It has been two years since Ma Ying jeou was elected president of Taiwan. As he approaches the mid-term milestone, President Ma’s record is puzzling. On the one hand, he has made significant progress toward his most important goals. First, he’s stabilized cross-Strait relations. The tension that gripped Taiwan and China during the Chen years has abated, high-level visits have become routine and the two sides are engaged in energetic negotiations on a wide range of issues. Also, after taking a hard hit in the global economic downturn of 2008, Taiwan’s economy is bouncing back. Exports in December 2009 were almost 50 percent greater than December 2008, and economic forecasters predict a 2010 economic growth rate between 4 and 5 percent, although unemployment remains high. Ma has also rebuilt the all-important Taipei-Washington relationship, culminating in the Obama administration’s recent announcement that it would complete a long-awaited arms sale to Taiwan.
What is puzzling is that these successes have failed to endear President Ma to his constituents. On the contrary, his popularity has plummeted since the election, and today his personal approval ratings hover below 30 percent. The dissatisfaction extends to his party as well, and it’s been manifested concretely in elections. Ma’s party, the Kuomintang (KMT), won a far smaller share of the vote in December’s local elections than it captured in the previous round, and it lost 6 out of 7 legislative by-elections in January and February. Municipal elections at the end of this year already are being touted as a bellwether for the 2012 presidential race, when Ma is expected to seek a second term, and the trends do not look good. Hence the conundrum: Why are Ma’s successes in areas believed to be important to voters – reducing cross-Strait tension and reviving the economy – not boosting his approval ratings or his party’s political fortunes?
When Ma Ying-jeou was elected president two years ago, there was a widespread feeling that Taiwan would “get back to normal.” From 2000 to 2008, relations between Taipei and Beijing stagnated, mainly because PRC leaders refused contact with Taiwan’s Sino-skeptical president, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leader Chen Shui-bian. For eight years, neither Taipei nor Beijing was interested in taking the political risks that reaching out to the other side would have entailed, and in the absence of progress, tensions increased. Thus, the return to power of the KMT, Taiwan’s long-time ruling party, was a welcome development in Washington and Beijing – and in Taiwan, where voters gave Ma 58 percent of the presidential vote as well as a legislature in which his party controlled almost 75 percent of the seats.
If Ma’s election meant things were “getting back to normal,” two years into his presidency we have a clear picture of what “normal” really means in the Taiwan Strait. In Taiwan’s domestic politics, “normal” is a highly-competitive democracy in which the executive is forced to accommodate an active and activist legislature while defending its positions from an energetic – and politically viable – opposition. In cross-Strait relations, “normal” means little overt tension, but no great breakthroughs to permanently resolve the conflict between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China.
To understand the state of play in the Taiwan Strait it is helpful to keep in mind Robert Putnam’s “two-level game” metaphor for international negotiations. Beijing and Taipei are working together to design a framework for relations that allows for mutually-beneficial economic and people-to-people interactions while balancing the two sides’ long-term goals regarding international status and potential unification. Some of this work is conducted by representatives of the two governments in high-level, formal negotiations. The content of those negotiations is shaped and constrained by what Putnam calls “level two” interactions – more commonly known as domestic politics. In Taiwan’s case, Ma’s domestic weakness constrains the pace and content of cross-Strait rapprochement.
Under President Ma, elite-level interactions have been smoother than ever before, but that only accentuates the ways domestic politics limit Taiwan leaders’ options. Those limitations are more evident today in part because the game was suspended for most of the Chen era. When Chen took office, PRC leaders paused the game because they perceived little benefit in negotiating with Chen, whom they believed was irreversibly committed to a pro-independence line. In their view, a small group of “stubborn independence elements” had wrested political control from the pro-China mainstream. They hoped that refusing to deal with Chen would help to restore the mainstream to power.
When Ma was elected, Beijing was happy to resume play. In the view of Chinese leaders, Ma was an improvement, not only over his immediate predecessor, but over the previous president, Lee Teng-hui, too. To give Ma a solid start, Beijing was prepared to concede important points. Rather than repeating their demand that Taiwan agree to their One China Principle as the basis for reopening negotiations, PRC leaders accepted Ma’s endorsement of the 1992 Consensus (a bit of verbal hand-waving in which the two sides agreed to set aside the problem of defining the “one China” they both claimed to believe in) as “close enough.”
Once it restarted the game, Beijing quickly discovered that having the right elite-level interlocutor was only the beginning. Many Taiwanese found Chen’s Sino-phobic policies unnecessarily provocative, but that did not mean they were ready to support blindly whatever policy the next administration proposed. As the pace of elite-level interactions accelerated, the focus of the domestic political debated shifted from restraining Chen’s provocations to scrutinizing Ma’s performance. At first, voters gave Ma the benefit of the doubt, but new government’s record was disappointing, and voters began to lose confidence.
A number of factors contributed to the public’s waning trust in Ma. The lack of transparency in decision-making has been a particular concern. DPP leaders suggest high-ranking KMT cross-Strait specialists might be willing to compromise Taiwan’s autonomy in order to reach an agreement with Beijing. They argue that the government’s closed cross-Strait decision-making is dangerous, because these specialists, whether out of perfidy or naïveté, might fail to protect Taiwan’s interests.
To protect Taiwan from a badly-negotiated deal, Ma’s critics are demanding ECFA be subjected to formal ratification, either by popular referendum or in the legislature. Legislative speaker Wang Jin-pyng, a KMT member, has said the legislature might overrule the ECFA deal if it does not meet lawmakers’ standards. President Ma chairs the KMT, so the lack of support for his policies within the party reinforces the sense that he and his inner circle lack a firm hand for dealing with opponents – and a firm hand is exactly what they need to deal effectively with the ever-tough negotiators from Beijing. Several of the KMT’s recent electoral set-backs resulted from local politicians rebelling against Ma’s attempts to clean up local politics, a development that further reinforces this impression.
Declining confidence in the Ma government also reflects the public’s sense that their leaders have not responded well to domestic crises. The government’s reaction to the disastrous typhoon last summer attracted enormous criticism, much of it focused on the perception that Ma had failed to register the impact of the disaster and react swiftly and proportionately. The government also has been hammered for dismissing popular fears about H1N1 vaccine and beef imported from the U.S.
Paradoxically, Ma’s political weakness at home may help him protect Taiwan’s interests in negotiations with Beijing. Taiwan’s economic, political and military power all are declining relative to the PRC, so the negotiations are in danger of becoming perilously uneven. The practical difficulty of ratifying a cross-Strait deal in Taiwan’s nervous domestic climate helps balance that asymmetry. In his discussion of two-level games, Putnam argues that authoritarian states are at a disadvantage in international bargaining for precisely that reason: they cannot plausibly claim that certain agreements will fail the test of domestic ratification. Leaders from democratic states can make that case, and they can extract concessions from the other side on those grounds. The dynamic that Putnam describes may benefit Taiwan, but it is no fun for the man caught in the middle: President Ma Ying-jeou.
Beijing is unlikely to find any Taiwanese leader easier to deal with than Ma, so it is in China’s interest to keep the relationship on a positive track – even if that means accepting slower progress than it would like. That logic helps to explain why, even as Chinese leaders fulminated against the U.S. for its decision to follow through on arms sales to Taiwan, they chose not to direct their venom at Taipei. Likewise, the PRