it human engineered.

India is a rising power, but so is China. India is a democracy, China is a communist command economy with broad sweeps of capitalism washing over it creating a measure of discord amongst its people. China is progressing fast, India is progressing just a wee bit slower. But India is a free nation for its citizens. It is a democracy. China apparently is, but really is not. It is not a democracy. China has its problems of disparate growth with wealth concentrated in its eastern sea board. India has 1.2 billion people. China has 1.4 billion. Both nations are consuming ever increasing food, meat, energy and information. Already, everywhere in the world, there is competition between India and China for resources as both find themselves bidding for the same items on the world's markets. As both become prosperous, the pressures and demands will only increase. Today the one that has more money calls the shots. Tomorrow when both have loads of it and when mere money will not seem to matter, the games will begin. What we are seeing today is a mere prelude to it all. The same oil fields, the same mines, the same corporates, the same banks and both India and China out with their wallets.

And I shudder to think, that we think we have evolved and become more civilized. It was but 65 years back when the Second World War was raging and millions were dying brutal deaths in war and concentration camps. 65 years is not too long back and too little a time span to have changed fundamental human nature. We want things. We are materialistic. When we don't get things we tend to fight and when stakes are high we tend to kill. We are like that. Dangerous animals. Don't misunderstand forks and knives on well laid out tables with black liveried waiters for civilization. Perhaps we also like to masquerade.
So what am I trying to say here? Just that behind a complex interplay of politics lie simple fights for resources. Power is tempting because it provides access to resources, whatever they may be.

When China fumes over Dalai Lama's visit to Arunachal Pradesh, it is simply flexing muscles and asserting claims over resources if not indicating that it is capable of being a nuisance. But perhaps this time China has overplayed its cards. Tired of being quiet and hoping China will glower, hiss and then go away, India has realized that China will never let up. How can it? It needs to gobble up more and more of the worlds resources to keep itself going and growing. And so does India. For the first time the Tibet card is turning out to be hugely important. There are 1.2 lakh Tibetans in India, and the younger generation wants freedom. It wants China out of Tibet. Totally and completely. Tibet is the biggest buffer India could hope for between China and itself. Today China stands on India's borders using the Tibetan plateau. But Tibet even today is restive. It is not China. And as Tenzin Tsundue, the Tibetan writer and activist in Dharamshala who climbs hotel walls and displays Tibetan flags to ruffle Chinese visitors says, India has nurtured many Tibetans like him who have not seen Tibet ever, yet are aggressive supporters of complete freedom and willing to fight and die for their homeland. The Dalai Lamas presence at Tawang in Arunachal will be the best symbolism for India's territorial integrity. China will look on impotently as the Dalai Lama prays at the monastery that had welcomed him when he trekked into India in 1959.

President Obama has designated a special envoy to interface with the Dalai Lama. Why? Because he is important. Why? Because he exerts influence over Tibetans. So? He can swing the direction in which the Tibetan protest winds blow for China. So? He can be an important influence in keeping China in check. So? China can be prevented from focusing on destabilizing other countries, because it will need to fear its own destabilization. So? Americans will find a balance of powers developing and keeping each other busy, in this case India and China. So? America continues to exert influence over both as they balance each other. And influence gets you money. And resources. See, we come back to the same thing...resources?

The Tibetan movement is focused and clear. The Muslim-dominated Uighur movement is still nebulous and disparate. China also wants to use the present situation to create an Indian bogey. When internal unrest threatens to loom, create the bogey of an external threat to unite its own people. Taiwan is too small a threat, Japan is farther away, with Russia there are no serious issues, India is the best bet to project as a threat. So claims over Arunachal, India's protests, China's counter protests, the Dalai Lama somewhere in between - part of the great game. After all we are humans. Lets not forget that.
So what will happen? Obviously, I don't know! But what I do know is--the games have begun. The world will compete and then fight. Again. I don't think we can wish it away. What do you think?

The Fall of The Wall

2009-11-08T13:05:00.000-08:00
Twenty years ago, the people of Berlin brought down the wall that had divided their city, not only ending the tragic chapter of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, but also closing the book on post-war American grand strategy. For forty years, the strategy of containment guided American elites of both parties; two decades later, U.S. policymakers are still searching in vain for containment's replacement.

The development of coherent strategies for using American power remains a vital goal in what has become an increasingly complex world. The U.S. military is overstretched thanks to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the U.S. economy remains fragile. Transnational threats are abundant. It's no wonder that a misplaced nostalgia exists for the supposed simplicity of the Cold War, when the United States faced one major enemy.

In 1946 in his famous "Long Telegram" and a year later in the "X article" in Foreign Affairs, George Kennan laid out a rationale for using the instruments of U.S. power--military, economic, and political--to keep that enemy, the USSR, from expanding the areas under its control. Kennan's main focus was on keeping core areas of the world, such as Western Europe and the Persian Gulf, out of Soviet hands and on putting pressure on the Soviet system itself. "The United States," he argued, "has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power. For no mystical, Messianic movement--and particularly not that of the Kremlin--can face frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself in one way or another to the logic of that state of affairs." It was a brilliant statement, as the events of 1989 to 1991 magically demonstrated.

That isn't to say there weren't huge debates about how best to pursue a strategy of containment, and as Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis has suggested, it's more accurate to recognize that the United States pursued "strategies" of containment. Kennan himself decried what he viewed as the over-militarization of the policy. Huge splits emerged in the country over the appropriateness of containment policies as applied toward Vietnam in the Johnson and Nixon administrations and toward Central America in the Reagan years. But by and large, a bipartisan consensus held that containing America's Cold War enemy was the vital, central purpose of U.S. foreign policy.

Post-Cold War Policy Drift

When the Berlin Wall fell, the American foreign policy establishment was suddenly adrift. There were brilliant and widely read analyses of the world produced in the early post-Cold War period such as Francis Fukuyama's End of History and Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations, but those were assessments not strategies.

The most developed strategy early on was articulated by Dick Cheney's Pentagon in the notorious 1992 Defense Planning Guidance, which was leaked to the New York Times. "Our first objective," an early draft read, "is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union." What made the document controversial was that it argued that the United States needed to prevent not only its adversaries from gaining greater power in core regions, but also major allies such as Germany and Japan.

The White House disavowed the Cheney document, and George H.W. Bush's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, later described the Pentagon's approach at the time as "nutty."

What became clear by the time Bill Clinton became president was that formulating a simple and relevant new strategic purpose for the United States was no easy task. Clinton often harangued his aides for failing to come up with a Kennanesque vision, believing that he needed a replacement for containment to explain his foreign policy to the American people. His top State Department advisers even arranged a dinner in 1994 with Kennan, who was still going strong at age 90. The old master's response to their quest? Forget the bumper sticker, he said, the world was now too complex. Try, instead, he suggested, "for a thoughtful paragraph or two."

Kennan had hit upon a central truth of the post-Cold War world: with no single enemy and a range of diverse challenges--including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, climate change, pandemics, terrorism, the rise of new great powers, and globalization--there would be no bumper sticker.

"War on Terror"

In case there was any doubt as to the wisdom of Kennan's suggestion to the Clinton team, consider the Bush administration's response to the attacks of 9/11: the "War on Terror," a simple and clear statement, just like containment. But even the president's top advisers were uncomfortable with the approach. "I don't think I would have called it a 'war on terror,'" Donald Rumsfeld admitted as he left the Pentagon in 2006. Colin Powell said later that the "war on terror" was a "bad phrase. It's a criminal problem. This is not the Soviets coming back." And even if it were the right way to combat the problem of Islamic extremism, it would not address all of the other challenges mentioned above.

Even without a bumper sticker, however, strategy is important. The process of developing one requires gauging what power the United States has to achieve its purposes, in other words, reconciling means with ends, something often missing in discussions of foreign policy. But when the Berlin Wall came down, so did the possibility of a single, simple strategy. What the United States needs today is a set of strategies.
Recognizing the world's complexity (as well as the limits of American power), President Obama has avoided talk of an "Obama Doctrine." He has clearly changed the country's approach to the world, emphasizing multilateralism and engagement. But, for the most part, he has yet to define in any detail the purposes to which this new approach is applied.

A Vision for Reducing Nuclear Threat

One area in which he has laid out a vision backed up by a set of policies is in his call for a nuclear weapons-free world. Even if such a world is improbable if not impossible (thus lessening its value as strategy), the steps he has outlined in the name of pursuing it are valuable and coherent. The president has called for reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy, lowering the numbers of strategic weapons in a new START treaty with Russia, achieving a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, completing a new agreement on ending the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons use, strengthening the Nonproliferation Treaty, creating an international fuel bank to encourage the peaceful use of nuclear power without risking proliferation, and securing vulnerable materials to prevent terrorists from getting their hands on them.

Nonproliferation and disarmament were one of the four pillars that Obama cited in his September speech to the UN General Assembly, and he has clearly laid out a comprehensive policy approach to these issues that will provide the basis for a strategy. That is not true of the other three pillars (the promotion of peace and security, the preservation of our planet, and a global economy that advances opportunity for all people). As for democracy and human rights, which he argued underlie all four pillars, beyond saying that we are in favor and that others should be as well, the president has not articulated a proactive strategy for advancing values. Even on terrorism, the president's focus has understandably been on developing a strategy for Afghanistan, but not on developing a more comprehensive approach to combating the problem of Islamic extremism.

No doubt all these things are hard, and that is the central feature of our post-containment world. Kennan's advice that we need to develop a thoughtful paragraph or two remains sound. Doing so won't make anyone as famous as Kennan, and it won't solve the political problem of needing to provide a clear explanation for the U.S. role in the world, but even that thoughtful paragraph or two is a challenge given the complex world unleashed by the collapse of communism twenty years ago.

Written By:James M. Goldgeier, Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow for Transatlantic Relations - for Council of Foreign Relations - Nov 2009

Kabul - the new Kashmir

2009-10-12T11:53:00.000-07:00
Across Afghanistan, hundreds of Indian workers and engineers are repairing disintegrated roads and constructing highways. India is building the country's new parliament building. It is running medical missions and training Afghan police officers, diplomats and civil servants, part of a hearts-and-minds offensive to strengthen old ties in a rough neighborhood.

Like archrival Pakistan, India sees Afghanistan as a strategic prize, but its efforts to establish a big footprint there have been set back twice in 15 months by suicide bombings aimed at its widening presence.

In some ways, India and Pakistan have been waging a quiet battle inside Afghanistan, and experts say the latest attack, on Thursday outside the Indian Embassy in Kabul, is bound to intensify that rivalry.

Pakistan's spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence, has long had deep ties with elements inside Afghanistan, but large numbers of Indian intelligence operatives are also in Afghanistan to counter Pakistan's influence and to act as a check on Taliban militants.

Intelligence agencies blame the Inter-Services Intelligence, better known as the ISI, for a 2008 blast at the Indian Embassy that killed 58 people, including the defense attache. Pakistan denied the assertions.

India's active opposition to the Taliban in Afghanistan dates to the 1990s, when the New Delhi government joined Iran and Russia in supporting the Northern Alliance against the Islamist movement. Now, India is spending $1.2 billion in health-care, food and infrastructure aid to Afghanistan, its largest foreign assistance program.

The bombing comes as hostilities between India and Pakistan have intensified after a November terrorist attack in Mumbai, which killed more than 170 people and brought India's financial capital to a three-day standstill. Indian authorities said all 10 attackers were from Pakistan. The Mumbai siege rolled back at least five years of diplomatic progress between the two countries.

The Kabul embassy blast, which left 17 dead, came a day after Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi announced that relations between India and Pakistan were thawing and that they could be getting ready to resume peace talks. A Taliban spokesman asserted responsibility for the attack, saying the embassy was the intended target. India has not yet assigned blame.

Experts say there is a growing rift between Pakistan's civilian government and its military, and between the military and the ISI. Those apparent rifts are not lost on Indian diplomats, who realize the limits of Pakistan's government to see through diplomatic promises.

Many in India note that Pakistan's government has been seeking some cooperation with New Delhi, leaving Pakistan's military services and the ISI outside of that diplomacy.

India and Afghanistan appear to be deepening their ties. More than 4,000 Indians work in Afghanistan. There are six Indian consulates there. The main immigration office in New Delhi has a special section for Afghans seeking residency or asylum in India. By helping rebuild Afghanistan, India sees itself as promoting regional stability as well as balancing Pakistan's influence in Kabul.

In recent years, Pakistan's government has been increasingly wary of India's influence in Afghanistan, including New Delhi's close ties to the government of President Hamid Karzai, who studied in India, as did most of Afghanistan's leadership.

An Indian air base in Tajikistan, the first one outside the country, also has increased Pakistan's worries about India's growing strategic reach in the region. The air base is a transit point for security forces and material to Afghanistan.

In the past few years, India has sent mountain-trained paramilitary forces to protect its workers in Afghanistan from kidnappings and attacks. About 500 Indian police officers are deployed there.

India has opened consulates in Herat and Mazar-e Sharif; it also reopened two in Jalalabad and Kandahar that had been shut since 1979. In January, India completed the Zaranj-Delaram highway near the Iranian border. In May, an Indian-made power transmission line brought 24-hour electricity to Kabul, the capital.

The bombings against the Indian Embassy in Kabul will be logged in the Indian mind beside the Mumbai attacks. All this is accumulating in the Indian mind and could lead to some kind of eventual retaliation.

Way out from Af-Pak Strategy

2009-10-12T10:23:00.000-07:00
THE KEY to getting out of Afghanistan without turning Kabul over to the Taliban lies in replacing the failed US “Af-Pak’’ strategy with a new regional approach in which India, Iran, Russia, and China - all opposed to a Taliban takeover - join with the United States and NATO in stabilizing the country.

The “Af-Pak’’ strategy is based on the false premise that Pakistan and the United States are both opposed to Islamist influence in Afghanistan. In reality, Pakistan has long supported the Taliban insurgents there for what it considers a compelling strategic reason: to counter the influence of India in Kabul.

Despite this, the United States continues to give military aid and $800 million in annual cash subsidies to the Pakistan Army, supposedly for the express purpose of fighting the Taliban.

Until this pretense is ended, the United States will remain mired in a stalemate with Pakistan-supplied Taliban fighters. Equally important, Islamabad will be increasingly emboldened to demand the exclusion of Indian influence from Afghanistan as the price for cooperation there. Given India’s strong opposition to Islamist forces, this would directly conflict with US interests and goals.

Defenders of aid to Pakistan argue that its Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, the ISI, has given the CIA valuable information about Al Qaeda. Another compelling reason for US reluctance to threaten a cutoff of subsidies and aid is that Islamabad could counter by denying transit through Pakistan to supply US forces in Afghanistan.

“With one hand, they threaten to prevent you from prosecuting the war unless you pay them off,’’ Said Jawad, the Afghan ambassador to the United States, said. “With the other, they help the Taliban to make sure that the war keeps going on and the aid keeps flowing.’’

To escape from this trap, the United States should make three policy changes:

First, the administration should make clear that it recognizes the right of India, as the preeminent South Asian power, to be a major player in Kabul. The spokesman of the Pakistan armed forces, Major General Athar Abbas, criticizing the “overinvolvement of Indians in Afghanistan’’ in a July CNN interview, specifically warned against any Indian role in training the Afghan Army. But such a role could be a valuable supplement to the current faltering US-NATO training efforts. Indian aid to Kabul has so far been limited to $1.2 billion in economic aid.

Second, the Obama administration should seek Pakistan’s help in negotiating peace agreements with local Taliban factions, following up earlier Saudi Arabian initiatives. To get Taliban participation, such agreements would have to include a timetable for phased withdrawal of most US forces from all but the major cities and highways of Afghanistan.

Third, local peace agreements should be linked to a larger peace process negotiated at regional conferences attended by India, Iran, Russia, and China, in addition to the United States, NATO, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.

India feels encircled by ISI-supported Islamist forces operating out of Bangladesh and Nepal as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Shi’ite-majority Iran opposes the Sunni Taliban, and China, facing an Islamist uprising in Sinkiang, is increasingly wary of Taliban rule in Kabul. Bringing these nations into Afghan affairs would offset Pakistani support for the Taliban so that its influence remains confined to its strongholds in the ethnically Pashtun south and east and it does not become dominant in Kabul.

A peace process that leads to a phased withdrawal of most US forces would end the dependence of the United States on Pakistani supply lines. It would then be possible, at last, for the United States to use its enormous aid leverage in Islamabad effectively.

If the Al Qaeda leadership is still in Pakistan, and if ISI provides actionable intelligence that facilitates its destruction, then the existing US payoffs to the army should continue. But if Al Qaeda is no longer centered in Pakistan, as some suspect, or if ISI is unable to provide actionable intelligence, then the United States should restrict its aid to Islamabad to large-scale economic assistance focused on development and education. Maintaining friendly ties with Pakistan as a major Third World country and a nuclear weapons state should continue to be a US priority. But the tail should no longer wag the dog.

Source: Boston - Selig S. Harrison, author of “Out of Afghanistan’’ and “In Afghanistan’s Shadow,’’ is director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy

The Baltic Blues

2009-10-08T13:16:00.000-07:00
The patient emerges from intensive care, hurls the medicine at the doctors and bites his blood donor. That may be an unfair characterisation of the recent news from crisis-stricken Latvia, but it is pretty much how outsiders see it. The prime minister, Valdis Dombrovskis, is refusing to make the spending cuts mandated by international lenders and has floated a new law that would partially expropriate foreign banks’ loan books.

It would be worrying enough if the European Union’s weakest economy defaults, devalues or implodes. But what scares outsiders more is the effect of Latvia’s latest wobble on other ex-communist economies, which until this week seemed to be surviving the financial crisis with less trouble than some had feared.

In recent weeks, the news from Latvia had seemed mildly encouraging, after a year during which the country has been kept afloat thanks to an $11.1 billion international bail-out. The breakneck decline has slowed: the economy is expected to contract by 17.5% this year, but by only 3% in 2010 and to return to growth in 2011, according to a forecast by SEB, a Swedish bank (and big lender to Latvia). The current account, which showed a yawning deficit of 1.42 billion lats ($3 billion) in the first seven months of last year has been transformed to show a 581m lats surplus in the same period of 2009.

The main outstanding issue is next year’s budget deficit. International lenders had softened the target to a mere 8.5% of GDP; the government still had to push through spending cuts of 500m lats to meet this.

But this week Mr Dombrovskis startled outsiders by saying that cuts of only 225m lats would be necessary. He has pencilled in a further 100m lats in better tax revenues—counting, apparently, on a faster economic recovery than anyone expects. The hesitation has brought stern warnings. Sweden’s finance minister, Anders Borg, said outsiders’ patience was “limited”—his country is due to provide SKr10 billion ($1.45 billion) in a loan tranche in early 2010. The EU’s monetary affairs commissioner, Joaquín Almunia, has publicly rebuked the government too. Mr Dombrovskis has now backtracked, saying that if the cuts are necessary, they will be made.

But doubts remain. Mr Dombrovskis lacks the authority to push tough measures through parliament and his public wobble could be seen as an attempt to summon up another burst of international pressure on the government to do the right thing. If so, it is risky.

The same could be said about another of Mr Dombrovskis’s moves—calling for a draft law that would restructure domestic liabilities of foreign banks. Lenders would be liable only for the collateral value of their loan (eg, a house bought with a mortgage) rather than the whole amount. Banks would also be unable to evict defaulters from their homes without rehousing them. A fall in property prices of over 50% has sent Latvia’s private-sector debts to foreigners ballooning. They will need restructuring eventually. But this proposal looks unworkable, clumsy and damaging. Shares in Nordic banks, which have been the biggest private-sector lenders to Latvia, dipped on the news.

If Latvia fails, with a strike by international lenders prompting a debt crisis or a bank run, the spotlight then turns to the neighbouring Baltic states of Estonia and Lithuania. They are not in the same political mess, but both have also pegged their currencies to the euro and are facing huge and painful adjustments. Some wonder if the EU might accelerate its recognition of Estonia’s impressive progress in sorting out public finances by giving it early approval of its plans to join the euro in 2011. But where would that leave Lithuania, which is nowhere near balancing its books and borrowing expensively from private lenders instead of turning to the IMF?

An even bigger question involves the future co-operation between the IMF and EU. They worked together closely during the emergency rescue of Latvia in December. Now ties are strained: the IMF thinks Latvia should devalue its currency. EU officials are determined that it should not, for fear of the wider effect on ex-communist countries that are trying to join the euro zone. That has led the EU to squeeze the IMF into accepting softer conditions on Latvia than it would have wished for. For all those involved, in Brussels, Washington, DC, and Riga, patience is running out.

Obama's policy - Af-Iran, not Af-Pak

2009-09-28T15:18:00.000-07:00

During the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign, now-U.S. Vice President Joe Biden said that like all U.S. presidents, Barack Obama would face a foreign policy test early in his presidency if elected. That test is now here.

His test comprises two apparently distinct challenges, one in Afghanistan and one in Iran. While different problems, they have three elements in common. First, they involve the question of his administration’s overarching strategy in the Islamic world. Second, the problems are approaching decision points (and making no decision represents a decision here). And third, they are playing out very differently than Obama expected during the 2008 campaign.

During the campaign, Obama portrayed the Iraq war as a massive mistake diverting the United States from Afghanistan, the true center of the “war on terror.” He accordingly promised to shift the focus away from Iraq and back to Afghanistan. Obama’s views on Iran were more amorphous. He supported the doctrine that Iran should not be permitted to obtain nuclear weapons, while at the same time asserted that engaging Iran was both possible and desirable. Embedded in the famous argument over whether offering talks without preconditions was appropriate (something now-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton attacked him for during the Democratic primary) was the idea that the problem with Iran stemmed from Washington’s refusal to engage in talks with Tehran.

Iran

Back in April, in the midst of the financial crisis, Obama reached an agreement at the G-8 meeting that the Iranians would have until Sept. 24 and the G-20 meeting to engage in meaningful talks with the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany (P-5+1) or face intensely increased sanctions. His administration was quite new at the time, so the amount of thought behind this remains unclear. On one level, the financial crisis was so intense and September so far away that Obama and his team probably saw this as a means to delay a secondary matter while more important fires were flaring up.

But there was more operating than that. Obama intended to try to bridge the gap between the Islamic world and the United States between April and September. In his speech to the Islamic world from Cairo, he planned to show a desire not only to find common ground, but also to acknowledge shortcomings in U.S. policy in the region. With the appointment of special envoys George Mitchell (for Israel and the Palestinian territories) and Richard Holbrooke (for Pakistan and Afghanistan), Obama sought to build on his opening to the Islamic world with intense diplomatic activity designed to reshape regional relationships.

It can be argued that the Islamic masses responded positively to Obama’s opening — it has been asserted to be so and we will accept this — but the diplomatic mission did not solve the core problem. Mitchell could not get the Israelis to move on the settlement issue, and while Holbrooke appears to have made some headway on increasing Pakistan’s aggressiveness toward the Taliban, no fundamental shift has occurred in the Afghan war.

Most important, no major shift has occurred in Iran’s attitude toward the United States and the P-5+1 negotiating group. In spite of Obama’s Persian New Year address to Iran, the Iranians did not change their attitude toward the United States. The unrest following Iran’s contested June presidential election actually hardened the Iranian position. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad remained president with the support of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, while the so-called moderates seemed powerless to influence their position. Perceptions that the West supported the demonstrations have strengthened Ahmadinejad’s hand further, allowing him to paint his critics as pro-Western and himself as an Iranian nationalist.

But with September drawing to a close, talks have still not begun. Instead, they will begin Oct. 1. And last week, the Iranians chose to announce that not only will they continue work on their nuclear program (which they claim is not for military purposes), they have a second, hardened uranium enrichment facility near Qom. After that announcement, Obama, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and French President Nicolas Sarkozy held a press conference saying they have known about the tunnel for several months, and warned of stern consequences.

This, of course, raises the question of what consequences. Obama has three choices in this regard.

First, he can impose crippling sanctions against Iran. But that is possible only if the Russians cooperate. Moscow has the rolling stock and reserves to supply all of Iran’s fuel needs if it so chooses, and Beijing can also remedy any Iranian fuel shortages. Both Russia and China have said they don’t want sanctions; without them on board, sanctions are meaningless.

Second, Obama can take military action against Iran, something easier politically and diplomatically for the United States to do itself rather than rely on Israel. By itself, Israel cannot achieve air superiority, suppress air defenses, attack the necessary number of sites and attempt to neutralize Iranian mine-laying and anti-ship capability all along the Persian Gulf. Moreover, if Israel struck on its own and Iran responded by mining the Strait of Hormuz, the United States would be drawn into at least a naval war with Iran — and probably would have to complete the Israeli airstrikes, too.

And third, Obama could choose to do nothing (or engage in sanctions that would be the equivalent of doing nothing). Washington could see future Iranian nuclear weapons as an acceptable risk. But the Israelis don’t, meaning they would likely trigger the second scenario. It is possible that the United States could try to compel Israel not to strike — though it’s not clear whether Israel would comply — something that would leave Obama publicly accepting Iran’s nuclear program.

And this, of course, would jeopardize Obama’s credibility. It is possible for the French or Germans to waffle on this issue; no one is looking to them for leadership. But for Obama simply to acquiesce to Iranian nuclear weapons, especially at this point, would have significant diplomatic and domestic political ramifications. Simply put, Obama would look weak — and that, of course, is why the Iranians announced the second nuclear site. They read Obama as weak, and they want to demonstrate their own resolve. That way, if the Russians were thinking of cooperating with the United States on sanctions, Moscow would be seen as backing the weak player against the strong one. The third option, doing nothing, therefore actually represents a significant action.

Afghanistan

In a way, the same issue is at stake in Afghanistan. Having labeled Afghanistan as critical — indeed, having campaigned on the platform that the Bush administration was fighting the wrong war — it would be difficult for Obama to back down in Afghanistan. At the same time, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, has reported that without a new strategy and a substantial increase in troop numbers, failure in Afghanistan is likely.

The number of troops being discussed, 30,000-40,000, would bring total U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan to just above the number of troops the Soviet Union deployed there in its war (just under 120,000) — a war that ended in failure. The new strategy being advocated would be one in which the focus would not be on the defeat of the Taliban by force of arms, but the creation of havens for the Afghan people and protecting those havens from the Taliban.

A move to the defensive when time is on your side is not an unreasonable strategy. But it is not clear that time is on Western forces’ side. Increased offensives are not weakening the Taliban. But halting attacks and assuming that the Taliban will oblige the West by moving to the offensive, thereby opening itself to air and artillery strikes, probably is not going to happen. And while assuming that the country will effectively rise against the Taliban out of the protected zones the United States has created is interesting, it does not strike us as likely. The Taliban is fighting the long war because it has nowhere else to go. Its ability to maintain military and political cohesion following the 2001 invasion has been remarkable. And betting that the Pakistanis will be effective enough to break the Taliban’s supply lines is hardly the most prudent bet.

In short, Obama’s commander on the ground has told him the current Afghan strategy is failing. He has said that unless that strategy changes, more troops won’t help, and that a change of strategy will require substantially more troops. But when we look at the proposed strategy and the force levels, it is far from obvious that even that level of commitment will stand a chance of achieving meaningful results quickly enough before the forces of Washington’s NATO allies begin to withdraw and U.S. domestic resolve erodes further.

Obama has three choices in Afghanistan. He can continue to current strategy and force level, hoping to prolong failure long enough for some undefined force to intervene. He can follow McChrystal’s advice and bet on the new strategy. Or he can withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan. Once again, doing nothing — the first option — is doing something quite significant.

The Two Challenges Come Together

The two crises intermingle in this way: Every president is tested in foreign policy, sometimes by design and sometimes by circumstance. Frequently, this happens at the beginning of his term as a result of some problem left by his predecessor, a strategy adopted in the campaign or a deliberate action by an antagonist. How this happens isn’t important. What is important is that Obama’s test is here. Obama at least publicly approached the presidency as if many of the problems the United States faced were due to misunderstandings about or the thoughtlessness of the United States. Whether this was correct is less important than that it left Obama appearing eager to accommodate his adversaries rather than confront them.

No one has a clear idea of Obama’s threshold for action.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban takes the view that the British and Russians left, and that the Americans will leave, too. We strongly doubt that the force level proposed by McChrystal will be enough to change their minds. Moreover, U.S. forces are limited, with many still engaged in Iraq. In any case, it isn’t clear what force level would suffice to force the Taliban to negotiate or capitulate — and we strongly doubt that there is a level practical to contemplate.

In Iran, Ahmadinejad clearly perceives that challenging Obama is low-risk and high reward. If he can finally demonstrate that the United States is unwilling to take military action regardless of provocations, his own domestic situation improves dramatically, his relationship with the Russians deepens, and most important, his regional influence — and menace — surges. If Obama accepts Iranian nukes without serious sanctions or military actions, the American position in the Islamic world will decline dramatically. The Arab states in the region rely on the United States to protect them from Iran, so U.S. acquiescence in the face of Iranian nuclear weapons would reshape U.S. relations in the region far more than a hundred Cairo speeches.

There are four permutations Obama might choose in response to the dual crisis. He could attack Iran and increase forces in Afghanistan, but he might well wind up stuck in a long-term war in Afghanistan. He could avoid that long-term war by withdrawing from Afghanistan and also ignore Iran’s program, but that would leave many regimes reliant on the United States for defense against Iran in the lurch. He could increase forces in Afghanistan and ignore Iran — probably yielding the worst of all possible outcomes, namely, a long-term Afghan war and an Iran with a nuclear program if not nuclear weapons.

On pure logic, history or politics aside, the best course is to strike Iran and withdraw from Afghanistan. That would demonstrate will in the face of a significant challenge while perhaps reshaping Iran and certainly avoiding a drawn-out war in Afghanistan. Of course, it is easy for those who lack power and responsibility — and the need to govern — to provide logical choices. But the forces closing in on Obama are substantial, and there are many competing considerations in play.

Presidents eventually arrive at the point where something must be done, and where doing nothing is very much doing something. At this point, decisions can no longer be postponed, and each choice involves significant risk. Obama has reached that point, and significantly, in his case, he faces a double choice. And any decision he makes will reverberate.

Does China want Asia as it's Backyard?

2009-06-07T05:58:00.000-07:00
There are definite signals coming out of China that the period of late leader Deng Xiaoping’s direction “hide your strength, bide your time” is over, and the country’s economy, military and diplomacy is strong enough to show case its power projection capability. In early May, the Chinese Ambassador to the UK remarked to a group of university students that the international community recognized China was emerging as a world power, adding that people inside China, however, still recognize there were some weaknesses. What Ambassador Fu Ying conveyed was China will not stop here but pursue its power agenda till it becomes a super power like the USA, China has fixed US global power as its target, and is working towards it steadily.

In mid-April, the authentic Chinese Communist Party (CCP) controlled newspaper, the Global Times, commented that Asia was China’s “great backyard”. The commentary argued China must first dominate Asia and resolve major issues which could turn into “crises” and prevent them from reaching a point of explosion. Ignoring the Asian challenge could lead to its dislocation from the world order.

From 2004, when President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao took over full powers, becoming the Chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC), there have been several characteristic shifts in China’s domestic and foreign policies. That, however, does not mean that he wields supreme power. Far from it. He failed to place his nominee, Li Keqiang as the fifth generation Party General Secretary. As things stand today, Li would have been satisfied as the Premier of the People’s Republic of China. Hu’s predecessor Jiang Zemin and his Shanghai group managed to place Xi Jiping, a revolutionary’s son, representing the more liberal group as the next Secretary General in 2013.

But Hu Jintao succeeded in using ultra-nationalism as an important tool in shaping an apparently new strategic policy. Starting from a somewhat weak controlling position of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), he compromised with the PLA’s top hardliners to win them over. His initial projected theory of 2004 “Rise of China” drafted by his strategic advisor, gave the first insight into Hu’s strategic thinking.

The year 2004 may be a watershed year in China’s aggressive strategic vision in Asia. This vision envisaged a western line at the extremities of Asia in the west, to extreme geographic line of Asia Pacific region in the east, as China’s region of domination. The strategic debate argued that Deng Xiaoping’s strategic decision of 1991 had served its purpose, and China had achieved total power to establish its sphere of influence. That debate appears to have been co-opted in the country’s foreign policy, and is beginning to be shown to the world, particularly Asia, now.

China is no longer shy to show a glimpse of its military power and capability and project it if need be, in the Asian theatre. There are two demonstrated examples of its capability. One is its determination not to allow even US naval ships to poach in the vicinity of its territorial waters. An US naval survey ship was sharked by Chinese vessels, eliciting a response from the US navy to send warships in the area. The other is to emphatically consolidate claims on sea area.

Following the Philippines and Malaysian actions to affirm their claims on small parts of the Spratly group of islands in the South China sea, the PLA navy has dispatched two ships to patrol the area. They have also contested Malaysian and Philippino claims at the UN on these parts of the Spratly group, and reiterated their sovereignty on the entire group of islands and their adjoining areas. The Chinese claims are based on highly questionable historical incidents which negate claims of other parties like Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei, that are based on geographical realities recognized by the UN Laws of the Seas Convention.

China also claims sovereignty over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in the East China Sea currently occupied by Japan. Tension has flared up between the two countries several times over the past years. Recently, advanced Chinese monitoring capabilities apparently helped Chinese naval vessels to enter the Senkaku waters when they noticed the absence of Japanese patrols.

The South China Sea is reported to be rich in oil and gas resources. Equally important, it is the shortest route between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, also reported to be rich in gas resources, would extend China’s waters closer to Japan, and into the Pacific. These are potential crisis points the Global Times commentary referred to. China has made these claims non-negotiable, and its earlier position of joint development in both areas with other claimants, but under the condition of recognizing Chinese sovereignty, was not really meant for implementation. This was a ploy to buy time, and project a benign and friendly face of China. Beijing is apparently showing its real face under the mask.

The next question raised by the Global Times commentary is managing relations with the smaller countries of Asia. Mismanagement with these relationships have the potential to disturb China’s relations with the United States and Europe. The Asia Pacific region is the cynosure of global focus of the 21st century, and the western nations and Japan. They are not going to sit by and watch an arrogant China riding rough shod over the South and East Asian arc. USA’s relations with Vietnam and the Philippines are witnessing a new development, and Malaysia sans Mahathir and the newly restructuring Indonesia may not be amenable to Beijing’s dictates if they have reliable support. The word “reliable” is the crux for South East Asian stability.

China’s show of military power began this year with the 2009 White Paper on Defence published on January 20, coinciding with US President Barak Obama’s inauguration. The time was not coincidental. Revealing very little but giving enough for experts to draw their conclusions, the White Paper made it clear that China’s military surge was now unstoppable. It also made it clear that informization of its armed forces and cyber warfare technology were battle ready.

Although the White Paper did not mention building aircraft carriers, soon signals came from Chinese military officials that a final decision to build carriers had been taken. According to available reports three aircraft carriers of 60 thousand dwt are on the anvil along with support ships. The first carrier group is expected to be afloat by 2015 if not earlier. They are expected to carry Russian Sukhois, probably Su-35.

The Chinese naval exposition of April 23-25, to which India, Pakistan, the US and Russia among others were invited made an impressive display. Two indigenously built nuclear submarines were on public show for the first time. But they did not show their best – Type 093 and Type 094 nuclear capable submarines.

An important omission from the invitees list to the naval expositions was Japan. This may have some historical hangover. In a naval battle in 1894 the Chinese navy was totally routed by the Japanese navy. But it has current connotations, too. Despite the huge trade between the two countries, political relations have gone cold under Taro Aso’s Prime Ministership of Japan.

China has officially announced an air force exposition around November 11, this year in which new aircraft, missile, radars and other indigenously built military arms and equipment will be displayed to selected invitees. This is expected to showcase the PLA Air Force’s (PLAAF) reach beyond the immediate coast, and will also leave observers to calculate how the air force can work in co-ordination with the navy in coastal defence and informationized short duration strikes in crisis points or “hot spots” in its neighbourhood.

In the second half of this year, China will hold a massive two-month long PLA exercise that will involve 50,000 troops from four Military Regions (MRs). The largest ever military exercise by China, the exercise will mobilize more than 60,000 vehicles and large weapons and equipments over a terrain that will cover 50 thousand kilometers, and one-way travel for some units will be more than 2,400 kilometers. The Lanzou MR from western China’s Xinjiang will meet up with Shenyang, Jinan and Guangzhou MRs on the seaboard. The exercise is likely to include the Air Force and Army Aviation units. It is notable that the Chengdu MR which is responsible for the Eastern Sector of the Sino-Indian border, and the Nanjing MR which covers Taiwan, have been excluded from Kuayue-2009 (Stride 2009) exercise. But we will have to watch the directions as the drill, which is to be conducted under real battle conditions with live ammunitions, fixes target. The parameter leaves no doubt that the initial targets are East China sea and the South China sea.

Apparently with fast improvement of basic relations with Taiwan under the KMT government led by Ma Ying-Jeo, China has redirected forces on the South China sea territories to exercise sovereignty over this vital sea route. This would have significant implication for global shipping, both commercial and naval.

But China’s muscle flexing has not gone unnoticed. Vietnam has reached an agreement in principle to acquire six Russian kilo-class submarines from Russia for $1.8 billion. Hanoi has also spent $3.8 billion for the procurement of 17 SU-27 and four SU-30 multi role aircraft. With Russian collaboration Vietnam is building 10 Russian type Molnia class missile boats, and Moscow will also supply two Gepard 3.9 class frigates to Vietnam. Vietnamese navy officers have for the first time visited a US aircraft carrier.

Australia’s Defence White Paper 2009, focused on the rise of Chinese military power and approved a special military budget of more than $ 70 billion in the next 20 years to augment its air and naval capability with state of the art arms and equipment. Australia, while underscoring its interest in the region including around Indonesia, also sees a potential face off between China and growing India.

Japan’s navy and air force are no light weights either. The Chinese navy is the largest in Asia in terms of tonnage, but in terms of quality Japan may be having an edge over them. Tokyo is also quietly raising its military might, expanding the area of its operation, and its enhanced military treaty with the USA at the beginning of this decade is no less a formidable defence arrangement for China to deal with.

China has instigated a major arms race in Asia and the Asia Pacific region. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently declared in a pointed but unnamed message to China that the USA was both a trans Pacific and trans-Indian Ocean power and is not going to move out. China would also understand that Russia is an interested party in the region and has its own plans and strategies independent of China-US confrontation. Vietnam and the rest of old Indo-China have not been forgotten in the corridors of Moscow.

South Asia and India cannot remain unconcerned with these developments. Leaving aside Pakistan, China’s permanent and closest ally, the other countries in the region have been periodically trying to use China to counter India, without realizing the ultimate cost to themselves. The Maoists in Nepal have openly invited in Beijing to counter India, and statements from visiting Chinese leaders from Nepal’s soil have had a definite anti-India edge. The new government in Bangladesh under the Awami League has moved to a position of neutrality. In Sri Lanka, the Chinese have made large strides over the last few years, especially with the Mahinda Rajapaksa government.

In the sea-bordering countries of South Asia, China has been seeking strategic port facilities. It has built the Gwadar Deep Sea port in Pakistan at a cost of $2.2 billion. The Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka on the Indian Ocean Sea route is being built by China. President Rajapaksa comes from Hambantota. In Myanmar, the Chinese have Sittwe to Kunming and are building an oil and gas pipeline from South East China. A similar pipe line is to be built from Gwadar Port to Xinjiang. China has also been looking for a sea port facility in Bangladesh’s Chittagong area, to be connected with a link road through Myanmar to Kunming.

It is a fact that China is looking for security for its energy imports. Nobody can deny China having aircraft carriers for defence. But the strategic philosophy behind China’s military modernization has raised serious concerns all around. Beijing wants to establish its ownership in the near abroad, and overlordship over the Indian Ocean and Asia. It wants Asia as its backyard. This contains deadly ingredients for instability.

In this context, it would be pertinent what the Chief of US Pacific Command (PACOM) Admiral Timothy J. Keating told his Indian counterpart during a recent visit. Admiral Keating said a senior Chinese Admiral had informally suggested to him that the US allow the Chinese to keep the Indian Ocean, and the US keep the Pacific Ocean. Such off the record talks or problems by senior Chinese military officers are not idle talks. Such probes have generally proved to be correct in the past. Where does India stand?

Will Pakistan be able to save itself from itself ?

2009-06-07T04:53:00.000-07:00
It was in November 1994 that the first group of Taliban emerged in Kandahar to take control of the city. By the end of the month this mysterious group had taken control of Lashkargah and Helmand provinces as well.

Less than two years later, aided by an eager Pakistani establishment and various other Pashtun groups it supported, the Taliban captured Kabul on September 26, 1996, and in another show of brutality hanged President Najibullah. Tajik leader Ahmed Shah Masood retreated and the Pakistanis presumed they had attained strategic depth.

Fifteen years later, the Taliban, be they Afghans sitting in Quetta or the Pakistani Taliban with total control in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) and partial control in many parts of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), only confirms that the Pakistani state has retreated from parts of its own territory.

Terrorist attacks attributed to the Taliban have been common even in Punjab province. If the latest reports are to be believed, the Taliban have entered southern and western Punjab with assistance from groups like the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), who have been the Inter-Services Intelligence’s (ISI) favourites.

Pakistan’s best known sociologist and political thinker, Dr Eqbal Ahmad, had anticipated this in his essay, What After Strategic Depth (Dawn, August 23, 1998). In a very perceptive analysis, he had said: "The costs of Islamabad’s Afghan policy have been augmenting since 1980 when Muhammad Zia-ul Haq proudly declared Pakistan a ‘frontline state’ in the Cold War. Those costs — already unbearable in proliferation of guns, heroin and armed fanatics — are likely now to multiply in myriad ways".

He had added: "The domestic costs of Pakistan’s friendly proximity to the Taliban are incalculable and potentially catastrophic... More importantly, the Taliban is the most retrograde political movement in the history of Islam". Today, that elusive strategic depth seems to have become Pakistan’s obscurantist black hole.

Others had given similar warnings. Jessica Stern ended her essay, Pakistan’s Jihad Culture (Foreign Affairs, November-December 2000), with this caution: "...Pakistan must recognise the militant groups for what they are ...dangerous gangs whose resources and reach continue to grow, threatening to destabilise the entire region. Pakistan’s continued support of religious-militant groups suggests that it does not recognise its own susceptibility to the culture of violence it has helped create. It should think again". Pakistan did get that chance after September 11, 2001; but its khaki grandees assumed that duplicity would help them win in the end.
Dr Hassan-Askari Rizvi, another one of Pakistan’s well-known defence and political analysts, had a few questions in an article, Military and Islamic Militancy (Daily Times, May 31, 2004). He asked: "How far has Islamic militancy penetrated the Army? Do some senior officers share the Taliban-type Islamic worldview and support Islamic militancy? Is there any threat of a coup led by an Islamist general? Another set of concerns pertain to the safety and security of nuclear weapons and fissile and radioactive material, against the backdrop of the recent disclosure about nuclear leakages from Khan Research Laboratory. Previously, most analysts dismissed these concerns on the assumption that Islamic extremists have not been able to penetrate the military".

Dr Rizvi made another very ominous but after ignored observation he wrote: "The long years of ISI-directed Islamic militancy were bound to have implications for Pakistani society and the military. In the case of the Army, its personnel were directly exposed to Islamic militancy and propaganda by Islamic groups in support of militancy, and a genuinely Islamic order for Pakistan. The Pakistani state openly identified with Islamic orthodoxy and militancy and it became fashionable to publicly support the militant groups engaged in insurgency in Kashmir".
Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy (The Saudi-isation of Pakistan) and Rubina Saigol (Myths versus Facts about Fundamentalism) are two other Pakistanis who, in recent weeks, have been brave and forthright enough to express their concern about Pakistan’s future in their aforementioned articles.

Dr Hoodbhoy’s worry is that "in the long term we will have to see how the larger political battle works out between those who want an Islamic theocratic state and those who want a modern Islamic republic".

Ms Saigol pointed out what we in India have been saying for some time: "The reign of terror had Pakistan’s official support, while the rest of the world remained incredulous. The policy of ‘bleeding India with a thousand cuts’... had state sponsorship. Going into Afghanistan in return for dollars was also a state decision".

Pakistan is still playing the same game, only for more dollars. It continues to raise different bogies in order to win American sympathy. But judging from some recent remarks from Washington, Pakistan’s Indian bogey does not seem to be selling well any longer.
Now that Nizam-e-Adl has officially been promulgated in Swat for implementation of Taliban-style Sharia, it is going to be exceedingly difficult for the state to prevent similar demands from other parts or to describe the Taliban as "anti-state". They have been legitimised. The NWFP governor had claimed that the state had responded to the aspirations of the people.
Responding to the people’s aspirations is laudable, but in this case the government of Pakistan signed a deal with an insurgent force it had not defeated or even overpowered. It was pure appeasement.

Pakistan’s so-called civil society, which had campaigned for the restoration of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry (who had been deposed by Pervez Musharraf) has all but disappeared, and many of its members are quietly looking for safe havens abroad.
The mainstream political parties, except for the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), have acquiesced in the Nizam-e-Adl.

The Pakistan Army, the strongest force in Pakistan today, did not intervene to prevent what could be a cascading effect.

The point, therefore, is whether what happened in Fata NWFP and in Malakand, is an unimpeded march of the Taliban, just a march of folly by the state or an elaborate policy of cultivating hatred that has become a scourge visiting its creators.

Questions will always be raised whether the Pakistan Army was unable, unwilling or complicit in all this. If the Pakistan Army does not reassert itself soon enough, the Taliban, along with elements of the Punjabi LeT and JeM jihadis in their ranks, will become unstoppable. The Taliban’s vacation of Buner was almost as smooth as the takeover; they remain active in the hills of northern Pakistan. They could move into Gilgit and Baltistan.

One should be prepared for renewed efforts to infiltrate terrorists into India as the Pakistani establishment scurries to try and remain relevant in Kashmir.

The Pakistan Army’s future course of action will thus depend on whether or not it is convinced that it must take action against its surrogates, both among the Pashtuns and Punjabis; and if this action will cause multiple ruptures within the Army. The third factor, of course, is the amount of pressure the United States is able to sustain on the Pakistan Army.

Can Pakistan manage to save itself from itself?

Source : Asian Age 29th April 2009

North Korea - the world's last gulag reaching Persian Gulf

2009-05-30T11:11:00.000-07:00
This week International condemnation of North Korea's underground nuclear test resonated the world over - just in time for Pyongyang to defiantly test two short-range missiles. After the U.N. Security Council condemned Pyongyang's long-range rocket launch in April, the country walked away from all previous nuclear agreements and threatened to restore normal operation of the Yongbyon nuclear plant, reprocess spent fuel rods to extract plutonium bomb fuel, pursue a light-water reactor, conduct nuclear tests, and launch intercontinental ballistic missiles. Kim Jong II and company seem intent on pushing the limits of international patience, and raising the stakes with each provocation. But how worried should the world be? That is, what is North Korea actually capable of doing?

Concern over North Korea's tests is warranted. Pyongyang is on a well-planned trajectory to enhance its nuclear and missile capabilities. North Korea had slowed down the disablement of its nuclear facility, Yongbyon. It then launched a multistage rocket and walked away from the nuclear talks. Pyongyang is strengthening its "deterrent" threat by building more bombs, and possibly more-sophisticated ones at that.

How big is the problem?

The history of proliferation shows that few countries actually ever decide to pursue nuclear weapons. Obtaining them requires immense investment, and the ability to focus and coordinate a major national undertaking over time. It is not something a leader like Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez could decide to pursue on a whim. A national government must have cohesion over the long span of time necessary to go from the foundations of a weapons program to a meaningful deterrent capability.

In addition to this sustained commitment there must be the willingness to be suspected by the international community and endure isolation which themselves are significant risks for even moderately integrated economies. One must also have reasonable means of deterring a pre-emptive strike by a competing power. A Venezuelan weapons program is therefore unlikely because the United States would act decisively the moment one was discovered, and there is little Venezuela could do to deter such action.

North Korea, on the other hand, has held downtown Seoul (right across the demilitarized zone) at risk for generations with one of the highest concentrations of deployed artillery, artillery rockets and short-range ballistic missiles on the planet. From the outside, Pyongyang is perceived as unpredictable enough that any potential pre-emptive strike on its nuclear facilities is too risky not because of some newfound nuclear capability, but because of Pyongyang’s capability to turn the South Korean capital city into a “sea of fire” via conventional war. A nuclear North Korea, the world has now seen, is not sufficient alone to risk renewed war on the Korean Peninsula.

In other words, some other deterrent (be it conventional or unconventional) against attack is a prerequisite for a nuclear program, since powerful potential adversaries can otherwise move to halt such efforts. North Korea has such deterrent. Most other countries widely considered major proliferation dangers, for example, Iraq before 2003, Syria or Venezuela - do not. And that fundamental deterrent remains in place after the country acquires nuclear weapons.

North Korea shut down Yongbyon in July 2007, but began to restart the facility last month. The country has now restored the reprocessing facility and has begun extracting roughly plutonium from spent fuel. Although Yongbyon will not be able to complete reprocessing for four to six months, the anticipated increase in plutonium is what has allowed it to conduct this week's nuclear test. Without the additional plutonium, Pyongyang was limited roughly four to eight bombs worth. Its small nuclear arsenal was likely also primitive; its first nuclear test in 2006 was only partially successful. Hours before the test, Pyongyang informed China that it would conduct a test at 4 kilotons, but it achieved less than 1 (by comparison, the bomb at Nagasaki yielded an explosion of 21 kilotons). It appears the North Koreans scaled back their original design to 4 kilotons to avoid a massive breach of the test tunnel.

The test this time was more successful, producing a yield that is estimated at 2 to 4 kilotons. This test will enhance Pyongyang's confidence in its arsenal and may be an important step toward miniaturizing warheads to fit on its missiles. Still, the size of North Korea's nuclear arsenal will remain restricted by its limited plutonium inventory. Fully capable nuclear-tipped missiles will require further tests, so the sequence of these provocative steps foreshadows more of the same.

For now, North Korea will remain somewhat trapped by its minimal plutonium supply. To make more, Pyongyang would have to restart its Yongbyon reactor. It will take approximately six months to prepare fuel for the reactor and to rebuild the cooling tower that the country destroyed last June as a symbolic gesture. Once fueled, the reactor will produce 6 kilograms of plutonium, roughly one bomb's worth, per year for the next decade or so. Pyongyang is not currently capable of ramping up plutonium production from there. The threat to develop its own light-water reactor is not a great concern for plutonium production, but it does likely signal that North Korea will now seriously explore uranium enrichment capabilities. But it would take many years for Pyongyang to develop the uranium route to the bomb.

New additions to the nuclear club are always cause for concern. But though North Korea’s nuclear program continues apace, it hardly threatens to shift underlying geopolitical realities. It may encourage the United States to retain a slightly larger arsenal to reassure Japan and South Korea about the credibility of its nuclear umbrella. It also could encourage Tokyo and Seoul to pursue their own weapons. But none of these shifts, though significant, is likely to alter the defining military, economic and political dynamics of the region fundamentally.

Nuclear arms are better understood as an insurance policy, one that no potential aggressor has any intention of steering afoul of. Without practical military or political use, they remain held in reserve — where in all likelihood they will remain for the foreseeable future.

In short, no one was going to invade North Korea — or even launch limited military strikes against it — before its first nuclear test in 2006. And no one will do so now, nor will they do so after its next test. So North Korea – with or without nuclear weapons – remains secure from invasion. With or without nuclear weapons, North Korea remains a pariah state, isolated from the international community. And with or without them, the world will go on with no immediate danger from Pyongyang.

Where is the real threat then?

No, real threat is what North Korea did not threaten about : there is a terrifying way that North Korea could overcome its limitation while simultaneously helping another nuclear aspirant: It could work with Iran - by expanding nuclear and missile cooperation with Iran. The two countries' abilities and needs are highly complementary, and past collaboration tells us that the diplomatic channels may be as well.

Similar to North Korea, Iran is also defended. It can threaten to close the Strait of Hormuz, to launch a barrage of medium-range ballistic missiles at Israel, and to use its proxies in Lebanon and elsewhere to respond with a new campaign of artillery rocket fire, guerrilla warfare and terrorism. But the biggest deterrent to a strike on Iran is Tehran’s ability to seriously interfere in ongoing U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan — efforts already tenuous enough without direct Iranian opposition.

Pyongyang lacks uranium centrifuge materials, technology, and know-how; Tehran has mastered them. Pyongyang has practical uranium metallurgy capabilities; Tehran has little. Pyongyang has its own nuclear test data; Tehran does not. Pyongyang knows all facets of plutonium technology; Tehran has little more than a plutonium-producing reactor under construction. Pyongyang helped Tehran establish a missile capability; now, Tehran's crash missile-test program and Pyongyang's long-range rocket tests could prove mutually beneficial.

Preventing escalation of nuclear and missile cooperation is critical to avoid destabilizing Northeast Asia and the Middle East. The urgency of this threat is underscored by North Korea's recent covert construction of a nuclear reactor in Syria and its extensive ongoing cooperation in missile technology with Iran. At least in its nuclear reach, Pyongyang isn't quite as isolated as it seems.

US Counterterrorism

2009-05-02T05:51:00.000-07:00
Over the past couple of weeks, we have been carefully watching the fallout from the Obama administration’s decision to release four classified memos from former President George W. Bush’s administration that authorized “enhanced interrogation techniques.” In a visit to CIA headquarters last week, President Barack Obama promised not to prosecute agency personnel who carried out such interrogations, since they were following lawful orders. Critics of the techniques, such as Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., have called for the formation of a “truth commission” to investigate the matter, and Rep. Jerrold Nadler, D-N.Y., has called on Attorney General Eric Holder to appoint a special prosecutor to launch a criminal inquiry into the matter.

Realistically, those most likely to face investigation and prosecution are those who wrote the memos, rather than the low-level field personnel who acted in good faith based upon the guidance the memos provided. Despite this fact and Obama’s reassurances, our contacts in the intelligence community report that the release of the memos has had a discernible “chilling effect” on those in the clandestine service who work on counterterrorism issues.

In some ways, the debate over the morality of such interrogation techniques — something we do not take a position on and will not be discussing here — has distracted many observers from examining the impact that the release of these memos is having on the ability of the U.S. government to fulfill its counterterrorism mission. And this impact has little to do with the ability to use torture to interrogate terrorist suspects.

Politics and moral arguments aside, the end effect of the memos’ release is that people who have put their lives on the line in U.S. counterterrorism efforts are now uncertain of whether they should be making that sacrifice. Many of these people are now questioning whether the administration that happens to be in power at any given time will recognize the fact that they were carrying out lawful orders under a previous administration. It is hard to retain officers and attract quality recruits in this kind of environment. It has become safer to work in programs other than counterterrorism.

The memos’ release will not have a catastrophic effect on U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Indeed, most of the information in the memos was leaked to the press years ago and has long been public knowledge. However, when the release of the memos is examined in a wider context, and combined with a few other dynamics, it appears that the U.S. counterterrorism community is quietly slipping back into an atmosphere of risk-aversion and malaise — an atmosphere not dissimilar to that described by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) as a contributing factor to the intelligence failures that led to the 9/11 attacks.

Cycles Within Cycles

The decrease in funding not only will affect defensive counterterrorism initiatives like embassy security and counter-surveillance programs, but also will impact offensive programs such as the number of CIA personnel dedicated to the counterterrorism role.

Beyond funding, however, there is another historical cycle of booms and busts that can be seen in the conduct of American clandestine intelligence activities. There are clearly discernible periods when clandestine activities are deemed very important and are widely employed. These periods are inevitably followed by a time of investigations, reductions in clandestine activities and a tightening of control and oversight over such activities.

After the widespread employment of clandestine activities in the Vietnam War era, the Church Committee was convened in 1975 to review (and ultimately restrict) such operations. Former President Ronald Reagan’s appointment of Bill Casey as director of the CIA ushered in a new era of growth as the United States became heavily engaged in clandestine activities in Afghanistan and Central America. Then, the revelation of the Iran-Contra affair in 1986 led to a period of hearings and controls.

There was a slight uptick in clandestine activities under the presidency of George H.W. Bush, but the fall of the Soviet Union led to another bust cycle for the intelligence community. By the mid-1990s, the number of CIA stations and bases was dramatically reduced (and virtually eliminated in much of Africa) for budgetary considerations. Then there was the case of Jennifer Harbury, a Harvard-educated lawyer who used little-known provisions in Texas common law to marry a dead Guatemalan guerrilla commander and gain legal standing as his widow. After it was uncovered that a CIA source was involved in the guerrilla commander’s execution, CIA stations in Latin America were gutted for political reasons. The Harbury case also led to the Torricelli Amendment, a law that made recruiting unsavory people, such as those with ties to death squads and terrorist groups, illegal without special approval. This bust cycle was well documented by both the Crowe Commission, which investigated the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, and the 9/11 Commission.

After the 9/11 attacks, the pendulum swung radically to the permissive side and clandestine activity was rapidly and dramatically increased as the U.S. sought to close the intelligence gap and quickly develop intelligence on al Qaeda’s capability and plans. Developments over the past two years clearly indicate that the United States is once again entering an intelligence bust cycle, a period that will be marked by hearings, increased controls and a general decrease in clandestine activity.

Institutional Culture

It is also very important to realize that the counterterrorism community is just one small part of the larger intelligence community that is affected by this ebb and flow of covert activity. In fact, as noted above, the counterterrorism component of intelligence efforts has its own boom-and-bust cycle that is based on major attacks. Soon after a major attack, interest in counterterrorism spikes dramatically, but as time passes without a major attack, interest lags. Other than during the peak times of this cycle, counterterrorism is considered an ancillary program that is sometimes seen as an interesting side tour of duty, but more widely seen as being outside the mainstream career path — risky and not particularly career-enhancing. This assessment is reinforced by such events as the recent release of the memos.

At the CIA, being a counterterrorism specialist in the clandestine service means that you will most likely spend much of your life in places line Sanaa, Islamabad and Kabul instead of Vienna, Paris or London. This means that, in addition to hurting your chances for career advancement, your job also is quite dangerous, provides relatively poor living conditions for your family and offers the possibility of contracting serious diseases.

While being declared persona non grata and getting kicked out of a country as part of an intelligence spat is considered almost a badge of honor at the CIA, the threat of being arrested and indicted for participating in the rendition of a terrorist suspect from an allied country like Italy is not. Equally unappealing is being sued in civil court by a terrorist suspect or facing the possibility of prosecution after a change of government in the United States. Over the past few years, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of CIA case officers who are choosing to carry personal liability insurance because they do not trust the agency and the U.S. government to look out for their best interests.

Now, there are officers who are willing to endure hardship and who do not really care much about career advancement, but for those officers there is another hazard — frustration. Aggressive officers dedicated to the counterterrorism mission quickly learn that many of the people in the food chain above them are concerned about their careers, and these superiors often take measures to rein in their less-mainstream subordinates. Additionally, due to the restrictions brought about by laws and regulations like the Torricelli Amendment, case officers working counterterrorism are often tightly bound by myriad legal restrictions.

Unlike in television shows like “24,” it is not uncommon in the real world for a meeting called to plan a counterterrorism operation to feature more CIA lawyers than case officers or analysts. These staff lawyers are intricately involved in the operational decisions made at headquarters, and legal issues often trump operational considerations. The need to obtain legal approval often delays decisions long enough for a critical window of operational opportunity to be slammed shut. This restrictive legal environment goes back many years in the CIA and is not a new fixture brought in by the Obama administration. There was a sense of urgency that served to trump the lawyers to some extent after 9/11, but the lawyers never went away and have reasserted themselves firmly over the past several years.

Of course, the CIA is not the only agency with a culture that is less than supportive of the counterterrorism mission. Although the prevention of terrorist attacks in the United States is currently the FBI’s No. 1 priority on paper, the counterterrorism mission remains the bureau’s redheaded stepchild. The FBI is struggling to find agents willing to serve in the counterterrorism sections of field offices, resident agencies (smaller offices that report to a field office) and joint terrorism task forces.

While the CIA was very much built on the legacy of Wild Bill Donovan’s Office of Strategic Services, the FBI was founded by J. Edgar Hoover, a conservative and risk-averse administrator who served as FBI director from 1935-1972. Even today, Hoover’s influence is clearly evident in the FBI’s bureaucratic nature. FBI special agents are unable to do much at all, such as open an investigation, without a supervisor’s approval, and supervisors are reluctant to approve anything too adventurous because of the impact it might have on their chance for promotion. Unlike many other law enforcement agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration or the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the FBI rarely uses its own special agents in an undercover capacity to penetrate criminal organizations. That practice is seen as being too risky; they prefer to use confidential informants rather than undercover operatives.

The FBI is also strongly tied to its roots in law enforcement and criminal investigation, and special agents who work major theft, public corruption or white-collar crime cases tend to receive more recognition — and advance more quickly — than their counterterrorism counterparts.

FBI special agents also see a considerable downside to working counterterrorism cases because of the potential for such cases to blow up in their faces if they make a mistake — such as in the New York field office’s highly publicized mishandling of the informant whom they had inserted into the group that later conducted the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. It is much safer, and far more rewarding from a career perspective, to work bank robberies or serve in the FBI’s Inspection Division.

After the 9/11 attacks — and the corresponding spike in the importance of counterterrorism operations — many of the resources of the CIA and FBI were focused on al Qaeda and terrorism, to the detriment of programs such as foreign counterintelligence. However, the more time that has passed since 9/11 without another major attack, the more the organizational culture of the U.S government has returned to normal. Once again, counterterrorism efforts are seen as being ancillary duties rather than the organizations’ driving mission. (The clash between organizational culture and the counterterrorism mission is by no means confined to the CIA and FBI. Fred’s book “Ghost: Confessions of a Counterterrorism Agent” provides a detailed examination of some of the bureaucratic and cultural challenges we faced while serving in the Counterterrorism Investigations Division of the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service.)

Liaison Services

One of the least well known, and perhaps most important, sources of intelligence in the counterterrorism field is the information that is obtained as a result of close relationships with allied intelligence agencies — often referred to as information obtained through “liaison channels.”

Like FBI agents, most CIA officers are well-educated, middle-aged white guys. This means they are better suited to use the cover of an American businessmen or diplomat than to pretend to be a young Muslim trying to join al Qaeda or Hezbollah. Like their counterparts in the FBI, CIA officers have far more success using informants than they do working undercover inside terrorist groups.

Services like the Jordanian General Intelligence Department, the Saudi Mabahith or the Yemeni National Security Agency not only can recruit sources, but also are far more successful in using young Muslim officers to penetrate terrorist groups. In addition to their source networks and penetration operations, many of these liaison services are not at all squeamish about using extremely enhanced interrogation techniques — this is the reason many of the terrorism suspects who were the subject of rendition operations ended up in such locations. Obviously, whenever the CIA is dealing with a liaison service, the political interests and objectives of the service must be considered — as should the possibility that the liaison service is fabricating the intelligence in question for whatever reason. Still, in the end, the CIA historically has received a significant amount of important intelligence (perhaps even most of its intelligence) via liaison channels.

Another concern that arises from the call for a truth commission is the impact a commission investigation could have on the liaison services that have helped the United States in its counterterrorism efforts since 9/11. Countries that hosted CIA detention facilities or were involved in the rendition or interrogation of terrorist suspects may find themselves exposed publicly or even held up for some sort of sanction by the U.S. Congress. Such activities could have a real impact on the amount of cooperation and information the CIA receives from these intelligence services.

Conclusion

As we’ve previously noted, it was a lack of intelligence that helped fuel the fear that led the Bush administration to authorize enhanced interrogation techniques. Ironically, the current investigation into those techniques and other practices (such as renditions) may very well lead to significant gaps in terrorism-related intelligence from both internal and liaison sources — again, not primarily because of the prohibition of torture, but because of larger implications.

When these implications are combined with the long-standing institutional aversion of U.S. government agencies toward counterterrorism, and with the difficulty of finding and retaining good people willing to serve in counterterrorism roles, the U.S. counterterrorism community may soon be facing challenges even more daunting than those posed by its already difficult mission.

US Presidential Realities and Barrack Obama's 100 Days

2009-05-02T05:47:00.000-07:00
U.S. presidential candidates run for office as if they would be free to act however they wish once elected. But upon election, they govern as they must. The freedom of the campaign trail contrasts sharply with the constraints of reality.

The test of a president is how effectively he bridges the gap between what he said he would do and what he finds he must do. Great presidents achieve this seamlessly, while mediocre presidents never recover from the transition. All presidents make the shift, including Obama, who spent his first hundred days on this task.

Obama won the presidency with a much smaller margin than his supporters seem to believe. Despite his wide margin in the Electoral College, more than 47 percent of voters cast ballots against him. Obama was acutely aware of this and focused on making certain not to create a massive split in the country from the outset of his term. He did this in foreign policy by keeping Robert Gates on as defense secretary, bringing in Hillary Clinton, Richard Holbrooke and George Mitchell in key roles and essentially extrapolating from the Bush foreign policy. So far, this has worked. Obama’s approval rating rests at 69 percent, which The Washington Post notes is average for presidents at the hundred-day mark.

Obama, of course, came into office in circumstances he did not anticipate when he began campaigning — namely, the financial and economic crisis that really began to bite in September 2008. Obama had no problem bridging the gap between campaign and governance with regard to this matter, as his campaign neither anticipated nor proposed strategies for the crisis — it just hit. The general pattern for dealing with the crisis was set during the Bush administration, when the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board put in place a strategy of infusing money into failing institutions to prevent what they feared would be a calamitous economic chain reaction.

Obama continued the Bush policy, though he added a stimulus package. But such a package had been discussed in the Bush administration, and it is unlikely that Sen. John McCain would have avoided creating one had he been elected. Obviously, the particular projects funded and the particular interests favored would differ between McCain and Obama, but the essential principle would not. The financial crisis would have been handled the same way — just as everything from the Third World debt crisis to the Savings and Loan crisis would have been handled the same way no matter who was president. Under either man, the vast net worth of the United States (we estimate it at about $350 trillion) would have been tapped by printing money and raising taxes, and U.S. assets would have been used to underwrite bad investments, increase consumption and build political coalitions through pork. Obama had no plan for this. Instead, he expanded upon the Bush administration solution and followed tradition.

The Reality of International Affairs

The manner in which Obama was trapped by reality is most clear with regard to international affairs. At the heart of Obama’s campaign was the idea that one of the major failures of the Bush administration was alienating the European allies of the United States. Obama argued that a more forthcoming approach to the Europeans would yield a more forthcoming response. In fact, the Europeans were no more forthcoming with Obama than they were with Bush.

Obama’s latest trip to Europe focused on two American demands and one European — primarily German — demand. Obama wanted the Germans to increase their economic stimulus plan because Germany is the largest exporter in the world. With the United States stimulating its economy, the Germans could solve their economic problem simply by increasing exports into the United States. This would limit job creation in the United States, particularly because German exports involve automobiles as well as other things, and Obama has struggled to build domestic demand for U.S. autos. Thus, he wanted the Germans to build domestic demand and not just rely on the United States to pull Germany out of recession. But the Germans refused, arguing that they could not afford a major stimulus now (when in fact they have no reason to be flexible, because the U.S. stimulus is going to help them no matter what Germany does).

Germany’s and France’s unwillingness to provide substantially more support in Afghanistan gave Obama a second disappointment. Some European troops were sent, but their numbers were few and their mission was limited to a very short period. (In some cases, the European force contribution will focus on training indigenous police officers, which will take a year or more to really have an impact.) The French and Germans essentially were as unwilling to deal with Obama as they were with Bush on this matter.

The Europeans, on the other hand, wanted a major effort by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Central European banking system, largely owned by banks from more established European countries, has reached a crisis state because of aggressive lending policies. The Germans in particular don’t want to bail out these banks; they want the IMF to do so. Put differently, they want the United States, China and Japan to help underwrite the European banking system. Obama did agree to contribute to this effort, but not nearly on the scale the Europeans wanted.

On the whole, the Europeans gave two big nos, while the Americans gave a mild yes. In substantive terms, the U.S.-European relationship is no better than it was under Bush. In terms of perception, however, the Obama administration managed a brilliant coup, shifting the focus to the changed atmosphere that prevailed at the meeting. Indeed, all parties wanted to emphasize the atmospherics, and judging from media coverage, they succeeded. The trip accordingly was perceived as a triumph.

Campaign Promises and Public Perception

This is not a trivial achievement. There are campaign promises, there is reality and there is public perception. All presidents must move from campaigning to governing; extremely skilled presidents manage the shift without appearing duplicitous. At least in the European case, Obama has managed the shift without suffering political damage. His core supporters appear prepared to support him independent of results. And that is an important foundation for effective governance.

We can see the same continuity in his treatment of Russia. When he ran for president, Obama pledged to abandon the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) deployment in Poland amid a great show made about resetting U.S. Russia policy. On taking office, however, he encountered the reality of the Russian position, which is that Russia wants to be the pre-eminent power in the former Soviet Union. The Bush administration took the position that the United States must be free to maintain bilateral relations with any country, to include the ability to extend NATO membership to interested countries. Obama has reaffirmed this core U.S. position.

The United States has asked for Russian help in two areas. First, Washington asked for a second supply line into Afghanistan. Moscow agreed so long as no military equipment was shipped in. Second, Washington offered to withdraw its BMD system from Poland in return for help from Moscow in blocking Iran’s development of nuclear weapons and missiles. The Russians refused, understanding that the offer on BMD was not worth removing a massive thorn (i.e., Iran) from the Americans’ side.

In other words, U.S.-Russian relations are about where they were in the Bush administration, and Obama’s substantive position is not materially different from the Bush administration’s position. The BMD deal remains in place, the United States is not depending on Russian help on logistics in Afghanistan, and Washington has not backed off on the principle of NATO expansion (even if expansion is most unlikely).

In Iraq, Obama has essentially followed the reality created under the Bush administration, shifting withdrawal dates somewhat but following the Petraeus strategy there and extending it — or trying to extend it — to Afghanistan. The Pakistani problem, of course, presents the greatest challenge (as it would have for any president), and Obama is coping with it to the extent possible.

Obama’s managing of perceptions as opposed to actually making policy changes shows up most clearly in regard to Iran. Obama tried to open the door to Tehran by indicating that he was prepared to talk to the Iranians without preconditions — that is, without any prior commitment on the part of the Iranians regarding nuclear development. The Iranians reacted by rejecting the opening, essentially saying Obama’s overture was merely a gesture, not a substantial shift in American policy. The Iranians are, of course, quite correct in this. Obama fully understands that he cannot shift policy on Iran without a host of regional complications. For example, the Saudis would be enormously upset by such an opening, while the Syrians would have to re-evaluate their entire position on openings to Israel and the United States. Changing U.S. Iranian policy is hard to do. There is a reason Washington has the policy it does, and that reason extends beyond presidents and policymakers.

When we look at Obama’s substantive foreign policy, we see continuity rather than changes. Certainly, the rhetoric has changed, and that is not insignificant; atmospherics do play a role in foreign affairs. Nevertheless, when we look across the globe, we see the same configuration of relationships, the same partners, the same enemies and the same ambiguity that dominates most global relations.

Turkey and the Substantial U.S. Shift

One substantial shift has taken place, however, and that one is with Turkey. The Obama administration has made major overtures to Turkey in multiple forms, from a presidential visit to putting U.S. anti-piracy vessels under Turkish command. These are not symbolic moves. The United States needs Turkey to counterbalance Iran, protect U.S. interests in the Caucasus, help stabilize Iraq, serve as a bridge to Syria and help in Afghanistan. Obama has clearly shifted strategy here in response to changing conditions in the region.

Intriguingly, the change in U.S.-Turkish relations never surfaced as even a minor issue during the U.S. presidential campaign. It emerged after the election because of changes in the configuration of the international system. Shifts in Russian policy, the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and shifts within Turkey that allowed the country to begin its return to the international arena all came together to make this necessary, and Obama responded.

None of this is designed to denigrate Obama in the least. While many of his followers may be dismayed, and while many of his critics might be unwilling to notice, the fact is that a single concept dominated Obama’s first hundred days: continuity. In the face of the realities of his domestic political position and the U.S. strategic position, as well as the economic crisis, Obama did what he had to do, and what he had to do very much followed from what Bush did. It is fascinating that both Obama’s supporters and his critics think he has made far more changes than he really has.

Of course, this is only the first hundred days. Presidents look for room to maneuver after they do what they need to do in the short run. Some presidents use that room to pursue policies that weaken, and even destroy, their presidencies. Others find ways to enhance their position. But normally, the hardest thing a president faces is finding the space to do the things he wants to do rather than what he must do. Obama came through the first hundred days following the path laid out for him. It is only in Turkey where he made a move that he wasn’t compelled to make just now, but that had to happen at some point. It will be interesting to see how many more such moves he makes.

Al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula

2009-04-13T13:48:00.000-07:00

The media wing of one of al Qaeda’s Yemeni franchises, al Qaeda in Yemen, released a statement on online jihadist forums Jan. 20 from the group’s leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi, announcing the formation of a single al Qaeda group for the Arabian Peninsula under his command. According to al-Wuhayshi, the new group, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, would consist of his former group (al Qaeda in Yemen) as well as members of the now-defunct Saudi al Qaeda franchise.

The press release noted that the Saudi militants have pledged allegiance to al-Wuhayshi, an indication that the reorganization was not a merger of equals. This is understandable, given that the jihadists in Yemen have been active recently while their Saudi counterparts have not conducted a meaningful attack in years. The announcement also related that a Saudi national (and former Guantanamo detainee) identified as Abu-Sayyaf al-Shihri has been appointed as al-Wuhayshi’s deputy. In some ways, this is similar to the way Ayman al-Zawahiri and his faction of Egyptian Islamic Jihad swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden and were integrated in to al Qaeda prime.

While not specifically mentioned, the announcement of a single al Qaeda entity for the entire Arabian Peninsula and the unanimous support by jihadist militants on the Arabian Peninsula for al-Wuhayshi suggests the new organization will incorporate elements of the other al Qaeda franchise in Yemen, the Yemen Soldiers Brigade.

The announcement also provided links to downloadable versions of the latest issue of the group’s online magazine, Sada al-Malahim, (Arabic for “The Echo of Battle”). The Web page links provided to download the magazine also featured trailers advertising the pending release of a new video from the group, now referred to by its new name, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

The translated name of this new organization sounds very similar to the old Saudi al Qaeda franchise, the al Qaeda Organization in the Arabian Peninsula (in Arabic, “Tandheem al Qaeda fi Jazeerat al-Arabiyah”). But the new group’s new Arabic name, Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Jazirat al-Arab, is slightly different. The addition of “al-Jihad” seems to have been influenced by the Iraqi al Qaeda franchise, Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn. The flag of the Islamic State of Iraq also appears in the Jan. 24 video, further illustrating the deep ties between the newly announced organization and al Qaeda in Iraq. Indeed, a number of Yemeni militants traveled to Iraq to fight, and these returning al Qaeda veterans have played a large part in the increased sophistication of militant attacks in Yemen over the past year.

Four days after the Jan. 20 announcement, links for a 19-minute video from the new group titled “We Start from Here and We Will Meet at al-Aqsa” began to appear in jihadist corners of cyberspace. Al-Aqsa refers to the al-Aqsa Mosque on what Jews know as Temple Mount and Muslims refer to as Al Haram Al Sharif. The video threatens Muslim leaders in the region (whom it refers to as criminal tyrants), including Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the Saudi royal family, and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. It also threatens so-called “crusader forces” supporting the regional Muslim leaders, and promises to carry the jihad from the Arabian Peninsula to Israel so as to liberate Muslim holy sites and brethren in Gaza.

An interview with al-Wuhayshi aired Jan. 27 on Al Jazeera echoed these sentiments. During the interview, al-Wuhayshi noted that the “crusades” against “Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia” have been launched from bases in the Arabian Peninsula, and that because of this, “all crusader interests” in the peninsula “should be struck.”
A Different Take on Events

Most of the analysis in Western media regarding the preceding developments has focused on how two former detainees at the U.S. facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, appear in the Jan. 24 video — one of whom was al-Shihri — and that both were graduates of Saudi Arabia’s ideological rehabilitation program, a government deprogramming course for jihadists. In addition to al-Shihri who, according to the video was Guantanamo detainee 372, the video also contains a statement from Abu-al-Harith Muhammad al-Awfi. Al-Awfi, who was identified as a field commander in the video, was allegedly former Guantanamo detainee 333. Prisoner lists from Guantanamo obtained by Stratfor appear to confirm that al-Shihri was in fact Guantanamo detainee No. 372. We did not find al-Awfi’s name on the list, however, another name appears as detainee No. 333. Given the proclivity of jihadists to use fraudulent identities, it is entirely possible that al-Awfi is an alias, or that he was held at Guantanamo under an assumed name. At any rate, we doubt al-Awfi would fabricate this claim and then broadcast it in such a public manner.

The media focus on the Guantanamo aspect is understandable in the wake of U.S. President Barack Obama’s Jan. 22 executive order to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility and all the complexities surrounding that decision. Clearly, some men released from Guantanamo, and even those graduated from the Saudi government’s rehabilitation program, can and have returned to the jihadist fold. Ideology is hard to extinguish, especially an ideology that teaches adherents that there is a war against Islam and that the “true believers” will be persecuted for their beliefs. Al Qaeda has even taken this one step further and has worked to prepare its members not only to face death, but also to endure imprisonment and harsh interrogation. A substantial number of al Qaeda cadres, such as al-Zawahiri and Abu Yahya al-Lib i, have endured both, and have been instrumental in helping members withstand captivity and interrogation.

This physical and ideological preparation means that efforts to induce captured militants to abandon their ideology can wind up reinforcing that ideology when those efforts appear to prove important tenets of the ideology, such as that adherents will be persecuted and that the Muslim rulers are aligned with the West. It is also important to realize that radical Islamist extremists, ultraconservatives and traditionalists tend to have a far better grasp of Islamic religious texts than their moderate, liberal and modernist counterparts. Hence, they have an edge over them on the ideological battlefield. Those opposing radicals and extremists have a long way to go before they can produce a coherent legitimate, authoritative and authentic alternative Islamic discourse.

In any event, in practical terms there is no system of “re-education” that is 100 percent effective in eradicating an ideology in humans except execution. There will always be people who will figure out how to game the system and regurgitate whatever is necessary to placate their jailers so as to win release. Because of this, it is not surprising to see people like al-Shihri and al-Awfi released only to re-emerge in their former molds.

Another remarkable feature of the Jan. 27 video is that it showcased four different leaders of the regional group, something rarely seen. In addition to al-Wuhayshi, al-Shihri and al-Awfi, the video also included a statement from Qasim al-Rami, who is suspected of having been involved with the operational planning of the suicide attack on a group of Spanish tourists in Marib, Yemen, in July 2007.

In our estimation, however, perhaps the most remarkable feature about these recent statements from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is not the appearance of these two former Guantanamo detainees in the video, or the appearance of four distinct leaders of the group in a single video, but rather what the statements tell us about the state of the al Qaeda franchises in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
Signposts

That the remnants of the Saudi al Qaeda franchise have been forced to flee their country and join up with the Yemeni group demonstrates that the Saudi government’s campaign to eradicate the jihadist organization has been very successful. The Saudi franchise was very active in 2003 and 2004, but has not attempted a significant attack since the February 2006 attack against the oil facility in Abqaiq. In spite of the large number of Saudi fighters who have traveled to militant training camps, and to fight in places such as Iraq, the Saudi franchise has had significant problems organizing operational cells inside the kingdom. Additionally, since the death of Abdel Aziz al-Muqrin, the Saudi franchise has struggled to find a charismatic and savvy leader. (The Saudis have killed several leaders who succeeded al-Muqrin.) In a militant organization conducting an insurgency or terrorist operations, leadership is critical not only to the operational success of the group but also to its ability to recruit new members, raise funding and acquire resources such as weapons.

Like the Saudi node, the fortunes of other al Qaeda regional franchises have risen or fallen based upon ability of the franchise’s leadership. For example, in August 2006 al Qaeda announced with great fanfare that the Egyptian militant group Gamaah al-Islamiyah (GAI) had joined forces with al Qaeda. Likewise, in November 2007 al Qaeda announced that the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) had formally joined the al Qaeda network. But neither of these groups really ever got off the ground. While a large portion of the responsibility for the groups’ lack of success may be due to the oppressive natures of the Egyptian and Libyan governments and the aggressive efforts those governments undertook to control the new al Qaeda franchise s, we believe the lack of success also stems from poor leadership. (There are certainly other significant factors contributing to the failure of al Qaeda nodes in various places, such as the alienation of the local population.)

Conversely, we believe that an important reason for the resurgence of the al Qaeda franchise in Yemen has been the leadership of al-Wuhayshi. As we have noted in the past, Yemen is a much easier environment for militants to operate in than either Egypt or Libya. There are many Salafists employed in the Yemeni security and intelligence apparatus who at the very least are sympathetic to the jihadist cause. These men are holdovers from the Yemeni civil war, when Saleh formed an alliance with Salafists and recruited jihadists to fight Marxist forces in South Yemen. This alliance continues today, with Saleh deriving significant political support from radical Islamists. Many of the state’s key institutions (including the military) employ Salafists, making any major crackdown on militant Islamists in the country politically difficult. This sen timent among the security forces also helps explain the many jihadists who have escaped from Yemeni prisons — such as al-Wuhayshi.

Yemen has also long been at the crossroads of a number of jihadist theaters, including Afghanistan/Pakistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Levant, Egypt and Somalia. Yemen also is a country with a thriving arms market, a desert warrior tradition and a tribal culture that often bridles against government authority and that makes it difficult for the government to assert control over large swaths of the country. Yemeni tribesmen also tend to be religiously conservative and susceptible to the influence of jihadist theology.

In spite of this favorable environment, the Yemeni al Qaeda franchise has largely floundered since 9/11. Much of this is due to U.S. and Yemeni efforts to decapitate the group, such as the strike by a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle on then-leader of al Qaeda in Yemen, Abu Ali al-Harithi, in late 2002 and the subsequent arrest of his replacement, Mohammed Hamdi al-Ahdal, in late 2003. The combination of these operations in such a short period helped cripple al Qaeda in Yemen’s operational capability.

As Stratfor noted in spring 2008, however, al Qaeda militants in Yemen have become more active and more effective under the leadership of al-Wuhayshi, an ethnic Yemeni who spent time in Afghanistan as a lieutenant under bin Laden. After his time with bin Laden, Iranian authorities arrested al-Wuhayshi, later returning him to Yemen in 2003 via an Iranian-Yemeni extradition deal. He subsequently escaped from a high-security prison outside the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, in February 2006 along with Jamal al-Badawi (the leader of the cell that carried out the suicide bombing of the USS Cole).

Al-Wuhayshi’s established ties with al Qaeda prime and bin Laden in particular not only provide him legitimacy in the eyes of other jihadists, in more practical terms, they may have provided him the opportunity to learn the tradecraft necessary to successfully lead a militant group and conduct operations. His close ties to influential veterans of al Qaeda in Yemen like al-Badawi also may have helped him infuse new energy into the struggle in Yemen in 2008.

While the group had been on a rising trajectory in 2008, things had been eerily quiet in Yemen since the Sept. 17, 2008, attack against the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa and the resulting campaign against the group. The recent flurry of statements has broken the quiet, followed by a Warden Message on Jan. 26 warning of a possible threat against the compound of the U.S. Embassy in Yemen and a firefight at a security checkpoint near the embassy hours later.

At this point, it appears the shooting incident may not be related to the threat warning and may instead have been the result of jumpy nerves. Reports suggest the police may have fired at a speeding car before the occupants, who were armed tribesmen, fired back. Although there have been efforts to crack down on the carrying of weapons in Sanaa, virtually every Yemeni male owns an AK-variant assault rifle of some sort; like the ceremonial jambiya dagger, such a rifle is considered a must-have accessory in most parts of the country. Not surprisingly, incidents involving gunfire are not uncommon in Yemen.

Either way, we will continue to keep a close eye on Yemen and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. As we have seen in the past, press statements are not necessarily indicative of future jihadist performance. It will be important to watch developments in Yemen for signs that will help determine whether this recent merger and announcement is a sign of desperation by a declining group, or whether the addition of fresh blood from Saudi Arabia will help breathe new life into al-Wuhayshi’s operations and provide his group the means to make good on its threats.

Central America: An Emerging Role in the Drug Trade

2009-04-12T11:03:00.000-07:00

We have observed some significant developments in the drug trade in the Western Hemisphere over the past year. While the United States remains the top destination for South American-produced cocaine, and Mexico continues to serve as the primary transshipment route, the path between Mexico and South America is clearly changing.

These changes have been most pronounced in Central America, where Mexican drug-trafficking organizations have begun to rely increasingly on land-based smuggling routes as several countries in the region have stepped up monitoring and interdiction of airborne and maritime shipments transiting from South America to Mexico.

The results of these changes have been extraordinary. According to a December 2008 report from the U.S. National Drug Intelligence Center, less than 1 percent of the estimated 600 to 700 tons of cocaine that departed South America for the United States in 2007 transited Central America. The rest, for the most part, passed through the Caribbean Sea or Pacific Ocean en route to Mexico. Since then, land-based shipment of cocaine through Central America appears to have ballooned. Earlier this month, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala Stephen McFarland estimated in an interview with a Guatemalan newspaper that cocaine now passes through that country at a rate of approximately 300 to 400 tons per year.

Notwithstanding the difficulty associated with estimating drug flows, it is clear that Central America has evolved into a significant transshipment route for drugs, and that the changes have taken place rapidly. These developments warrant a closer look at the mechanics of the drug trade in the region, the actors involved, and the implications for Central American governments — for whom drug-trafficking organizations represent a much more daunting threat than they do for Mexico.

Some Background

While the drug trade in the Western Hemisphere is multifaceted, it fundamentally revolves around the trafficking of South American-produced cocaine to the United States, the world’s largest market for the drug. Drug shipment routes between Peru and Colombia — where the vast majority of cocaine is cultivated and produced — and the United States historically have been flexible, evolving in response to interdiction efforts or changing markets. For example, Colombian drug traffickers used to control the bulk of the cocaine trade by managing shipping routes along the Caribbean smuggling corridor directly to the United States. By the 1990s, however, as the United States and other countries began to focus surveillance and interdiction efforts along this corridor, the flow of U.S.-bound drugs was forced into Mexico, which remains the main transshipment route for the overwhelming majority of cocaine entering the United States.

A similar situation has been occurring over the last two years in Central America. From the 1990s until as recently as 2007, traffickers in Mexico received multiton shipments of cocaine from South America. There was ample evidence of this, including occasional discoveries of bulk cocaine on everything from small propeller aircraft and Gulfstream jets to self-propelled semisubmersible vessels, fishing trawlers and cargo ships. These smuggling platforms had sufficient range and capacity to bypass Central America and ship bulk drugs directly to Mexico.

By early 2008, however, a series of developments in several Central American countries suggested that drug-trafficking organizations — Mexican cartels in particular — were increasingly trying to establish new land-based smuggling routes through Central America for cocaine shipments from South America to Mexico and eventual delivery to the United States. While small quantities of drugs had certainly transited the region in the past, the routes used presented an assortment of risks. A combination of poorly maintained highways, frequent border crossings, volatile security conditions and unpredictable local criminal organizations apparently presented such great logistical challenges that traffickers opted to send the majority of their shipments through well-established maritime and airborne platforms.

In response to this relatively unchecked international smuggling, several countries in the region began taking steps to increase the monitoring and interdiction of such shipments. The Colombian government, for one, stepped up monitoring of aircraft operating in its airspace. The Mexican government installed updated radar systems and reduced the number of airports authorized to receive flights originating in Central and South America. The Colombian government estimates that the aerial trafficking of cocaine from Colombia has decreased by as much as 90 percent since 2003.

Maritime trafficking also appears to have suffered over the past few years, most likely due to greater cooperation and information-sharing between Mexico and the United States. The United States has an immense capability to collect maritime technical intelligence, and an increasing degree of awareness regarding drug trafficking at sea. Two examples of this progress include the Mexican navy’s July 2008 capture — acting on intelligence provided by the United States — of a self-propelled semisubmersible vessel loaded with more than five tons of cocaine, and the U.S. Coast Guard’s February 2009 interdiction of a Mexico-flagged fishing boat loaded with some seven tons of cocaine about 700 miles off Mexico’s Pacific coast. Presumably as a result of successes such as these, the Mexican navy reported in 2008 that maritime trafficking had decreased by an estimated 60 percent over the last two years.

While it is impossible to independently corroborate the Mexican and Colombian governments’ estimates on the degree to which air- and seaborne drug trafficking has decreased over the last few years, developments in Central America over the past year certainly support their assessments. In particular, we have observed that in order to make up for losses in maritime and aerial trafficking, land-based smuggling routes are increasingly being used — not by Colombian cocaine producers or even Central American drug gangs, but by the now much more powerful Mexican drug-trafficking organizations.

Mechanics of Central American Drug Trafficking

It is important to clarify that what we are defining as land-based trafficking is not limited to overland smuggling. The methods associated with land-based trafficking can be divided into three categories: overland smuggling, littoral maritime trafficking and short-range aerial trafficking.

The most straightforward of these is simple overland smuggling. As a series of investigations in Panama, Costa Rica and Nicaragua demonstrated last year, overland smuggling operations use a wide variety of approaches. In one case, authorities pieced together a portion of a route being used by Mexico’s Sinaloa cartel in which small quantities of drugs entered Costa Rica from Panama via the international point of entry on the Pan-American Highway. The cocaine was often held for several days in a storage facility before being loaded onto another vehicle to be driven across the country on major highways. Upon approaching the Nicaraguan border, however, the traffickers opted to avoid the official port of entry and instead transferred the shipments into Nicaragua on foot or on horseback along a remote part of the border. Once across, the shipments were taken to the shores of the large inland Lake Nicaragua, where they were transferred onto boats to be taken north, at which point they would be loaded onto vehicles to be driven toward the Honduran border. In one case in Nicaragua, authorities uncovered another Sinaloa-linked route that passed through Managua and is believed to have followed the Pan-American Highway through Honduras and into El Salvador.

The second method associated with land-based trafficking involves littoral maritime operations. Whereas long-range maritime trafficking involves large cargo ships and self-propelled semi-submersible vessels capable of delivering multiton shipments of drugs from South America to Mexico without having to refuel, littoral trafficking tends to involve so-called “go-fast boats” that are used to carry smaller quantities of drugs at higher speeds over shorter distances. This method is useful to traffickers who might want to avoid, for whatever reason, a certain stretch of highway or perhaps even an entire country. According to Nicaraguan military officials, several go-fast boats are suspected of operating off the country’s coasts and of sailing outside Nicaraguan territorial waters in order to avoid authorities. While it is possible to make the entire trip from South America to Mexico using only this method — and making frequent refueling stops — it is believed that littoral trafficking is often combined with an overland network.

The third method associated with land-based drug smuggling involves short-range aerial operations. In these cases, clandestine planes make stops in Central America before either transferring their cargo to a land vehicle or making another short flight toward Mexico. Over the past year, several small planes loaded with drugs or cash have crashed or been seized in Honduras, Mexico and other countries in the region. In addition, authorities in Guatemala have uncovered several clandestine airstrips allegedly managed by the Mexican drug-trafficking organization Los Zetas. These examples suggest that even as overall aerial trafficking appears to have decreased dramatically, the practice continues in Central America. Indeed, there is little reason to expect that it would not continue, considering that many countries in the region lack the resources to adequately monitor their airspace.

While each of these three methods involves a different approach to drug smuggling, the methods share two important similarities. For one, the vehicles involved — be they speedboats, small aircraft or private vehicles — have limited cargo capacities, which means land-based trafficking generally involves cocaine shipments in quantities no greater than a few hundred pounds. While smaller quantities in more frequent shipments mean more handling, they also mean that less product is lost if a shipment is seized. More importantly, each of these land-based methods requires that a drug-trafficking organization maintain a presence inside Central America.

Actors Involved

There are a variety of drug-trafficking organizations operating inside Central America. In addition to some of the notorious local gangs — such as Calle 18 and MS-13 — there is also a healthy presence of foreign criminal organizations. Colombian drug traffickers, for example, historically have been no strangers to the region. However, as we have observed over the past year, it is the more powerful Mexico-based drug-trafficking organizations that appear to be overwhelmingly responsible for the recent upticks in land-based narcotics smuggling in Central America.

Based on reports of arrests and drug seizures in the region over the past year, it is clear that no single Mexican cartel maintains a monopoly on land-based drug trafficking in Central America. Los Zetas, for example, are extremely active in several parts of Guatemala, where they engage in overland and short-range aerial trafficking. The Sinaloa cartel, which we believe is the most capable Mexican trafficker of cocaine, has been detected operating a fairly extensive overland smuggling route from Panama to El Salvador. Some intelligence gaps remain regarding, for example, the precise route Sinaloa follows from El Salvador to Mexico or the route Los Zetas use between South America and Guatemala. It is certainly possible that these two Mexican cartels do not rely exclusively on any single route or method in the region. But the logistical challenges associated with establishing even one route across Central America make it likely that existing routes are maintained even after they have been detected — and are defended if necessary.

The operators of the Mexican cartel-managed routes also do not match a single profile. At times, Mexican cartel members themselves have been found to be operating in Central America. More common is the involvement of locals in various phases of smuggling operations. Nicaraguan and Salvadoran nationals, for example,have been arrested in northwestern Nicaragua for operating a Sinaloa-linked overland and littoral route into El Salvador. Authorities in Costa Rica have arrested Costa Rican nationals for their involvement in overland routes through that country. In that case, a related investigation in Panama led to the arrest of several Mexican nationals who reportedly had recently arrived in the area to more closely monitor the operation of their route.

One exception is Guatemala, where Mexican drug traffickers appear to operate much more extensively than in any other Central American country; this may be due, at least in part, to the relationship between Los Zetas and the Guatemalan Kaibiles. Beyond the apparently more-established Zeta smuggling operations there, several recent drug seizures — including an enormous 1,800-acre poppy plantation attributed to the Sinaloa cartel — make it clear that other Mexican drug-trafficking organizations are currently active inside Guatemala. Sinaloa was first suspected of increasing its presence in Guatemala in early 2008, when rumors surfaced that the cartel was attempting to recruit local criminal organizations to support its own drug-trafficking operations there. The ongoing Zeta-Sinaloa rivalry at that time triggered a series of deadly firefights in Guatemala, prompting fears that the bloody turf battles that had led to record levels of organized crime-related violence inside Mexico would extend into Central America.

Security Implications in Central America

Despite these concerns and the growing presence of Mexican traffickers in the region, there apparently have been no significant spikes in drug-related violence in Central America outside of Guatemala. Several factors may explain this relative lack of violence.

First, most governments in Central America have yet to launch large-scale counternarcotics campaigns. The seizures and arrests that have been reported so far have generally been the result of regular police work, as opposed to broad changes in policies or a significant commitment of resources to address the problem. More significantly, though, the quantities of drugs seized probably amount to just a drop in the bucket compared to the quantity of drugs that moves through the region on a regular basis. Because seizures have remained low, Mexican drug traffickers have yet to launch any significant reprisal attacks against government officials in any country outside Guatemala. In that country, even the president has received death threats and had his office bugged, allegedly by drug traffickers.

The second factor, which is related to the first, is that drug traffickers operating in Central America likely rely more heavily on bribes than on intimidation to secure the transit of drug shipments. This assessment follows from the region’s reputation for official corruption (especially in countries like Nicaragua, Honduras, Panama and Guatemala) and the economic disadvantage that many of these countries face compared to the Mexican cartels. For example, the gross domestic product of Honduras is $12 billion, while the estimated share of the drug trade controlled by the Mexican cartels is estimated to be $20 billion.
Finally, Mexican cartels currently have their hands full at home. Although Central America has undeniably become more strategically important for the flow of drugs from South America, the cartels in Mexico have simultaneously been engaged in a two-front war at home against the Mexican government and against rival criminal organizations. As long as this war continues at its present level, Mexican drug traffickers may be reluctant to divert significant resources too far from their home turf, which remains crucial in delivering drug shipments to the United States.

Looking Ahead

That said, there is no guarantee that Central America will continue to escape the wrath of Mexican drug traffickers. On the contrary, there is reason for concern that the region will increasingly become a battleground in the Mexican cartel war.
For one thing, the Merida Initiative, a U.S. anti-drug aid program that will put some $300 million into Mexico and about $100 million into Central America over the next year, could be perceived as a meaningful threat to drug-trafficking operations. If Central American governments choose to step up counternarcotics operations, either at the request of the United States or in order to qualify for more Merida money, they risk disrupting existing smuggling operations to the extent that cartels begin to retaliate.

Also, even though Mexican cartels may be reluctant to divert major resources from the more important war at home, it is important to recognize that a large-scale reassignment of cartel operatives or resources from Mexico to Central America might not be necessary to have a significant impact on the security situation in any given Central American country. Given the rampant corruption and relatively poor protective security programs in place for political leaders in the region, very few cartel operatives or resources would actually be needed if a Mexican drug-trafficking organization chose to, for example, conduct an assassination campaign against high-ranking government officials.

Governments are not the only potential threat to drug traffickers in Central America. The increases in land-based drug trafficking in the region could trigger intensified competition over trafficking routes. Such turf battles could occur either among the Mexican cartels or between the Mexicans and local criminal organizations, which might try to muscle their way into the lucrative smuggling routes or attempt to grab a larger percentage of the profits.

If the example of Mexico is any guide, the drug-related violence that could be unleashed in Central America would easily overwhelm the capabilities of the region’s governments as Mexico is a far stronger and richer country than its fragile southern neighbors, who simply do not have the resources to deal with the cartels on their own.

A Possible Revolution Simmering in Georgia

2009-04-12T10:31:00.000-07:00

Georgian opposition movements have planned mass protests for April 9, mostly in Tbilisi but also around the country. These protests could spell trouble for President Mikhail Saakashvili. The Western-leaning president has faced protests before, but this time the opposition is more consolidated than in the past. Furthermore, some members of the government are expected to join in the protests, and Russia has stepped up its efforts to oust Saakashvili.

Opposition parties inside Georgia are planning mass protests for April 9, mainly in the capital city of Tbilisi but also across the country. The protests are against President Mikhail Saakashvili and are expected to demand his resignation. This is not the first set of rallies against Saakashvili, who has had a rocky presidency since taking power in the pro-Western “Rose Revolution” of 2003. Anti-government protests have been held constantly over the past six years. But the upcoming rally is different: This is the first time all 17 opposition parties have consolidated enough to organize a mass movement in the country. Furthermore, many members of the government are joining the cause, and foreign powers — namely Russia — are known to be encouraging plans to oust Saakashvili.

The planned protests in Georgia have been scheduled to coincide with the 20th anniversary of the Soviet crackdown on independence demonstrators in Tbilisi. The opposition movement claims that more than 100,000 people will take to the streets — an ambitious number, as the protests of the past six years have not drawn more than 15,000 people. But this time around, the Georgian people’s discontent is greatly intensified because of the blame placed on Saakashvili after the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008. Most Georgians believe Saakashvili pushed the country into a war, knowing the repercussions, and into a serious financial crisis in which unemployment has reached nearly 9 percent.

Georgia’s opposition has always been fractured and so has only managed to pull together sporadic rallies rather than a real movement. But the growing discontent in Georgia is allowing the opposition groups to finally overcome their differences and agree that Saakashvili should be removed. Even Saakashvili loyalists like former Parliament Speaker Nino Burjanadze and former Georgian Ambassador to the United Nations Irakli Alasania have joined the opposition’s cause, targeting Saakashvili personally. The problem now is that opposition members still do not agree on how to remove the president; some are calling for referendums on new elections, and some want to install a replacement government to make sure Saakashvili does not have a chance to return to power. But all 17 parties agreed to start with large-scale demonstrations in the streets and go from there.

If the movement does inspire such a large turnout, it would be equivalent to the number of protesters that hit the streets at the height of the Rose Revolution, which toppled the previous government and brought Saakashvili into power in the first place.

Saakashvili and the remainder of his supporters are prepared, however, with the military on standby outside of Tbilisi in order to counter a large movement. During a demonstration in 2007, Saakashvili deployed the military and successfully — though violently — crushed the protests. But that demonstration consisted of 15,000 protesters; it is unclear if Saakashvili and the military could withstand numbers seven times that.

There is also concern that protests are planned in the Georgian secessionist region of Adjara, which rose up against and rejected Saakashvili’s government in 2004 after the Rose Revolution. This region was suppressed by Saakashvili once and has held a grudge ever since, looking for the perfect time to rise up again. Tbilisi especially wants to keep Adjara under its control because it is home to the large port of Batumi, and many of Georgia’s transport routes to Turkey run through it. If Adjara rises up, there are rumors in the region that its neighboring secessionist region, Samtskhe-Javakheti, will join in to help destabilize Saakashvili and the government. Georgia already officially lost its two northern secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Russian occupation during the August 2008 war and is highly concerned with its southern regions trying to break away.

These southern regions, like the northern ones, have strong support from Russia; thus, Moscow is square in the middle of tomorrow’s activities. Russia has long backed all of Georgia’s secessionist regions, but has had difficulty penetrating the Georgian opposition groups in order to organize them against Saakashvili. Though none of the 17 opposition groups are pro-Russian, Russian money has been flowing into the groups in order to nudge them along in organizing the impending protests.

Russia has a vested interest in breaking the Georgian government. Russia and the West have been locked in a struggle over the small Caucasus state. That struggle led to the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war, after which Moscow felt secure in its control over Georgia. Since Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and U.S. President Barack Obama met April 1 and disagreed over a slew of issues, including U.S. ballistic missile defense installations in Poland and NATO expansion to Ukraine and Georgia, Russia is not as secure and is seeking to consolidate its power in Georgia. This means first breaking the still vehemently pro-Western Saakashvili. This does not mean Russia thinks it can get a pro-Russian leader in power in Georgia; it just wants one who is not so outspoken against Moscow and so determined to invite Western influence.

The April 9 protests are the point at which all sides will try to gain — and maintain — momentum. The 2003 Rose Revolution took months to build up to, but the upcoming protests are the starting point for both the opposition and Russia — and opposition movements in Georgia have not seen this much support and organization since the 2003 revolution. April 9 will reveal whether or not things are about to get shaken up, if not completely transformed, in Georgia.

Redefining the Global System

2009-04-01T10:52:00.000-07:00

From Europe to Turkey, world leaders are coming together this week for a slew of global summits. There is much for these world leaders to discuss: the global financial infrastructure is now up for debate, the jihadist war continues to rage in South Asia, the Russians are locked into intractable negotiations with the Americans over the boundaries of the former Soviet sphere of influence, and the Turks are returning to their great power past.

These summits are not just about photo-ops and handshakes. Taken together, this array of diplomatic meetings constitute the greatest density of decision points in the modern world since the summits that brought about the end of the Cold War. This is a time when the true colors of nation-states come out, as each fights for their political, economic and security interests behind a thin veneer of global cooperation.

With geopolitical boundaries being redrawn across the world, We have a responsibility to penetrate the media glitz and read through the lines of diluted joint statements and press conferences to explain to our readers the core issues at stake for each player involved. Through our extensive coverage in this week’s Global Summit series, our intent has been to do just that.

Midway through the bilateral summits, we have yet to see any major surprises deviating from our assessments. In the lead-up to the G-20 summit in London, the Americans and the Germans will be at the core of the debate over how to restructure the global financial system. The Americans, the British and the Japanese believe stimulus is the way to go to put the global economy back on track, while Germany, the economic heavyweight of Europe, prefers instead to export its way out of the recession. This is not a debate that will be resolved by the end of this summit (if at all), leaving G-20 members and the struggling economies watching from the outside with the impression that they have little choice but to fend for themselves in this severe economic environment.

The Americans do not just disagree with the Europeans on economics — in spite of Europe’s enthusiasm for U.S. President Barack Obama, the EU members at the summit made clear their unwillingness to make any meaningful contributions to the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan beyond a few aid packages. With the Western coalition in Afghanistan looking more and more like a one-man show, the Americans are branching out of their post-World War II system of alliance in search of new strategic partners. The United States has found one such partner in Turkey, where Obama will be wrapping up his visit on April 6-7. This will demonstrate to allies and adversaries alike that Washington embraces a greater Turkish role in global affairs that stretch from the Islamic World to the Russian periphery.

The summits thus far have given the Russians plenty to chew on. Russian President Dmitri Medvedev came to the G-20 ready to negotiate with Obama on a slew of issues that revolve around a core Russian imperative of consolidating power in the former Soviet periphery. A look at the joint statement and press conferences from the Obama-Medvedev meetings might leave one with the impression that the Americans and the Russians are ready to cooperate, but in reality, all they could really boast about was a commitment to restart talks on nuclear disarmament, leaving a host of outstanding critical issues in limbo. It is quite apparent that the United States has its hands full, but Obama still let the Russians know that he does not intend sit back and allow Moscow to have its way with Eurasia. The Russians now have a better idea of Obama’s boundaries in these negotiations, but their priorities have not changed; Moscow still has ways of grabbing Washington’s attention.

It has been a roller coaster ride thus far, with still more to come. Before Obama makes his way to Turkey, he still has to touch base with his NATO allies in Prague. With the Russians ready to play hardball and the balance of the Eurasian landmass still in flux, these meetings will be anything but bland.

Indo-Pakistani Crisis

2008-12-09T12:06:00.000-08:00
Next Steps in the Indo-Pakistani Crisis

We begin with an Indian strike on Pakistan, precipitating a withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the Afghan border, resulting in intensified Taliban activity along the border and a deterioration in the U.S. position in Afghanistan, all culminating in an emboldened Iran. The scenario is not unlikely, assuming India chooses to strike.

Our argument that India is likely to strike focused, among other points, on the weakness of the current Indian government and how it is likely to fall under pressure from the opposition and the public if it does not act decisively. An unnamed Turkish diplomat involved in trying to mediate the dispute has argued that saving a government is not a good reason to go to war. That is a good argument, except that in this case, not saving the government is unlikely to prevent a war, either.

If India’s Congress party government were to fall, its replacement would be even more likely to strike at Pakistan. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Congress’ Hindu nationalist rival, has long charged that Congress is insufficiently aggressive in combating terrorism. The BJP will argue that the Mumbai attack in part resulted from this failing. Therefore, if the Congress government does not strike, and is subsequently forced out or loses India’s upcoming elections, the new government is even more likely to strike.

It is therefore difficult to see a path that avoids Indian retaliation, and thus the emergence of at least a variation on the scenario we laid out. But the problem is not simply political: India must also do something to prevent more Mumbais. This is an issue of Indian national security, and the pressure on India’s government to do something comes from several directions.

Three Indian Views of Pakistan

The question is what an Indian strike against Pakistan, beyond placating domestic public opinion, would achieve. There are three views on this in India.

The first view holds that Pakistani officials aid and abet terrorism — in particular the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), which serves as Pakistan’s main intelligence service. In this view, the terrorist attacks are the work of Pakistani government officials — perhaps not all of the government, but enough officials of sufficient power that the rest of the government cannot block them, and therefore the entire Pakistani government can be held accountable.

The second view holds that terrorist attacks are being carried out by Kashmiri groups that have long been fostered by the ISI but have grown increasingly autonomous since 2002 — and that the Pakistani government has deliberately failed to suppress anti-Indian operations by these groups. In this view, the ISI and related groups are either aware of these activities or willfully ignorant of them, even if ISI is not in direct control. Under this thinking, the ISI and the Pakistanis are responsible by omission, if not by commission.

The third view holds that the Pakistani government is so fragmented and weak that it has essentially lost control of Pakistan to the extent that it cannot suppress these anti-Indian groups. This view says that the army has lost control of the situation to the point where many from within the military-intelligence establishment are running rogue operations, and groups in various parts of the country simply do what they want. If this argument is pushed to its logical conclusion, Pakistan should be regarded as a state on the verge of failure, and an attack by India might precipitate further weakening, freeing radical Islamist groups from what little control there is.

The first two analyses are essentially the same. They posit that Pakistan could stop attacks on India, but chooses not to. The third is the tricky one. It rests on the premise that the Pakistani government (and in this we include the Pakistani army) is placing some restraint on the attackers. Thus, the government’s collapse would make enough difference that India should restrain itself, especially as any Indian attack would so destabilize Pakistan that it would unleash our scenario and worse. In this view, Pakistan’s civilian government has only as much power in these matters as the army is willing to allow.

The argument against attacking Pakistan therefore rests on a very thin layer of analysis. It requires the belief that Pakistan is not responsible for the attacks, that it is nonetheless restraining radical Islamists to some degree, and that an Indian attack would cause even these modest restraints to disappear. Further, it assumes that these restraints, while modest, are substantial enough to make a difference.

There is a debate in India, and in Washington, as to whether this is the case. This is why New Delhi has demanded that Pakistan turn over 20 individuals wanted by India in connection with attacks. The list doesn’t merely include Islamists, but also Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, the former head of the ISI who has long been suspected of close ties with Islamists. (The United States apparently added Gul to the list.) Turning those individuals over would be enormously difficult politically for Pakistan. It would create a direct confrontation between Pakistan’s government and the Pakistani Islamist movement, likely sparking violence in Pakistan. Indeed, turning any Pakistani over to India, regardless of ideology, would create a massive crisis in Pakistan.

The Indian government chose to make this demand precisely because complying with it is enormously difficult for Pakistan. New Delhi is not so much demanding the 20 individuals, but rather that Pakistan take steps that will create conflict in Pakistan. If the Pakistani government is in control of the country, it should be able to weather the storm. If it can’t weather the storm, then the government is not in control of Pakistan. And if it could weather the storm but chooses not to incur the costs, then India can reasonably claim that Pakistan is prepared to export terrorism rather than endure it at home. In either event, the demand reveals things about the Pakistani reality.

The View from Islamabad

Pakistan’s evaluation, of course, is different. Islamabad does not regard itself as failed because it cannot control all radical Islamists or the Taliban. The official explanation is that the Pakistanis are doing the best they can. From the Pakistani point of view, while the Islamists ultimately might represent a threat, the threat to Pakistan and its government that would arise from a direct assault on the Islamists is a great danger not only to Pakistan, but also to the region. It is thus better for all to let the matter rest. The Islamist issue aside, Pakistan sees itself as continuing to govern the country effectively, albeit with substantial social and economic problems (as one might expect). The costs of confronting the Islamists, relative to the benefits, are therefore high.

The Pakistanis see themselves as having several effective counters against an Indian attack. The most important of these is the United States. The very first thing Islamabad said after the Mumbai attack was that a buildup of Indian forces along the Pakistani border would force Pakistan to withdraw 100,000 troops from its Afghan border. Events over the weekend, such as the attack on a NATO convoy, showed the vulnerability of NATO’s supply line across Pakistan to Afghanistan.

The Americans are fighting a difficult holding action against the Taliban in Afghanistan. The United States needs the militant base camps in Pakistan and the militants’ lines of supply cut off, but the Americans lack the force to do this themselves. A withdrawal of Pakistani forces from the Afghan border would pose a direct threat to American forces. Therefore, the Pakistanis expect Washington to intervene on their behalf to prevent an Indian attack. They do not believe a major Indian troop buildup will take place, and if it does, the Pakistanis do not think it will lead to substantial conflict.

There has been some talk of an Indian naval blockade against Pakistan, blocking the approaches to Pakistan’s main port of Karachi. This is an attractive strategy for India, as it plays to New Delhi’s relative naval strength. Again, the Pakistanis do not believe the Indians will do this, given that it would cut off the flow of supplies to American troops in Afghanistan. (Karachi is the main port serving U.S. forces in Afghanistan.) The line of supply in Afghanistan runs through Pakistan, and the Americans, the Pakistanis calculate, do not want anything to threaten that.

From the Pakistani point of view, the only potential military action India could take that would not meet U.S. opposition would be airstrikes. There has been talk that the Indians might launch airstrikes against Islamist training camps and bases in Pakistani-administered Kashmir. In Pakistan’s view, this is not a serious problem. Mounting airstrikes against training camps is harder than it might seem. The only way to achieve anything in such a facility is with area destruction weapons — for instance, using B-52s to drop ordnance over very large areas. The targets are not amenable to strike aircraft, because the payload of such aircraft is too small. It would be tough for the Indians, who don’t have strategic bombers, to hit very much. Numerous camps exist, and the Islamists can afford to lose some. As an attack, it would be more symbolic than effective.

Moreover, if the Indians did kill large numbers of radical Islamists, this would hardly pose a problem to the Pakistani government. It might even solve some of Islamabad’s problems, depending on which analysis you accept. Airstrikes would generate massive support among Pakistanis for their government so long as Islamabad remained defiant of India. Pakistan thus might even welcome Indian airstrikes against Islamist training camps.

Islamabad also views the crisis with India with an eye to the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. Any attack by India that might destabilize the Pakistani government opens at least the possibility of a Pakistani nuclear strike or, in the event of state disintegration, of Pakistani nuclear weapons falling into the hands of factional elements. If India presses too hard, New Delhi faces the unknown of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal — unless, of course, the Indians are preparing a pre-emptive nuclear attack on Pakistan, something the Pakistanis find unlikely.

All of this, of course, depends upon two unknowns. First, what is the current status of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal? Is it sufficiently reliable for Pakistan to count on? Second, to what extent do the Americans monitor Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities? Ever since the crisis of 2002, when American fears that Pakistani nuclear weapons could fall into al Qaeda’s hands were high, we have assumed that American calm about Pakistan’s nuclear facilities was based on Washington’s having achieved a level of transparency on their status. This might limit Pakistan’s freedom of action with regard to — and hence ability to rely on — its nuclear arsenal.

Notably, much of Pakistan’s analysis of the situation rests on a core assumption — namely, that the United States will choose to limit Indian options, and just as important, that the Indians would listen to Washington. India does not have the same relationship or dependence on the United States as, for example, Israel does. India historically was allied with the Soviet Union; New Delhi moved into a strategic relationship with the United States only in recent years. There is a commonality of interest between India and the United States, but not a dependency. India would not necessarily be blocked from action simply because the Americans didn’t want it to act.

As for the Americans, Pakistan’s assumption that the United States would want to limit India is unclear. Islamabad’s threat to shift 100,000 troops from the Afghan border will not easily be carried out. Pakistan’s logistical capabilities are limited. Moreover, the American objection to Pakistan’s position is that the vast majority of these troops are not engaged in controlling the border anyway, but are actually carefully staying out of the battle. Given that the Americans feel that the Pakistanis are ineffective in controlling the Afghan-Pakistani border, the shift from virtually to utterly ineffective might not constitute a serious deterioration from the United States’ point of view. Indeed, it might open the door for more aggressive operations on — and over — the Afghan-Pakistani border by American forces, perhaps by troops rapidly transferred from Iraq.

The situation of the port of Karachi is more serious, both in the ground and naval scenarios. The United States needs Karachi; it is not in a position to seize the port and the road system out of Karachi. That is a new war the United States can’t fight. At the same time, the United States has been shifting some of its logistical dependency from Pakistan to Central Asia. But this requires a degree of Russian support, which would cost Washington dearly and take time to activate. In short, India’s closing the port of Karachi by blockade, or Pakistan’s doing so as retaliation for Indian action, would hurt the United States badly.

Supply lines aside, Islamabad should not assume that the United States is eager to ensure that the Pakistani state survives. Pakistan also should not assume that the United States is impressed by the absence or presence of Pakistani troops on the Afghan border. Washington has developed severe doubts about Pakistan’s commitment and effectiveness in the Afghan-Pakistani border region, and therefore about Pakistan’s value as an ally.

Pakistan’s strongest card with the United States is the threat to block the port of Karachi. But here, too, there is a counter to Pakistan: If Pakistan closes Karachi to American shipping, either the Indian or American navy also could close it to Pakistani shipping. Karachi is Pakistan’s main export facility, and Pakistan is heavily dependent on it. If Karachi were blocked, particularly while Pakistan is undergoing a massive financial crisis, Pakistan would face disaster. Karachi is thus a double-edged sword. As long as Pakistan keeps it open to the Americans, India probably won’t block it. But should Pakistan ever close the port in response to U.S. action in the Afghan-Pakistani borderland, then Pakistan should not assume that the port will be available for its own use.

India’s Military Challenge

India faces difficulties in all of its military options. Attacks on training camps sound more effective than they are. Concentrating troops on the border is impressive only if India is prepared for a massive land war, and a naval blockade has multiple complications.

India needs a military option that demonstrates will and capability and decisively hurts the Pakistani government, all without drawing India into a nuclear exchange or costly ground war. And its response must rise above the symbolic.

We have no idea what India is thinking, but one obvious option is airstrikes directed not against training camps, but against key government installations in Islamabad. The Indian air force increasingly has been regarded as professional and capable by American pilots at Red Flag exercises in Nevada. India has modern Russian fighter jets and probably has the capability, with some losses, to penetrate deep into Pakistani territory.

India also has acquired radar and electronic warfare equipment from Israel and might have obtained some early precision-guided munitions from Russia and/or Israel. While this capability is nascent, untested and very limited, it is nonetheless likely to exist in some form.

The Indians might opt for a drawn-out diplomatic process under the theory that all military action is either ineffective or excessively risky. If it chooses the military route, New Delhi could opt for a buildup of ground troops and some limited artillery exchanges and tactical ground attacks. It also could choose airstrikes against training facilities. Each of these military options would achieve the goal of some substantial action, but none would threaten fundamental Pakistani interests. The naval blockade has complexities that could not be managed. That leaves, as a possible scenario, a significant escalation by India against targets in Pakistan’s capital.

The Indians have made it clear that the ISI is their enemy. The ISI has a building, and buildings can be destroyed, along with files and personnel. Such an aerial attack also would serve to shock the Pakistanis by representing a serious escalation. And Pakistan might find retaliation difficult, given the relative strength of its air force. India has few good choices for retaliation, and while this option is not a likely one, it is undoubtedly one that has to be considered.

It seems to us that India can avoid attacks on Pakistan only if Islamabad makes political concessions that it would find difficult to make. The cost to Pakistan of these concessions might well be greater than the benefit of avoiding conflict with India. All of India’s options are either ineffective or dangerous, but inactivity is politically and strategically the least satisfactory route for New Delhi. This circumstance is the most dangerous aspect of the current situation. In our opinion, the relative quiet at present should not be confused with the final outcome, unless Pakistan makes surprising.

Arctic Ocean – The New Cold War

2008-12-07T10:06:00.000-08:00

Arctic Ocean – The Cold War for the Cold Region

Canada, Russia, the US, Denmark [via Greenland] and Norway are staking claims in the Arctic Ocean, which may contain a quarter of the world's untapped petroleum reserves, and is becoming more accessible due to global warming. Under the Convention on the Law of the Sea, they could acquire rights to Arctic seafloor territory if the areas are linked to their continental shelves. Russia made its claim in 2001, though it will make a resubmission. Canada ratified the Law on the Sea in 2003, so it has to file its claim by 2013. The United States had not ratified the Law of the Sea Convention.

In recent decades, it has been well recognized that published portrayals of the sea floor north of the Arctic Circle, particularly in the deep central basin of the Arctic Ocean, are not totally accurate, and that in certain areas, there are significant discrepancies between observed and charted depths. The principal cause of this situation has been the lack of sounding information needed to construct reliable and detailed charts: certain regions remain inadequately mapped on account of difficult operating conditions, or because critical data sets have not been made available for widespread public use.

The severe climatic and ice conditions in the Arctic Ocean make it difficult to apply some of the existing methods and technologies that are generally easy to use in other oceans, in order to obtain the information that is necessary for establishing the outer limits of the Continental Shelf.

The floor of the Arctic Ocean is characterized by the existence of at least four large submarine elevations that could be considered to be submerged prolongations of the continental margins beyond 200 nautical miles: Chukchi Plateau, Mendeleyev Ridge, Lomonosov Ridge, and Alpha Ridge. Adequate sets of geological and geophysical data, together with bathymetric and morphological information, are seen as critical to establishing that such elevations are indeed natural components of the continental margin.

The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, stipulates that any coastal state can claim territory 200 nautical miles from their shoreline and exploit the natural resources within that zone. Nations can also extend that limit to up to 350 nautical miles from their coast if they can provide scientific proof that the undersea continental plate is a natural extension of their territory.

Continental shelf claims beyond 200 nautical miles are made according to the provisions of Article 76 of the Law of the Sea. The implementation of Article 76 rests fundamentally upon the analysis and interpretation of bathymetric and geological information. A 1996 Workshop assembled specialists from the five coastal states that border the Arctic Ocean (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States of America) to discuss scientific and technical issues relating to the preparation of continental shelf claims beyond 200 nautical miles. During the course of the 1996 Workshop, it was recognized that all five coastal states have valid grounds for developing continental shelf claims beyond their 200 nautical mile limits, and that the possibility, if not the likelihood, existed of overlapping claims between neighbouring states.

Article 76 of UNCLOS specifies a mechanism for extending the limits of the continental shelf beyond the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). After ratification of UNCLOS a country has ten years to collect the appropriate information and submit a claim for an extended continental shelf to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).

Much of the argument revolves around the underwater Lomonosov Ridge. Mikhail Vasil'evich Lomonosov was the first Russian natural scientist of world importance. His major scientific accomplishment was in the field of physical chemistry, with other notable discoveries in astronomy, geophysics, geology and mineralogy. He founded what became Moscow State University, in 1755. This university, officially named after Lomonosov, is at the apex of the Russian system of higher education.

The Lomonosov Ridge is an undersea chain of mountains rising some 2500 meters above the Arctic floor. Measuring about 1700 km in length, the Lomonosov Ridge is considered to be of continental origin, a sliver that was separated from the Kara and Barents shelves and transported to its present position by sea-floor spreading.

The General Bathymetric Chart of the Oceans (GEBCO, Canadian Hydrographic Service, 1979) served as an authoritative portrayal of the seafloor north of 64°N. The International Bathymetric Chart of the Arctic Ocean (IBCAO) was developed from an accumulation of bathymetric measurements collected during past and modern expeditions. Striking discrepancies between the GEBCO and IBCAO portrayals of the Lomonosov Ridge occur between the North Pole and the Siberian continental shelf. The new model shows a far more complex morphology, with a ridge that is broken into several smaller segments.

Countries have the possibility of claiming the Lomonosov Ridge, a submarine mountain range, as a natural prolongation of their land territory. Bathymetry, seismic and gravity data are needed to substantiate the claim. Out to a distance of 350 nautical miles or further, if coastal states can claim the Lomonosov Ridge as a natural prolongation of land territory, coastal states can exercise specified sovereign rights. These rights include the right to explore and exploit mineral and biological resources on and below the seabed and jurisdiction in matters related to environment and conservation.

The Lomonosov Ridge, which Russia claims is part of their continental shelf, is clearly a separate oceanic seafloor volcanic ridge and thus not part of Russia's continental shelf. The Russian UNCLOS claim over the Arctic Commons Abyssal area adjacent to the edge of their continental shelf was rejected in 2001 by the Commission for the Continental Shelf, as the geological facts proved that the claim had no basis under UNCLOS rules. The geology of the area in question has not changed since the Russian claim was rejected.

Russia's Oceanology research institute has undertaken two Arctic expeditions - to the Mendeleyev underwater chain in 2005 and to the Lomonosov ridge in August 2007 - on orders from the ministry to back Russian claims to the region, believed to contain vast oil and gas reserves and other mineral riches, likely to become accessible in future decades due to man-made global warming. The Natural Resources Ministry said in September 2007 that preliminary results of research carried out by Russian scientists will allow the country to claim 1.2 million sq km (460,000 sq miles) of potentially energy-rich Arctic territory. On 04 October 2007 Russia's natural resources minister said the development of the Lomonosov underwater mountain chain in the Arctic could bring Russia up to 5 billion metric tons of equivalent fuel. "Reaching the Lomonosov ridge means for Russia potentially up to 5 billion tons of equivalent fuel," Yury Trutnev said

In August 2008 Canadian researchers teamed with Danish scientists to offer proof that the Lomonosov Ridge is a natural extension of the North American continent. Their landmark findings, the initial result of years of sea floor mapping and millions of dollars in research investments by the Canadian and Danish governments, were presented at the 2008 International Geological Congress in Oslo under the innocuous title "Crustal Structure from the Lincoln Sea to the Lomonosov Ridge, Arctic Ocean."

Denmark hopes to collect evidence that will support a claim that the continental shelf of Greenland-a province of Denmark-extends to the North Pole. Norway is the only other country (besides Russia) that has filed a legal claim to extend its continental shelf into a portion of the Arctic Ocean.

Arctic sea ice during the 2007 melt season plummeted to the lowest levels since satellite measurements began in 1979. The average sea ice extent for the month of September was 4.28 million square kilometers (1.65 million square miles), the lowest September on record, shattering the previous record for the month, set in 2005, by 23 percent.

Arctic sea ice receded so much that the fabled Northwest Passage completely opened for the first time in human memory during 2007. Explorers and other seafarers had long recognized that this passage, through the straits of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, represented a potential shortcut from the Pacific to the Atlantic. Roald Amundsen began the first successful navigation of the route starting in 1903. It took his group two-and-a-half years to leapfrog through narrow passages of open water, with their ship locked in the frozen ice through two cold, dark winters. More recently, icebreakers and ice-strengthened ships have on occasion traversed the normally ice-choked route. However, by the end of the 2007 melt season, a standard ocean-going vessel could have sailed smoothly through. On the other hand, the Northern Sea Route, a shortcut along the Eurasian coast that is often at least partially open, was completely blocked by a band of ice in 2007.

In 2007 National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC) Senior Scientist Mark Serreze said, “The sea ice cover is in a downward spiral and may have passed the point of no return. As the years go by, we are losing more and more ice in summer, and growing back less and less ice in winter. We may well see an ice-free Arctic Ocean in summer within our lifetimes.” The scientists agree that this could occur by 2030.

Discovery of oil fields and natural gas in the artic has led to an increased interest in the development of ice-breaking cargo vessels and/or tankers for use in transporting these resources to refineries and consumers at remotely situated markets. The cargo and/or tanker ships must operate efficiently during the transportation of their cargo. In order to operate efficiently, they must maintain a satisfactory speed with a relatively low fuel consumption. In order to meet these efficiency requirements, conventional ship designs have been developed. Such conventional designs have a low value of ship-ice resistance per unit cargo capacity. Such conventional designs are generally characterized by a relatively large length-to-beam ratio, fine bow forms and long parallel middle-body sections. Such hull designs allow the ship to perform efficiently during normal travel through non-ice-covered waters, and to perform well during straight travel through ice-covered waters. However, due to their relatively long parallel middle body sections, these conventional ships have poor maneuverability in ice-covered waters. The poor maneuverability of the conventional design has presented serious problems when attempting to turn these ships in order to change course in ice-covered waters to avoid objects, such as a major ice ridge or for maneuvering the ship into a docking facility. Accordingly, the poor maneuverability of such conventional designs within ice-covered waters deterimentally affects the safe operation and time required to effectively dock and position the vessel.

The progress of a conventional vessel through ice is dependent mainly on the thickness and type of ice; the thrust of the propeller or propellers; the shape of the hull, with particular emphasis on the forward section; and friction between the hull of the vessel and the ice. Should any of the above factors change or be changed then the vessel's performance would change. The ability of a vessel to steer, when operating in ice, is dependent principally on the thickness and characteristics of the ice; the shape of the bow section; the shape of the stern section; the thrust of the propeller and size of the rudder; and possibly of greatest influence, the length of parallel body (straight ship sides). So, although most vessels, other than ice breakers, have trouble in navigating in ice covered waterways, some have a lot more trouble than others, and this difficulty is proportionately increased with ship length.

In order to avoid safety hazards and attempt to minimize the transit time required to specifically maneuver the vessel, some ships have been designed to serve as the primary ice-breaking vessels. Such vessels escort the conventional cargo ships, clearing the path in front of the cargo ship. Such ice-breaking ships must have both a high maneuverability in the ice and cut a wide channel for the cargo vessel in which to follow. The necessary maneuverability, and ability to form a wide channel are made possible by providing such ice-breaking vessels with a stocky, rounded hull with a relatively low length-to-beam ratio, typically in the range of 4.0 to 5.5. The water plane-shape of this type of hull enables a certain degree of turning within the confines of the channel cut by the ship's beam. However, such a high beam-to-displacement ratio makes such a vessel configuration unsuitable as a cargo vessel. The high beam-to-displacement ratio results in a relatively high power requirement per unit cargo capacity which is moved. Furthermore, this high beam-to-displacement ratio results in an increased open water resistance per unit displacement. Therefore, such vessels do not travel efficiently through ice-covered or non-ice-covered waters.

Another design which has been developed in order to increase the maneuverability of a cargo ship in ice-covered waters includes a wide beam forward configuration. The object of the wide beam forward design is to cause the ship's bow to cut a sufficiently wide channel through the ice to allow a relatively narrow middle body and stern to swing outward to either side during a turning maneuver. This concept was embodied in a converted tanker SS Manhattan. While the wide beam forward design does provide a certain degree of improved turning capability in ice-covered waters, it suffers to some extent from the same effects as the stocky, rounded hull escort vessel discussed above. The wide beam forward configuration requires greater propulsion power per unit displacement in order to break through the ice than is required by an equivalent sized ship having a relatively high length-to-beam ratio. Therefore, although the wide beam forward configuration allows for greater maneuverability during turns in ice-covered waters, the design is inefficient for straight forward travel through ice-covered or non-ice-covered waters. The conventional fine hull shape with a long, parallel middle body section is a fuel efficient design. The fuel efficiency of this design is sacrificed to achieve improved maneuverability when the wide beam forward design is utilized.

When the ship is moving straight ahead, the ice is broken by its bow and the unbroken ice tends to hug the sides and develop considerable friction, impeding forward movement. The condition is complicated by the fact that the ice is often "uneven", as a result of channels having been broken and rebroken, with the pieces of ice thrown up into uneven mounds and refreezing in that form. This uneven structure increases the friction and resistance to movement. If straightline movement is difficult, the problem is compounded when the ship tries to turn. In making a turn, under the action of the rudder, the ship pivots about a point about a third of the way from the bow to the stern (this will vary somewhat depending on the design of the vessel and its draft forward as against its draft aft). Bow thrusters are sometimes used to move the bow laterally, but these tend to become fouled in ice and so are not usually employed for winter navigation.

The US Navy has not recently designed surface ships, other than ice breakers, to operate in the Arctic. The problems of ice damage and topside icing when surface ships were operated in high latitudes were handled on an ad hoc basis. From time to time during the design of a new class of surface ships, the issue of ice hardening has arisen. One example was during the design of the Perry (DDG-7) class guided missile frigates. While high latitude operations were envisioned, these ships were heavily cost constrained and the ice hardening characteristic was dropped from consideration during cost tradeoffs.

The Navy and Coast Guard, however, have designed icebreakers, as have commercial interests. Other commercial ships have been designed for ice hardening. Most major classification societies who govern the details of commercial ship hull design have established rules for the design of ship hulls for operations in ice. The American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) would be the relevant classification society for US ship design. ABS Rules require strengthening of the bow and stern areas. Bow mounted sonar domes and arrays in particular would require careful attention. Propellers, rudders, fin stabilizers, and sea chests are also affected by ice operation. The effect of topside icing and a provision to de-ice must also be considered.

Pakistan’s Frankenstein Monster

2008-12-07T01:13:00.000-08:00
India's has accused "elements inside Pakistan" of orchestrating the late November terrorist attacks on high-profile targets in Mumbai. While such accusations often follow attacks inside India, the scale of these attacks put them in a new category. India's accusations may be based on hard evidence, but cautions that Pakistan's government may be unable to control the "Frankenstein's monster" it created when it helped train terrorists to infiltrate and fight against Indian rule in the disputed Kashmir region. "These groups have developed an independent capacity to raise resources and an independent capacity to plan and prosecute operations in Afghanistan, in India, and, unfortunately for Pakistanis, increasingly within Pakistan."

It appears that any time there's an incident like this in India, particularly an incident involving Muslims in India, the government immediately points its finger to Pakistan and often to the area administered by India in Kashmir. How much of this is based on actual evidence and how much just seems to be a reaction that India has to any of these type of incidents?

I think any reporting that you get out of India on these kinds of events that come out within the first few hours is almost certainly not related to some sort of actual data or evidence. It's only through the evidence that they get maybe out of interrogations—this one individual that they actually were able to arrest and presumably interrogate at great length already—that's when you start to realize that they might actually have a sense as to what's really going on. Even then, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad are groups that are always named every single time something goes wrong and subsequently we know that they are not always the ones that were directly responsible for the attacks even if they may have some indirect linkages to the groups that actually perpetrated them. So from my perspective, it's always useful to wait at least twenty-four hours and see if some more reliable evidence actually comes out. In this instance, because we're starting to hear about the idea that they came via Karachi, that apparently this one individual they arrested says that he was somehow trained in a Lashkar-e-Taiba camp or was associated with them, it starts to make more sense. But even then, the complexity of these groups, they're not as distinguishable as they once were, or as distinct as they once were. There are multiple and overlapping relationships in terms of the facilities they use and the training and so on.

These two groups have been pegged for years as groups which have at least received support and some training from inside Pakistan to disrupt Indian rule in Kashmir. There are some analysts today that feel the Pakistani government, having developed its own pretty serious terrorist challenge internally, has really lost control of these two groups. Is that fair to say?

I think it's absolutely fair to say that this looks more like a Frankenstein's monster kind of situation in Pakistan than it looks like a directly controlled and manipulated and directed militancy that's driven by the top leadership in Islamabad. So that means exactly what you say, which is that historically these groups Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and others were very clearly in the pay of the Pakistani state intelligence and military. In time, however, what they've done is these groups have developed an independent capacity to raise resources and an independent capacity to plan and prosecute operations in Afghanistan, in India, and, unfortunately for Pakistanis, increasingly within Pakistan. They've turned against the hands that once fed them. So that's the nature of the problem now. It is actually still complicated by the fact that there appears to be evidence of continued complicity or at least passive relations between the Pakistani state and some of these groups.

For years the Israelis tried to hold Yasser Arafat responsible for the actions of various groups that were either within Fatah and described by the Palestinian Authority government as out of control militants or were actually outside it. The Israelis held them responsible one way or another. Is that essentially the Indian position with the Pakistani government here?

I think it had been the Indian position and was certainly the Indian position in 2001-2002, where the Pakistani government and President Pervez Musharraf after the attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001 came out and took some actions, banned some of these organizations, and the Indians still came out and said, "Look, you've got to get your house in order. We blame you; it's your territory." And there are certainly Indians who still believe that. But I think what has changed is that Indians are starting to see evidence that supports the Pakistani claim that their leadership, including their military leadership, is directly threatened by some of these groups. So I think the Indians, at least Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, are somewhat more reluctant to go down that path of just blaming Pakistan because what they see in the Pakistani state is a state of weakness. Now maybe the Israelis saw the same thing in Arafat, and they honestly didn't care. They gave up on him and decided that he could not be, as they say, a partner for peace. And at some point maybe the Indians will come to that conclusion. I'm hopeful that they haven't reached that conclusion yet, that instead what they see in the Pakistani government is a weak but increasingly more well-meaning potential partner.

There's another analysis out there that it's not just these groups which are really out of control of the civilian government in Pakistan, but the ISI, the Intelligence Services, and the military itself really don't appear to be under the complete control of the civilian government. Is that a fair statement?

It's absolutely fair, and I don't think there are too many people who would honestly suggest that the Pakistani civilians completely control their military at all. The military sets it own budget, it sets it operational plans, and although this military head of the army is more amenable to sharing his plans and, in fact to some degree, letting the civilians set a strategic framework for his operations, he's still very much in control of his actual operations and that holds for the ISI as well. So what you have in Pakistan is, in relative terms, a strong and dominant national institution in the army and a relatively weaker civilian political leadership that is only in the very early stages of trying to balance out the influence and sort of come to any kind of command relationship over the military. I think they're a ways off from that.

This crisis in Mumbai occurred as India is building up to national elections. There's a lot of talk about the Congress Party being in some serious trouble now. They're under a lot of pressure and criticism for their handling of the attacks. Should we be wary of public statements from the Indian government right now on this?

You're right, the Congress Party is feeling very much under pressure and I think recognizes that the upcoming national elections weren't looking particularly good for them because of the economic downturn, and this is one more reason why they are probably anticipating a significant loss of support at the polls relative to the last elections. For that reason they're really going to have to—at some level they have to find a face-saving way out of this. The resignation of the home minister is one piece of it. Pressuring the Pakistanis to yield on something will have to be another piece of it, I think. And demonstrating as a government that they are taking firm steps to improve India's internal security will have to be a third piece. All these things are very hard, and I think the opposition BJP, which hasn't been a particularly effective party in opposition, is already looking to exploit this politically.

Up until now, the charges of not providing enough security, which have been leveled by the BJP after a series of attacks in India over the past several years, really haven't stuck. They haven't found an audience. But an event like this, hitting such symbolic targets of Indian wealth and rising power, economic power, is probably going to touch more people and make them more concerned about the state of their national security, possibly shifting some votes toward the BJP, although I have to imagine that the national economy will still be more of a campaign issue in the end.

Now you could look at this in a perspective that says that if there was, in fact, some group that actually crossed the border with Pakistan, India might feel somewhat relieved. It has an enormous Muslim minority and unrest among that group would be maybe an even greater challenge. Is that right?

There is a problem if these kinds of attacks, like some of the ones over recent months apparently have been perpetrated by this group, the Indian Mujahideen, which has at least got some significant indigenous connections, not necessarily from Pakistan or Bangladesh or anywhere else but Indian. And the problem with these indigenous strikes is that they raise questions about India's capacity to actually live and make workable a multi-ethnic, as they say, secular Indian state, to maintain that as a national identity and to make it workable. So if the attack comes from the outside it doesn't necessarily damage that national identity side of things, but it does threaten a cross- border level of violence with their neighbor in Pakistan that is probably almost as dangerous. So different kinds of problems, and yes, in some ways it is nice for the Indian government to be able to point fingers outside the country in terms of a political sense, in a domestic politics sense, but I would say no matter how the Mumbai attack ends up being in terms of who is responsible and where the strings run, they do have an increasing problem with domestic violence or internal violence perpetrated by Indian Muslims and unfortunately it appears Hindu nationalists as well.

What's Washington's role here? It strikes me that this is just an absolute hornet's nest for US policymakers.

It's very difficult, certainly, for the incoming Obama team as they're just getting their footing but also for the Bush administration to do much more than certainly counsel restraint on both sides, and that's clearly happening. The only other piece—because the United States is a country that enjoys relatively good relationships with both governments—is that it can help, if there is a face-saving way to avoid any escalation here, it may be able to help find it and find it rapidly to avoid unnecessary escalation that's driven by politicking on both sides. So that's where a lot of talk—I'm sure the phone lines are burning up; I gather US Secretary [of State Condoleezza] Rice is in Delhi or on her way—that's where the United States can play a role. But it's important to recognize that the India-Pakistan conflict is one that we've seen an improvement in that relationship over the past several years primarily driven by those countries themselves, not by the United States. And there's always been relatively little the United States could do—in the way of leverage that is more significant than what either state has in the way of interests with respect to the other. In other words, the United States can be helpful, and we can help to find solutions. If the two sides are willing and able to put them on the table, it can bring them closer together, but unfortunately it doesn't have the capacity, I think, to impose a solution.

Globalization and Clashes of Economic Powers - US and China - Part 1

2008-12-04T12:38:00.000-08:00
The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship

China held to its hybrid model of a state-directed economic system throughout 2008 as it consolidated its position as one of the world’s fastest-growing countries. Alone among the world’s major economies, China refuses to allow the renminbi (RMB), its currency, to respond to free market movements. China’s leaders instead keep the currency trading at an artificially low level in order to suppress export prices—a deliberate violation of the rules of the International Monetary Fund, of which it is a member. As a result of this and other factors, China’s current account surplus with the United States and the rest of the world soared and added to China’s record foreign exchange reserves of nearly $2 trillion when this Report was completed, up from $1.43 trillion at the publication of the Commission’s Report a year ago. China began employing thisforeign exchange in new ways. Rather than using it to improve the standard of living for the Chinese people through education, health care, or pension systems, China began investing the money through new overseas investment vehicles, including an official sovereign wealth fund, the China Investment Corporation. Despite statements by Chinese leaders that they seek only financial gain from diversifying their investments into equity stakes in western companies,there are increasing suspicions that China intends to use its cash to gain political advantage globally and to lock up supplies of scarce resources around the world. Other Chinese government economic policies harmed the United States, China’s trading partners, and its own citizens. China made scant progress in reining in the rampant counterfeiting and piracy that deprive legitimate foreign businesses operating in China of their intellectual property, while they provide an effective subsidy to Chinese companies that make use of stolen software and other advanced technology. Chinese regulators failed to prevent the domestic sale and export of consumer goods tainted with industrial chemicals and fraudulent ingredients. In one case examined by the Commission, China’s lax controls on the production and handling of its seafood exports led to a partial U.S. ban for health reasons on imported Chinese seafood. Yet, thanks to artificially low prices partly resulting from an array of subsidies to its seafood industry, China has become the largest exporter of seafood to the United States.

The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship’s Current Status and Significant Changes During 2008

* China’s trade surplus with the United States remains large, despite the global economic slowdown. The U.S. trade deficit in goods with China through August 2008 was $167.7 billion, which represents an increase of 2.4 percent over the same period in 2007. Since China joined the WTO in 2001, the United States has accumulated a $1.16 trillion goods deficit with China and, as a result of the persistent trade imbalance, by August 2008 China had accumulated nearly $2 trillion in foreign currency reserves. China’s trade relationship with the United States continues to be severely unbalanced.

* The U.S. current account deficit causes considerable anxiety among both economists and foreign investors who worry that future taxpayers will find it increasingly difficult to meet both principal and interest payments on such a large debt. The total debt burden already is having a significant impact on economic growth, which will only increase in severity.

* China’s currency has strengthened against the U.S. dollar by more than 18.5 percent since the government announced in July 2005 it was transitioning from a hard peg to the dollar to a ‘‘managed float.’’ Starting in July 2008, however, the rate of the RMB’s appreciation has slowed, and there are some indications this may be due to the Chinese government’s fear that a strong RMB will damage China’s exports. China’s RMB remains significantly undervalued.

* China continues to violate its WTO commitments to avoid trade distorting measures. Among the trade-related situations in China that are counter to those commitments are restricted market access for foreign financial news services, books, films and other media; weak intellectual property protection; sustained use of domestic and export subsidies; lack of transparency in regulatory processes; continued emphasis on implementing policies that protect and promote domestic industries to the disadvantage of foreign competition; import barriers and export preferences; and limitations on foreign investment or ownership in certain sectors of the economy.

* Over the past year, China has adopted a battery of new laws and policies that may restrict foreign access to China’s markets and protect and assist domestic producers. These measures include new antimonopoly and patent laws and increased tax rebates to textile manufacturers. The full impact of these laws is not yet known, particularly whether they will help or hinder fair trade and investment.

* In 2008, China emerged as a stronger power within the WTO as it took a more assertive role in the Doha Round of multilateral trade talks, working with India and other less-developed nations to insist on protection for subsistence farmers.

China’s Capital Investment Vehicles and Implications for the U.S. Economy and National Security

* The significant expansion of the Chinese government’s involvement in the international economy in general and in the U.S. economy in particular has concerned many economists and government officials due to uncertainty about the Chinese government’s and the Chinese Communist Party’s motivations, strategies, and possible impacts on market stability and national security. At the same time, cash-strapped U.S. firms have welcomed the investments, viewing them as stable and secure sources of financing in the wake of the credit crunch.

* China’s government uses a number of state-controlled investment vehicles among which it chooses depending on its particular investment purposes and strategies; most widely known among such vehicles are China Investment Corporation (CIC), the State Administration for Foreign Exchange (SAFE), and China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC).

* Some aspects of China Investment Corporation’s mandate follow China’s industrial policy planning and promotion of domestic industries by, for example, investing in natural resources and emerging markets that are relevant for the advancement of China’s value-added industries. CIC and SAFE form just one part of a complex web of state-owned banks, state-owned companies and industries, and pension funds, all of which receive financing and instructions from the central government, promote a state-led development agenda, and have varying levels of transparency. Many of their investment activities contravene official assurances that they are not being managed to wield political influence.

* Regulations governing investments by sovereign wealth funds, especially disclosure requirements pertaining to their transactions and ownership stakes, are still in development, both in the multilateral arena and in the United States. There is concern that the Chinese government can hide its ownership of U.S. companies by using stakes in private equity vehicles like hedge or investment funds.

* China’s foreign exchange reserves continue to grow, while its management of the exchange rate has given it monopoly control on outward flows of investment. This strongly suggests that China will have a very substantial and long-term presence in the U.S. economy through equity stakes; loans; mergers and acquisitions; ownership of land, factories, and companies; and other forms of investment.Research and Development, Technological Advances in Some Key Industries, and Changing Trade Flows with China.

* China has been pursuing a government policy designed to make China a technology superpower and to enhance its exports. Some of its tactics violate free market principles—specifically its use of subsidies and an artificially low RMB value to attract foreign investment. Foreign technology companies, such as U.S. and European computer,aerospace, and automotive firms, have invested heavily in research and development and production facilities in China, sharing or losing technology and other know-how. Chinese manufacturers have benefitted from this investment. The U.S. government has not established any effective policies or mechanisms at the federal level to retain research and development facilities within its borders.

* China’s trade surplus in advanced technology products is growing rapidly, while the United States is running an ever-larger deficit in technology trade. China also is pursuing a strategy of creating an integrated technology sector to reduce its dependence on manufacturing inputs.

* China seeks to become a global power in aerospace and join the United States and Europe in producing large passenger aircraft. China also seeks to join the United States, Germany, and Japan as major global automobile producers. So far as China competes fairly with other nations, this need not be a concern. But China’s penchant for using currency manipulation, industrial subsidies, and intellectual property theft to gain an advantage violates international norms.

China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests

China’s record of proliferating weapons of mass destruction or effect has improved in recent years, and the nation has played a significant role in some important nonproliferation activities such as the Six-Party Talks intended to denuclearize North Korea. However, the United States continues to have concerns about the commitment of China’s leadership to nonproliferation and to enforcing the strengthened nonproliferation laws and procedures the nation has established and about China’s refusal to participate in some international nonproliferation agreements and regimes. The United States also is concerned that the nuclear power technology China is selling to other nations may result in nuclear proliferation.

China increasingly is devising unique interpretations of agreements or treaties to which it is a party that have the effect of expanding the territory over which it claims sovereignty and rationalizing such expansions, particularly outward from its coast and upward into outer space. This development, coupled with its military modernization, its development of impressive but disturbing

capabilities for military use of space and cyber warfare, and its demonstrated employment of these capabilities, suggest China is intent on expanding its sphere of control even at the expense of its Asian neighbors and the United States and in contravention of international consensus and formal treaties and agreements. These tendencies quite possibly will be exacerbated by China’s growing need for natural resources to support its population and economy that it cannot obtain domestically. The United States should watch these trends closely and act to protect its interests where they are threatened.

China’s Proliferation Policies and Practices

* China has made progress in developing nonproliferation policies and mechanisms to implement those policies. Although it is apparent that China is making some meaningful efforts to establish a culture and norms supporting some aspects of nonproliferation within its bureaucracy and industry, gaps remain in the policies, the strength of government support for them, and their enforcement.

* Although China has acceded to numerous international agreements on nonproliferation and has cooperated with the United States on some nonproliferation issues (e.g., the Six-Party Talks),China has been reluctant to participate fully in U.S.-led nonproliferation efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and in multilateral efforts to persuade Iran to cease its uranium enrichment and other nuclear development activities.

* China’s support for multilateral negotiations with North Korea can help to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula, open North Korea to dialogue, and improve bilateral relations among the countries participating in the process—which may be crucial ingredients for peace and cooperation in northeast Asia and beyond.

* Experts have expressed concerns that China’s sales or transfers of nuclear energy technology to other nations may create conditions for proliferation of nuclear weapons expertise, technology, and related materials. These activities also could feed the insecurities of other nations and cause them to pursue their own nuclear weapons development efforts. This could lead to an increase in the number of nations possessing nuclear weapons capability.

China’s Views of Sovereignty and Methods of Controlling Access to its Territory

* China’s leaders adamantly resist any activity they perceive to interfere with China’s claims to territorial sovereignty. At times this priority conflicts with international norms and practices.

* Some experts within China are attempting to assert a view that China is entitled to sovereignty over outer space above its territory, contrary to international practice. If this becomes Chinese policy, it could set the stage for conflict with the United States and other nations that expect the right of passage for their spacecraft.

* China has asserted sovereignty over the seas and airspace in an Exclusive Economic Zone that extends 200 miles from its coastal baseline. This already has produced disputes with the United States and other nations and brings the prospect of conflict in the future.

* Any assertions by Chinese officials of sovereignty in the maritime,air, and outer space domains are not just a bilateral issue between the United States and China. The global economy is dependent upon the fundamental principles of freedom of navigation of the seas and air space, and treatment of outer space as a global ‘‘commons’’ without borders. All nations that benefit from the use of these domains would be adversely affected by the encroachment of Chinese sovereignty claims.

* China’s efforts to alter the balance of sovereignty rights are part of its overall access control strategy and could have an impact on the perceived legitimacy of U.S. military operations in the region, especially in times of crisis.

* China is building a legal case for its own unique interpretation of international treaties and agreements. China is using ‘‘lawfare’’ and other tools of national power to persuade other nations to accept China’s definition of sovereignty in the maritime, air, and space domains.

The Nature and Extent of China’s Space and Cyber Activities and their Implications for U.S. Security

* China continues to make significant progress in developing space capabilities, many of which easily translate to enhanced military capacity. In China, the military runs the space program, and there is no separate, distinguishable civilian program. Although some Chinese space programs have no explicit military intent, many space systems—such as communications, navigation, meteorological, and imagery systems—are dual use in nature.

* The People’s Liberation Army currently has sufficient capability to meet many of its space goals. Planned expansions in electronic and signals intelligence, facilitated in part by new, space-based assets, will provide greatly increased intelligence and targeting capability. These advances will result in an increased threat to U.S. military assets and personnel.

* China’s space architecture contributes to its military’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capability. This increased capability allows China to project its limited military power in the western and southern Pacific Ocean and to place U.S. forces at risk sooner in any conflict. Cyber space is a critical vulnerability of the U.S. government and economy, since both depend heavily on the use of computers and their connection to the Internet. The dependence on the Internet makes computers and information stored on those computers vulnerable.

* China is likely to take advantage of the U.S. dependence on cyber space for four significant reasons. First, the costs of cyber operations are low in comparison with traditional espionage or military activities. Second, determining the origin of cyber operations and attributing them to the Chinese government or any other operator is difficult. Therefore, the United States would be hindered in responding conventionally to such an attack. Third, cyber attacks can confuse the enemy. Fourth, there is an underdeveloped legal framework to guide responses.

* China is aggressively pursuing cyber warfare capabilities that may provide it with an asymmetric advantage against the United States. In a conflict situation, this advantage would reduce current U.S. conventional military dominance.

Thinking the unthinkable - The Blood Borders!!!

2008-12-01T16:59:00.001-08:00
Thinking the unthinkable - The Blood Borders!!!

Here is a controversial article written by Ralph Peters published in Armed Forces Journal. Though the article has been debated extensively on different forums for its political biases and is focused specifically on the Middle East, it helps in thinking about a truly new view of looking at man-made political boundaries of nations which in many cases do not represent the ethnic, cultural and nationalistic identity of the different regions and the people. This underlying cause ranges from Falkland Island in South America to Western Sahara in Morocco; Kurdistan and Baluchistan to Korean peninsula in the east.

This definition of a country or nation can be challenged by many people, but to me this clash of associative identity and superimposed identity is the 'root'- cause of most of the current global conflicts. This question and the ways out, we would explore in the blogs later. I would appreciate if you can drop your thoughts and comments(+-) at the bottom of the blog so that they can help me in formulating and exploring this idea further. The article goes like this :

"Blood borders
How a better Middle East would look

International borders are never completely just. But the degree of injustice they inflict upon those whom frontiers force together or separate makes an enormous difference — often the difference between freedom and oppression, tolerance and atrocity, the rule of law and terrorism, or even peace and war.

The most arbitrary and distorted borders in the world are in Africa and the Middle East. Drawn by self-interested Europeans (who have had sufficient trouble defining their own frontiers), Africa’s borders continue to provoke the deaths of millions of local inhabitants. But the unjust borders in the Middle East — to borrow from Churchill — generate more trouble than can be consumed locally.

While the Middle East has far more problems than dysfunctional borders alone — from cultural stagnation through scandalous inequality to deadly religious extremism — the greatest taboo in striving to understand the region’s comprehensive failure isn’t Islam but the awful-but-sacrosanct international boundaries worshipped by our own diplomats.

Of course, no adjustment of borders, however draconian, could make every minority in the Middle East happy. In some instances, ethnic and religious groups live intermingled and have intermarried. Elsewhere, reunions based on blood or belief might not prove quite as joyous as their current proponents expect. The boundaries projected in the maps accompanying this article redress the wrongs suffered by the most significant “cheated” population groups, such as the Kurds, Baluch and Arab Shia, but still fail to account adequately for Middle Eastern Christians, Bahais, Ismailis, Naqshbandis and many another numerically lesser minorities. And one haunting wrong can never be redressed with a reward of territory: the genocide perpetrated against the Armenians by the dying Ottoman Empire.

Yet, for all the injustices the borders re-imagined here leave unaddressed, without such major boundary revisions, we shall never see a more peaceful Middle East.

Even those who abhor the topic of altering borders would be well-served to engage in an exercise that attempts to conceive a fairer, if still imperfect, amendment of national boundaries between the Bosporus and the Indus. Accepting that international statecraft has never developed effective tools — short of war — for readjusting faulty borders, a mental effort to grasp the Middle East’s “organic” frontiers nonetheless helps us understand the extent of the difficulties we face and will continue to face. We are dealing with colossal, man-made deformities that will not stop generating hatred and violence until they are corrected.

As for those who refuse to “think the unthinkable,” declaring that boundaries must not change and that’s that, it pays to remember that boundaries have never stopped changing through the centuries. Borders have never been static, and many frontiers, from Congo through Kosovo to the Caucasus, are changing even now (as ambassadors and special representatives avert their eyes to study the shine on their wingtips).

Oh, and one other dirty little secret from 5,000 years of history: Ethnic cleansing works.

Begin with the border issue most sensitive to American readers: For Israel to have any hope of living in reasonable peace with its neighbors, it will have to return to its pre-1967 borders — with essential local adjustments for legitimate security concerns. But the issue of the territories surrounding Jerusalem, a city stained with thousands of years of blood, may prove intractable beyond our lifetimes. Where all parties have turned their god into a real-estate tycoon, literal turf battles have a tenacity unrivaled by mere greed for oil wealth or ethnic squabbles. So let us set aside this single overstudied issue and turn to those that are studiously ignored.

The most glaring injustice in the notoriously unjust lands between the Balkan Mountains and the Himalayas is the absence of an independent Kurdish state. There are between 27 million and 36 million Kurds living in contiguous regions in the Middle East (the figures are imprecise because no state has ever allowed an honest census). Greater than the population of present-day Iraq, even the lower figure makes the Kurds the world’s largest ethnic group without a state of its own. Worse, Kurds have been oppressed by every government controlling the hills and mountains where they’ve lived since Xenophon’s day.

The U.S. and its coalition partners missed a glorious chance to begin to correct this injustice after Baghdad’s fall. A Frankenstein’s monster of a state sewn together from ill-fitting parts, Iraq should have been divided into three smaller states immediately. We failed from cowardice and lack of vision, bullying Iraq’s Kurds into supporting the new Iraqi government — which they do wistfully as a quid pro quo for our good will. But were a free plebiscite to be held, make no mistake: Nearly 100 percent of Iraq’s Kurds would vote for independence.

As would the long-suffering Kurds of Turkey, who have endured decades of violent military oppression and a decades-long demotion to “mountain Turks” in an effort to eradicate their identity. While the Kurdish plight at Ankara’s hands has eased somewhat over the past decade, the repression recently intensified again and the eastern fifth of Turkey should be viewed as occupied territory. As for the Kurds of Syria and Iran, they, too, would rush to join an independent Kurdistan if they could. The refusal by the world’s legitimate democracies to champion Kurdish independence is a human-rights sin of omission far worse than the clumsy, minor sins of commission that routinely excite our media. And by the way: A Free Kurdistan, stretching from Diyarbakir through Tabriz, would be the most pro-Western state between Bulgaria and Japan.

A just alignment in the region would leave Iraq’s three Sunni-majority provinces as a truncated state that might eventually choose to unify with a Syria that loses its littoral to a Mediterranean-oriented Greater Lebanon: Phoenecia reborn. The Shia south of old Iraq would form the basis of an Arab Shia State rimming much of the Persian Gulf. Jordan would retain its current territory, with some southward expansion at Saudi expense. For its part, the unnatural state of Saudi Arabia would suffer as great a dismantling as Pakistan.

A root cause of the broad stagnation in the Muslim world is the Saudi royal family’s treatment of Mecca and Medina as their fiefdom. With Islam’s holiest shrines under the police-state control of one of the world’s most bigoted and oppressive regimes — a regime that commands vast, unearned oil wealth — the Saudis have been able to project their Wahhabi vision of a disciplinarian, intolerant faith far beyond their borders. The rise of the Saudis to wealth and, consequently, influence has been the worst thing to happen to the Muslim world as a whole since the time of the Prophet, and the worst thing to happen to Arabs since the Ottoman (if not the Mongol) conquest.

While non-Muslims could not effect a change in the control of Islam’s holy cities, imagine how much healthier the Muslim world might become were Mecca and Medina ruled by a rotating council representative of the world’s major Muslim schools and movements in an Islamic Sacred State — a sort of Muslim super-Vatican — where the future of a great faith might be debated rather than merely decreed. True justice — which we might not like — would also give Saudi Arabia’s coastal oil fields to the Shia Arabs who populate that subregion, while a southeastern quadrant would go to Yemen. Confined to a rump Saudi Homelands Independent Territory around Riyadh, the House of Saud would be capable of far less mischief toward Islam and the world.

Iran, a state with madcap boundaries, would lose a great deal of territory to Unified Azerbaijan, Free Kurdistan, the Arab Shia State and Free Baluchistan, but would gain the provinces around Herat in today’s Afghanistan — a region with a historical and linguistic affinity for Persia. Iran would, in effect, become an ethnic Persian state again, with the most difficult question being whether or not it should keep the port of Bandar Abbas or surrender it to the Arab Shia State.

What Afghanistan would lose to Persia in the west, it would gain in the east, as Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier tribes would be reunited with their Afghan brethren (the point of this exercise is not to draw maps as we would like them but as local populations would prefer them). Pakistan, another unnatural state, would also lose its Baluch territory to Free Baluchistan. The remaining “natural” Pakistan would lie entirely east of the Indus, except for a westward spur near Karachi.

The city-states of the United Arab Emirates would have a mixed fate — as they probably will in reality. Some might be incorporated in the Arab Shia State ringing much of the Persian Gulf (a state more likely to evolve as a counterbalance to, rather than an ally of, Persian Iran). Since all puritanical cultures are hypocritical, Dubai, of necessity, would be allowed to retain its playground status for rich debauchees. Kuwait would remain within its current borders, as would Oman.

In each case, this hypothetical redrawing of boundaries reflects ethnic affinities and religious communalism — in some cases, both. Of course, if we could wave a magic wand and amend the borders under discussion, we would certainly prefer to do so selectively. Yet, studying the revised map, in contrast to the map illustrating today’s boundaries, offers some sense of the great wrongs borders drawn by Frenchmen and Englishmen in the 20th century did to a region struggling to emerge from the humiliations and defeats of the 19th century.

Correcting borders to reflect the will of the people may be impossible. For now. But given time — and the inevitable attendant bloodshed — new and natural borders will emerge. Babylon has fallen more than once.

Meanwhile, our men and women in uniform will continue to fight for security from terrorism, for the prospect of democracy and for access to oil supplies in a region that is destined to fight itself. The current human divisions and forced unions between Ankara and Karachi, taken together with the region’s self-inflicted woes, form as perfect a breeding ground for religious extremism, a culture of blame and the recruitment of terrorists as anyone could design. Where men and women look ruefully at their borders, they look enthusiastically for enemies.

From the world’s oversupply of terrorists to its paucity of energy supplies, the current deformations of the Middle East promise a worsening, not an improving, situation. In a region where only the worst aspects of nationalism ever took hold and where the most debased aspects of religion threaten to dominate a disappointed faith, the U.S., its allies and, above all, our armed forces can look for crises without end. While Iraq may provide a counterexample of hope — if we do not quit its soil prematurely — the rest of this vast region offers worsening problems on almost every front.

If the borders of the greater Middle East cannot be amended to reflect the natural ties of blood and faith, we may take it as an article of faith that a portion of the bloodshed in the region will continue to be our own."
I would not want to go for this concept specifically applied to Middle East because of all the political biases and hidden controversies. But do not forget to come back to the blog to see further analysis of the underlying theory and how it can address the global conflicts. Adios!!!

Militant Attacks In Mumbai and Their Consequences

2008-12-01T15:54:00.000-08:00

Militant Attacks In Mumbai and Their Consequences

On 26/11, a group of Islamist operatives carried out a complex terror operation in the Indian city of Mumbai. The attack was not complex because of the weapons used or its size, but in the apparent training, multiple methods of approaching the city and excellent operational security and discipline in the final phases of the operation, when the last remaining attackers held out in the Taj Mahal hotel for several days. The operational goal of the attack clearly was to cause as many casualties as possible, particularly among Jews and well-to-do guests of five-star hotels. But attacks on various other targets, from railroad stations to hospitals, indicate that the more general purpose was to spread terror in a major Indian city.

While it is not clear precisely who carried out the Mumbai attack, two separate units apparently were involved. One group, possibly consisting of Indian Muslims, was established in Mumbai ahead of the attacks. The second group appears to have just arrived. It traveled via ship from Karachi, Pakistan, later hijacked a small Indian vessel to get past Indian coastal patrols, and ultimately landed near Mumbai.

Extensive preparations apparently had been made, including surveillance of the targets. So while the precise number of attackers remains unclear, the attack clearly was well-planned and well-executed.

Evidence and logic suggest that radical Pakistani Islamists carried out the attack. These groups have a highly complex and deliberately amorphous structure. Rather than being centrally controlled, ad hoc teams are created with links to one or more groups. Conceivably, they might have lacked links to any group, but this is hard to believe. Too much planning and training were involved in this attack for it to have been conceived by a bunch of guys in a garage. While precisely which radical Pakistani Islamist group or groups were involved is unknown, the Mumbai attack appears to have originated in Pakistan. It could have been linked to al Qaeda prime or its various franchises and/or to Kashmiri insurgents.

More important than the question of the exact group that carried out the attack, however, is the attackers’ strategic end. There is a tendency to regard terror attacks as ends in themselves, carried out simply for the sake of spreading terror. In the highly politicized atmosphere of Pakistan’s radical Islamist factions, however, terror frequently has a more sophisticated and strategic purpose. Whoever invested the time and took the risk in organizing this attack had a reason to do so. Let’s work backward to that reason by examining the logical outcomes following this attack.

An End to New Delhi's Restraint

The most striking aspect of the Mumbai attack is the challenge it presents to the Indian government — a challenge almost impossible for New Delhi to ignore. A December 2001 Islamist attack on the Indian parliament triggered an intense confrontation between India and Pakistan. Since then, New Delhi has not responded in a dramatic fashion to numerous Islamist attacks against India that were traceable to Pakistan. The Mumbai attack, by contrast, aimed to force a response from New Delhi by being so grievous that any Indian government showing only a muted reaction to it would fall.

India’s restrained response to Islamist attacks (even those originating in Pakistan) in recent years has come about because New Delhi has understood that, for a host of reasons, Islamabad has been unable to control radical Pakistani Islamist groups. India did not want war with Pakistan; it felt it had more important issues to deal with. New Delhi therefore accepted Islamabad’s assurances that Pakistan would do its best to curb terror attacks, and after suitable posturing, allowed tensions originating from Islamist attacks to pass.

This time, however, the attackers struck in such a way that New Delhi couldn’t allow the incident to pass. As one might expect, public opinion in India is shifting from stunned to furious. India’s Congress party-led government is politically weak and nearing the end of its life span. It lacks the political power to ignore the attack, even if it were inclined to do so. If it ignored the attack, it would fall, and a more intensely nationalist government would take its place. It is therefore very difficult to imagine circumstances under which the Indians could respond to this attack in the same manner they have to recent Islamist attacks.

What the Indians actually will do is not clear. In 2001-2002, New Delhi responded to the attack on the Indian parliament by moving forces close to the Pakistani border and the Line of Control that separates Indian- and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, engaging in artillery duels along the front, and bringing its nuclear forces to a high level of alert. The Pakistanis made a similar response. Whether India ever actually intended to attack Pakistan remains unclear, but either way, New Delhi created an intense crisis in Pakistan.

The U.S. and the Indo-Pakistani Crisis

The United States used this crisis for its own ends. Having just completed the first phase of its campaign in Afghanistan, Washington was intensely pressuring Pakistan’s then-Musharraf government to expand cooperation with the United States; purge its intelligence organization, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), of radical Islamists; and crack down on al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Afghan-Pakistani border region. Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had been reluctant to cooperate with Washington, as doing so inevitably would spark a massive domestic backlash against his government.

The crisis with India produced an opening for the United States. Eager to get India to stand down from the crisis, the Pakistanis looked to the Americans to mediate. And the price for U.S. mediation was increased cooperation from Pakistan with the United States. The Indians, not eager for war, backed down from the crisis after guarantees that Islamabad would impose stronger controls on Islamist groups in Kashmir.

In 2001-2002, the Indo-Pakistani crisis played into American hands. In 2008, the new Indo-Pakistani crisis might play differently. The United States recently has demanded increased Pakistani cooperation along the Afghan border. Meanwhile, President-elect Barack Obama has stated his intention to focus on Afghanistan and pressure the Pakistanis.

Therefore, one of Islamabad’s first responses to the new Indo-Pakistani crisis was to announce that if the Indians increased their forces along Pakistan’s eastern border, Pakistan would be forced to withdraw 100,000 troops from its western border with Afghanistan. In other words, threats from India would cause Pakistan to dramatically reduce its cooperation with the United States in the Afghan war. The Indian foreign minister is flying to the United States to meet with Obama; obviously, this matter will be discussed among others.

We expect the United States to pressure India not to create a crisis, in order to avoid this outcome. As we have said, the problem is that it is unclear whether politically the Indians can afford restraint. At the very least, New Delhi must demand that the Pakistani government take steps to make the ISI and Pakistan’s other internal security apparatus more effective. Even if the Indians concede that there was no ISI involvement in the attack, they will argue that the ISI is incapable of stopping such attacks. They will demand a purge and reform of the ISI as a sign of Pakistani commitment. Barring that, New Delhi will move troops to the Indo-Pakistani frontier to intimidate Pakistan and placate Indian public opinion.

Dilemmas for Islamabad, New Delhi and Washington

At that point, Islamabad will have a serious problem. The Pakistani government is even weaker than the Indian government. Pakistan’s civilian regime does not control the Pakistani military, and therefore does not control the ISI. The civilians can’t decide to transform Pakistani security, and the military is not inclined to make this transformation. (Pakistan’s military has had ample opportunity to do so if it wished.)

Pakistan faces the challenge, just one among many, that its civilian and even military leadership lack the ability to reach deep into the ISI and security services to transform them. In some ways, these agencies operate under their own rules. Add to this the reality that the ISI and security forces — even if they are acting more assertively, as Islamabad claims — are demonstrably incapable of controlling radical Islamists in Pakistan. If they were capable, the attack on Mumbai would have been thwarted in Pakistan. The simple reality is that in Pakistan’s case, the will to make this transformation does not seem to be present, and even if it were, the ability to suppress terror attacks isn’t there.

The United States might well want to limit New Delhi’s response. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is on her way to India to discuss just this. But the politics of India’s situation make it unlikely that the Indians can do anything more than listen. It is more than simply a political issue for New Delhi; the Indians have no reason to believe that the Mumbai operation was one of a kind. Further operations like the Mumbai attack might well be planned. Unless the Pakistanis shift their posture inside Pakistan, India has no way of knowing whether other such attacks can be stymied. The Indians will be sympathetic to Washington’s plight in Afghanistan and the need to keep Pakistani troops at the Afghan border. But New Delhi will need something that the Americans — and in fact the Pakistanis — can’t deliver: a guarantee that there will be no more attacks like this one.

The Indian government cannot chance inaction. It probably would fall if it did. Moreover, in the event of inactivity and another attack, Indian public opinion probably will swing to an uncontrollable extreme. If an attack takes place but India has moved toward crisis posture with Pakistan, at least no one can argue that the Indian government remained passive in the face of threats to national security. Therefore, India is likely to refuse American requests for restraint.

It is possible that New Delhi will make a radical proposal to Rice, however. Given that the Pakistani government is incapable of exercising control in its own country, and given that Pakistan now represents a threat to both U.S. and Indian national security, the Indians might suggest a joint operation with the Americans against Pakistan.

What that joint operation might entail is uncertain, but regardless, this is something that Rice would reject out of hand and that Obama would reject in January 2009. Pakistan has a huge population and nuclear weapons, and the last thing Bush or Obama wants is to practice nation-building in Pakistan. The Indians, of course, will anticipate this response. The truth is that New Delhi itself does not want to engage deep in Pakistan to strike at militant training camps and other Islamist sites. That would be a nightmare. But if Rice shows up with a request for Indian restraint and no concrete proposal — or willingness to entertain a proposal — for solving the Pakistani problem, India will be able to refuse on the grounds that the Americans are asking India to absorb a risk (more Mumbai-style attacks) without the United States’ willingness to share in the risk.

Setting the Stage for a New Indo-Pakistani Confrontation

That will set the stage for another Indo-Pakistani confrontation. India will push forces forward all along the Indo-Pakistani frontier, move its nuclear forces to an alert level, begin shelling Pakistan, and perhaps — given the seriousness of the situation — attack short distances into Pakistan and even carry out airstrikes deep in Pakistan. India will demand greater transparency for New Delhi in Pakistani intelligence operations. The Indians will not want to occupy Pakistan; they will want to occupy Pakistan’s security apparatus.

Naturally, the Pakistanis will refuse that. There is no way they can give India, their main adversary, insight into Pakistani intelligence operations. But without that access, India has no reason to trust Pakistan. This will leave the Indians in an odd position: They will be in a near-war posture, but will have made no demands of Pakistan that Islamabad can reasonably deliver and that would benefit India. In one sense, India will be gesturing. In another sense, India will be trapped by making a gesture on which Pakistan cannot deliver. The situation thus could get out of hand.

In the meantime, the Pakistanis certainly will withdraw forces from western Pakistan and deploy them in eastern Pakistan. That will mean that one leg of the Petraeus and Obama plans would collapse. Washington’s expectation of greater Pakistani cooperation along the Afghan border will disappear along with the troops. This will free the Taliban from whatever limits the Pakistani army had placed on it. The Taliban’s ability to fight would increase, while the motivation for any of the Taliban to enter talks — as Afghan President Hamid Karzai has suggested — would decline. U.S. forces, already stretched to the limit, would face an increasingly difficult situation, while pressure on al Qaeda in the tribal areas would decrease.

Now, step back and consider the situation the Mumbai attackers have created. First, the Indian government faces an internal political crisis driving it toward a confrontation it didn’t plan on. Second, the minimum Pakistani response to a renewed Indo-Pakistani crisis will be withdrawing forces from western Pakistan, thereby strengthening the Taliban and securing al Qaeda. Third, sufficient pressure on Pakistan’s civilian government could cause it to collapse, opening the door to a military-Islamist government — or it could see Pakistan collapse into chaos, giving Islamists security in various regions and an opportunity to reshape Pakistan. Finally, the United States’ situation in Afghanistan has now become enormously more complex.

By staging an attack the Indian government can’t ignore, the Mumbai attackers have set in motion an existential crisis for Pakistan. The reality of Pakistan cannot be transformed, trapped as the country is between the United States and India. Almost every evolution from this point forward benefits Islamists. Strategically, the attack on Mumbai was a precise blow struck to achieve uncertain but favorable political outcomes for the Islamists.

Rice’s trip to India now becomes the crucial next step. She wants Indian restraint. She does not want the western Pakistani border to collapse. But she cannot guarantee what India must have: assurance of no further terror attacks on India originating in Pakistan. Without that, India must do something. No Indian government could survive without some kind of action. So it is up to Rice, in one of her last acts as secretary of state, to come up with a miraculous solution to head off a final, catastrophic crisis for the Bush administration — and a defining first crisis for the new Obama administration. Former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld once said that the enemy gets a vote. The Islamists cast their ballot in Mumbai.

The Zionist Plan for the Middle East in 20th Century

2008-11-29T10:26:00.000-08:00

A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties

This essay originally appeared in Hebrew in KIVUNIM (Directions), A Journal for Judaism and Zionism; Issue No, 14--Winter, 5742, February 1982, Editor: Yoram Beck. Editorial Committee: Eli Eyal, Yoram Beck, Amnon Hadari, Yohanan Manor, Elieser Schweid. Published by the Department of Publicity/The World Zionist Organization, Jerusalem.

At the outset of the nineteen eighties the State of Israel is in need of a new perspective as to its place, its aims and national targets, at home and abroad. This need has become even more vital due to a number of central processes which the country, the region and the world are undergoing. We are living today in the early stages of a new epoch in human history which is not at all similar to its predecessor, and its characteristics are totally different from what we have hitherto known. That is why we need an understanding of the central processes which typify this historical epoch on the one hand, and on the other hand we need a world outlook and an operational strategy in accordance with the new conditions. The existence, prosperity and steadfastness of the Jewish state will depend upon its ability to adopt a new framework for its domestic and foreign affairs.

This epoch is characterized by several traits which we can already diagnose, and which symbolize a genuine revolution in our present lifestyle. The dominant process is the breakdown of the rationalist, humanist outlook as the major cornerstone supporting the life and achievements of Western civilization since the Renaissance. The political, social and economic views which have emanated from this foundation have been based on several "truths" which are presently disappearing--for example, the view that man as an individual is the center of the universe and everything exists in order to fulfill his basic material needs. This position is being invalidated in the present when it has become clear that the amount of resources in the cosmos does not meet Man's requirements, his economic needs or his demographic constraints. In a world in which there are four billion human beings and economic and energy resources which do not grow proportionally to meet the needs of mankind, it is unrealistic to expect to fulfill the main requirement of Western Society, i.e., the wish and aspiration for boundless consumption. The view that ethics plays no part in determining the direction Man takes, but rather his material needs do--that view is becoming prevalent today as we see a world in which nearly all values are disappearing. We are losing the ability to assess the simplest things, especially when they concern the simple question of what is Good and what is Evil.

The vision of man's limitless aspirations and abilities shrinks in the face of the sad facts of life, when we witness the break-up of world order around us. The view which promises liberty and freedom to mankind seems absurd in light of the sad fact that three fourths of the human race lives under totalitarian regimes. The views concerning equality and social justice have been transformed by socialism and especially by Communism into a laughing stock. There is no argument as to the truth of these two ideas, but it is clear that they have not been put into practice properly and the majority of mankind has lost the liberty, the freedom and the opportunity for equality and justice. In this nuclear world in which we are (still) living in relative peace for thirty years, the concept of peace and coexistence among nations has no meaning when a superpower like the USSR holds a military and political doctrine of the sort it has: that not only is a nuclear war possible and necessary in order to achieve the ends of Marxism, but that it is possible to survive after it, not to speak of the fact that one can be victorious in it.

The essential concepts of human society, especially those of the West, are undergoing a change due to political, military and economic transformations. Thus, the nuclear and conventional might of the USSR has transformed the epoch that has just ended into the last respite before the great saga that will demolish a large part of our world in a multi-dimensional global war, in comparison with which the past world wars will have been mere child's play. The power of nuclear as well as of conventional weapons, their quantity, their precision and quality will turn most of our world upside down within a few years, and we must align ourselves so as to face that in Israel. That is, then, the main threat to our existence and that of the Western world. The war over resources in the world, the Arab monopoly on oil, and the need of the West to import most of its raw materials from the Third World, are transforming the world we know, given that one of the major aims of the USSR is to defeat the West by gaining control over the gigantic resources in the Persian Gulf and in the southern part of Africa, in which the majority of world minerals are located. We can imagine the dimensions of the global confrontation which will face us in the future.

The Gorshkov doctrine calls for Soviet control of the oceans and mineral rich areas of the Third World. That together with the present Soviet nuclear doctrine which holds that it is possible to manage, win and survive a nuclear war, in the course of which the West's military might well be destroyed and its inhabitants made slaves in the service of Marxism-Leninism, is the main danger to world peace and to our own existence. Since 1967, the Soviets have transformed Clausewitz' dictum into "War is the continuation of policy in nuclear means," and made it the motto which guides all their policies. Already today they are busy carrying out their aims in our region and throughout the world, and the need to face them becomes the major element in our country's security policy and of course that of the rest of the Free World. That is our major foreign challenge.

The Arab Muslim world, therefore, is not the major strategic problem which we shall face in the Eighties, despite the fact that it carries the main threat against Israel, due to its growing military might. This world, with its ethnic minorities, its factions and internal crises, which is astonishingly self-destructive, as we can see in Lebanon, in non-Arab Iran and now also in Syria, is unable to deal successfully with its fundamental problems and does not therefore constitute a real threat against the State of Israel in the long run, but only in the short run where its immediate military power has great import. In the long run, this world will be unable to exist within its present framework in the areas around us without having to go through genuine revolutionary changes. The Muslim Arab World is built like a temporary house of cards put together by foreigners (France and Britain in the Nineteen Twenties), without the wishes and desires of the inhabitants having been taken into account. It was arbitrarily divided into 19 states, all made of combinations of minorites and ethnic groups which are hostile to one another, so that every Arab Muslim state nowadays faces ethnic social destruction from within, and in some a civil war is already raging. Most of the Arabs, 118 million out of 170 million, live in Africa, mostly in Egypt (45 million today).

Apart from Egypt, all the Maghreb states are made up of a mixture of Arabs and non-Arab Berbers. In Algeria there is already a civil war raging in the Kabile mountains between the two nations in the country. Morocco and Algeria are at war with each other over Spanish Sahara, in addition to the internal struggle in each of them. Militant Islam endangers the integrity of Tunisia and Qaddafi organizes wars which are destructive from the Arab point of view, from a country which is sparsely populated and which cannot become a powerful nation. That is why he has been attempting unifications in the past with states that are more genuine, like Egypt and Syria. Sudan, the most torn apart state in the Arab Muslim world today is built upon four groups hostile to each other, an Arab Muslim Sunni minority which rules over a majority of non-Arab Africans, Pagans, and Christians. In Egypt there is a Sunni Muslim majority facing a large minority of Christians which is dominant in upper Egypt: some 7 million of them, so that even Sadat, in his speech on May 8, expressed the fear that they will want a state of their own, something like a "second" Christian Lebanon in Egypt.

All the Arab States east of Israel are torn apart, broken up and riddled with inner conflict even more than those of the Maghreb. Syria is fundamentally no different from Lebanon except in the strong military regime which rules it. But the real civil war taking place nowadays between the Sunni majority and the Shi'ite Alawi ruling minority (a mere 12% of the population) testifies to the severity of the domestic trouble.

Iraq is no different in essence from its neighbors, although its majority is Shi'ite and the ruling minority Sunni. Sixty-five percent of the population has no say in politics, in which an elite of 20 percent holds the power. In addition there is a large Kurdish minority in the north, and if it weren't for the strength of the ruling regime, the army and the oil revenues, Iraq's future state would be no different than that of Lebanon in the past or of Syria today. The seeds of inner conflict and civil war are apparent today already, especially after the rise of Khomeini to power in Iran, a leader whom the Shi'ites in Iraq view as their natural leader.

All the Gulf principalities and Saudi Arabia are built upon a delicate house of sand in which there is only oil. In Kuwait, the Kuwaitis constitute only a quarter of the population. In Bahrain, the Shi'ites are the majority but are deprived of power. In the UAE, Shi'ites are once again the majority but the Sunnis are in power. The same is true of Oman and North Yemen. Even in the Marxist South Yemen there is a sizable Shi'ite minority. In Saudi Arabia half the population is foreign, Egyptian and Yemenite, but a Saudi minority holds power.

Jordan is in reality Palestinian, ruled by a Trans-Jordanian Bedouin minority, but most of the army and certainly the bureaucracy is now Palestinian. As a matter of fact Amman is as Palestinian as Nablus. All of these countries have powerful armies, relatively speaking. But there is a problem there too. The Syrian army today is mostly Sunni with an Alawi officer corps, the Iraqi army Shi'ite with Sunni commanders. This has great significance in the long run, and that is why it will not be possible to retain the loyalty of the army for a long time except where it comes to the only common denominator: The hostility towards Israel, and today even that is insufficient.

Alongside the Arabs, split as they are, the other Muslim states share a similar predicament. Half of Iran's population is comprised of a Persian speaking group and the other half of an ethnically Turkish group. Turkey's population comprises a Turkish Sunni Muslim majority, some 50%, and two large minorities, 12 million Shi'ite Alawis and 6 million Sunni Kurds. In Afghanistan there are 5 million Shi'ites who constitute one third of the population. In Sunni Pakistan there are 15 million Shi'ites who endanger the existence of that state.

This national ethnic minority picture extending from Morocco to India and from Somalia to Turkey points to the absence of stability and a rapid degeneration in the entire region. When this picture is added to the economic one, we see how the entire region is built like a house of cards, unable to withstand its severe problems.

In this giant and fractured world there are a few wealthy groups and a huge mass of poor people. Most of the Arabs have an average yearly income of 300 dollars. That is the situation in Egypt, in most of the Maghreb countries except for Libya, and in Iraq. Lebanon is torn apart and its economy is falling to pieces. It is a state in which there is no centralized power, but only 5 de facto sovereign authorities (Christian in the north, supported by the Syrians and under the rule of the Franjieh clan, in the East an area of direct Syrian conquest, in the center a Phalangist controlled Christian enclave, in the south and up to the Litani river a mostly Palestinian region controlled by the PLO and Major Haddad's state of Christians and half a million Shi'ites). Syria is in an even graver situation and even the assistance she will obtain in the future after the unification with Libya will not be sufficient for dealing with the basic problems of existence and the maintenance of a large army. Egypt is in the worst situation: Millions are on the verge of hunger, half the labor force is unemployed, and housing is scarce in this most densely populated area of the world. Except for the army, there is not a single department operating efficiently and the state is in a permanent state of bankruptcy and depends entirely on American foreign assistance granted since the peace.

In the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Egypt there is the largest accumulation of money and oil in the world, but those enjoying it are tiny elites who lack a wide base of support and self-confidence, something that no army can guarantee. The Saudi army with all its equipment cannot defend the regime from real dangers at home or abroad, and what took place in Mecca in 1980 is only an example. A sad and very stormy situation surrounds Israel and creates challenges for it, problems, risks but also far-reaching opportunities for the first time since 1967. Chances are that opportunities missed at that time will become achievable in the Eighties to an extent and along dimensions which we cannot even imagine today.

The "peace" policy and the return of territories, through a dependence upon the US, precludes the realization of the new option created for us. Since 1967, all the governments of Israel have tied our national aims down to narrow political needs, on the one hand, and on the other to destructive opinions at home which neutralized our capacities both at home and abroad. Failing to take steps towards the Arab population in the new territories, acquired in the course of a war forced upon us, is the major strategic error committed by Israel on the morning after the Six Day War. We could have saved ourselves all the bitter and dangerous conflict since then if we had given Jordan to the Palestinians who live west of the Jordan river. By doing that we would have neutralized the Palestinian problem which we nowadays face, and to which we have found solutions that are really no solutions at all, such as territorial compromise or autonomy which amount, in fact, to the same thing. Today, we suddenly face immense opportunities for transforming the situation thoroughly and this we must do in the coming decade, otherwise we shall not survive as a state.

In the course of the Nineteen Eighties, the State of Israel will have to go through far-reaching changes in its political and economic regime domestically, along with radical changes in its foreign policy, in order to stand up to the global and regional challenges of this new epoch. The loss of the Suez Canal oil fields, of the immense potential of the oil, gas and other natural resources in the Sinai peninsula which is geomorphologically identical to the rich oil-producing countries in the region, will result in an energy drain in the near future and will destroy our domestic economy: one quarter of our present GNP as well as one third of the budget is used for the purchase of oil. The search for raw materials in the Negev and on the coast will not, in the near future, serve to alter that state of affairs.

Regaining the Sinai peninsula with its present and potential resources is therefore a political priority which is obstructed by the Camp David and the peace agreements. The fault for that lies of course with the present Israeli government and the governments which paved the road to the policy of territorial compromise, the Alignment governments since 1967. The Egyptians will not need to keep the peace treaty after the return of the Sinai, and they will do all they can to return to the fold of the Arab world and to the USSR in order to gain support and military assistance. American aid is guaranteed only for a short while, for the terms of the peace and the weakening of the U.S. both at home and abroad will bring about a reduction in aid. Without oil and the income from it, with the present enormous expenditure, we will not be able to get through 1982 under the present conditions and we will have to act in order to return the situation to the status quo which existed in Sinai prior to Sadat's visit and the mistaken peace agreement signed with him in March 1979.

Israel has two major routes through which to realize this purpose, one direct and the other indirect. The direct option is the less realistic one because of the nature of the regime and government in Israel as well as the wisdom of Sadat who obtained our withdrawal from Sinai, which was, next to the war of 1973, his major achievement since he took power. Israel will not unilaterally break the treaty, neither today, nor in 1982, unless it is very hard pressed economically and politically and Egypt provides Israel with the excuse to take the Sinai back into our hands for the fourth time in our short history. What is left therefore, is the indirect option. The economic situation in Egypt, the nature of the regime and its pan-Arab policy, will bring about a situation after April 1982 in which Israel will be forced to act directly or indirectly in order to regain control over Sinai as a strategic, economic and energy reserve for the long run. Egypt does not constitute a military strategic problem due to its internal conflicts and it could be driven back to the post 1967 war situation in no more than one day.

The myth of Egypt as the strong leader of the Arab World was demolished back in 1956 and definitely did not survive 1967, but our policy, as in the return of the Sinai, served to turn the myth into "fact." In reality, however, Egypt's power in proportion both to Israel alone and to the rest of the Arab World has gone down about 50 percent since 1967. Egypt is no longer the leading political power in the Arab World and is economically on the verge of a crisis. Without foreign assistance the crisis will come tomorrow. In the short run, due to the return of the Sinai, Egypt will gain several advantages at our expense, but only in the short run until 1982, and that will not change the balance of power to its benefit, and will possibly bring about its downfall. Egypt, in its present domestic political picture, is already a corpse, all the more so if we take into account the growing Muslim-Christian rift. Breaking Egypt down territorially into distinct geographical regions is the political aim of Israel in the Nineteen Eighties on its Western front.

Egypt is divided and torn apart into many foci of authority. If Egypt falls apart, countries like Libya, Sudan or even the more distant states will not continue to exist in their present form and will join the downfall and dissolution of Egypt. The vision of a Christian Coptic State in Upper Egypt alongside a number of weak states with very localized power and without a centralized government as to date, is the key to a historical development which was only set back by the peace agreement but which seems inevitable in the long run.

The Western front, which on the surface appears more problematic, is in fact less complicated than the Eastern front, in which most of the events that make the headlines have been taking place recently. Lebanon's total dissolution into five provinces serves as a precendent for the entire Arab world including Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Arabian peninsula and is already following that track. The dissolution of Syria and Iraq later on into ethnically or religiously unqiue areas such as in Lebanon, is Israel's primary target on the Eastern front in the long run, while the dissolution of the military power of those states serves as the primary short term target. Syria will fall apart, in accordance with its ethnic and religious structure, into several states such as in present day Lebanon, so that there will be a Shi'ite Alawi state along its coast, a Sunni state in the Aleppo area, another Sunni state in Damascus hostile to its northern neighbor, and the Druzes who will set up a state, maybe even in our Golan, and certainly in the Hauran and in northern Jordan. This state of affairs will be the guarantee for peace and security in the area in the long run, and that aim is already within our reach today.

Iraq, rich in oil on the one hand and internally torn on the other, is guaranteed as a candidate for Israel's targets. Its dissolution is even more important for us than that of Syria. Iraq is stronger than Syria. In the short run it is Iraqi power which constitutes the greatest threat to Israel. An Iraqi-Iranian war will tear Iraq apart and cause its downfall at home even before it is able to organize a struggle on a wide front against us. Every kind of inter-Arab confrontation will assist us in the short run and will shorten the way to the more important aim of breaking up Iraq into denominations as in Syria and in Lebanon. In Iraq, a division into provinces along ethnic/religious lines as in Syria during Ottoman times is possible. So, three (or more) states will exist around the three major cities: Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, and Shi'ite areas in the south will separate from the Sunni and Kurdish north. It is possible that the present Iranian-Iraqi confrontation will deepen this polarization.

The entire Arabian peninsula is a natural candidate for dissolution due to internal and external pressures, and the matter is inevitable especially in Saudi Arabia. Regardless of whether its economic might based on oil remains intact or whether it is diminished in the long run, the internal rifts and breakdowns are a clear and natural development in light of the present political structure.

Jordan constitutes an immediate strategic target in the short run but not in the long run, for it does not constitute a real threat in the long run after its dissolution, the termination of the lengthy rule of King Hussein and the transfer of power to the Palestinians in the short run.

There is no chance that Jordan will continue to exist in its present structure for a long time, and Israel's policy, both in war and in peace, ought to be directed at the liquidation of Jordan under the present regime and the transfer of power to the Palestinian majority. Changing the regime east of the river will also cause the termination of the problem of the territories densely populated with Arabs west of the Jordan. Whether in war or under conditions of peace, emigrationfrom the territories and economic demographic freeze in them, are the guarantees for the coming change on both banks of the river, and we ought to be active in order to accelerate this process in the nearest future. The autonomy plan ought also to be rejected, as well as any compromise or division of the territories for, given the plans of the PLO and those of the Israeli Arabs themselves, the Shefa'amr plan of September 1980, it is not possible to go on living in this country in the present situation without separating the two nations, the Arabs to Jordan and the Jews to the areas west of the river. Genuine coexistence and peace will reign over the land only when the Arabs understand that without Jewish rule between the Jordan and the sea they will have neither existence nor security. A nation of their own and security will be theirs only in Jordan.

Within Israel the distinction between the areas of '67 and the territories beyond them, those of '48, has always been meaningless for Arabs and nowadays no longer has any significance for us. The problem should be seen in its entirety without any divisions as of '67. It should be clear, under any future political situation or mifitary constellation, that the solution of the problem of the indigenous Arabs will come only when they recognize the existence of Israel in secure borders up to the Jordan river and beyond it, as our existential need in this difficult epoch, the nuclear epoch which we shall soon enter. It is no longer possible to live with three fourths of the Jewish population on the dense shoreline which is so dangerous in a nuclear epoch.

Dispersal of the population is therefore a domestic strategic aim of the highest order; otherwise, we shall cease to exist within any borders. Judea, Samaria and the Galilee are our sole guarantee for national existence, and if we do not become the majority in the mountain areas, we shall not rule in the country and we shall be like the Crusaders, who lost this country which was not theirs anyhow, and in which they were foreigners to begin with. Rebalancing the country demographically, strategically and economically is the highest and most central aim today. Taking hold of the mountain watershed from Beersheba to the Upper Galilee is the national aim generated by the major strategic consideration which is settling the mountainous part of the country that is empty of Jews today.

Realizing our aims on the Eastern front depends first on the realization of this internal strategic objective. The transformation of the political and economic structure, so as to enable the realization of these strategic aims, is the key to achieving the entire change. We need to change from a centralized economy in which the government is extensively involved, to an open and free market as well as to switch from depending upon the U.S. taxpayer to developing, with our own hands, of a genuine productive economic infrastructure. If we are not able to make this change freely and voluntarily, we shall be forced into it by world developments, especially in the areas of economics, energy, and politics, and by our own growing isolation.

From a military and strategic point of view, the West led by the U.S. is unable to withstand the global pressures of the USSR throughout the world, and Israel must therefore stand alone in the Eighties, without any foreign assistance, military or economic, and this is within our capacities today, with no compromises.Rapid changes in the world will also bring about a change in the condition of world Jewry to which Israel will become not only a last resort but the only existential option. We cannot assume that U.S. Jews, and the communities of Europe and Latin America will continue to exist in the present form in the future.

Our existence in this country itself is certain, and there is no force that could remove us from here either forcefully or by treachery (Sadat's method). Despite the difficulties of the mistaken "peace" policy and the problem of the Israeli Arabs and those of the territories, we can effectively deal with these problems in the foreseeable future.

Conclusions

Three important points have to be clarified in order to be able to understand the significant possibilities of realization of this Zionist plan for the Middle East, and also why it had to be published.

The Military Background of The Plan

The military conditions of this plan have not been mentioned above, but on the many occasions where something very like it is being "explained" in closed meetings to members of the Israeli Establishment, this point is clarified. It is assumed that the Israeli military forces, in all their branches, are insufficient for the actual work of occupation of such wide territories as discussed above. In fact, even in times of intense Palestinian "unrest" on the West Bank, the forces of the Israeli Army are stretched out too much. The answer to that is the method of ruling by means of "Haddad forces" or of "Village Associations" (also known as "Village Leagues"): local forces under "leaders" completely dissociated from the population, not having even any feudal or party structure (such as the Phalangists have, for example). The "states" proposed by Yinon are "Haddadland" and "Village Associations," and their armed forces will be, no doubt, quite similar. In addition, Israeli military superiority in such a situation will be much greater than it is even now, so that any movement of revolt will be "punished" either by mass humiliation as in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or by bombardment and obliteration of cities, as in Lebanon now (June 1982), or by both. In order to ensure this, the plan, as explained orally, calls for the establishment of Israeli garrisons in focal places between the mini states, equipped with the necessary mobile destructive forces. In fact, we have seen something like this in Haddadland and we will almost certainly soon see the first example of this system functioning either in South Lebanon or in all Lebanon.

It is obvious that the above military assumptions, and the whole plan too, depend also on the Arabs continuing to be even more divided than they are now, and on the lack of any truly progressive mass movement among them. It may be that those two conditions will be removed only when the plan will be well advanced, with consequences which can not be foreseen.

Why it is necessary to publish this in Israel?

The reason for publication is the dual nature of the Israeli-Jewish society: A very great measure of freedom and democracy, specially for Jews, combined with expansionism and racist discrimination. In such a situation the Israeli-Jewish elite (for the masses follow the TV and Begin's speeches) has to be persuaded. The first steps in the process of persuasion are oral, as indicated above, but a time comes in which it becomes inconvenient. Written material must be produced for the benefit of the more stupid "persuaders" and "explainers" (for example medium-rank officers, who are, usually, remarkably stupid). They then "learn it," more or less, and preach to others. It should be remarked that Israel, and even the Yishuv from the Twenties, has always functioned in this way. I myself well remember how (before I was "in opposition") the necessity of war with was explained to me and others a year before the 1956 war, and the necessity of conquering "the rest of Western Palestine when we will have the opportunity" was explained in the years 1965-67.

Why is it assumed that there is no special risk from the outside in the publication of such plans?

Such risks can come from two sources, so long as the principled opposition inside Israel is very weak (a situation which may change as a consequence of the war on Lebanon) : The Arab World, including the Palestinians, and the United States. The Arab World has shown itself so far quite incapable of a detailed and rational analysis of Israeli-Jewish society, and the Palestinians have been, on the average, no better than the rest. In such a situation, even those who are shouting about the dangers of Israeli expansionism (which are real enough) are doing this not because of factual and detailed knowledge, but because of belief in myth. A good example is the very persistent belief in the non-existent writing on the wall of the Knesset of the Biblical verse about the Nile and the Euphrates. Another example is the persistent, and completely false declarations, which were made by some of the most important Arab leaders, that the two blue stripes of the Israeli flag symbolize the Nile and the Euphrates, while in fact they are taken from the stripes of the Jewish praying shawl (Talit). The Israeli specialists assume that, on the whole, the Arabs will pay no attention to their serious discussions of the future, and the Lebanon war has proved them right. So why should they not continue with their old methods of persuading other Israelis?

In the United States a very similar situation exists, at least until now. The more or less serious commentators take their information about Israel, and much of their opinions about it, from two sources. The first is from articles in the "liberal" American press, written almost totally by Jewish admirers of Israel who, even if they are critical of some aspects of the Israeli state, practice loyally what Stalin used to call "the constructive criticism." (In fact those among them who claim also to be "Anti-Stalinist" are in reality more Stalinist than Stalin, with Israel being their god which has not yet failed). In the framework of such critical worship it must be assumed that Israel has always "good intentions" and only "makes mistakes," and therefore such a plan would not be a matter for discussion--exactly as the Biblical genocides committed by Jews are not mentioned. The other source of information, The Jerusalem Post, has similar policies. So long, therefore, as the situation exists in which Israel is really a "closed society" to the rest of the world, because the world wants to close its eyes, the publication and even the beginning of the realization of such a plan is realistic and feasible?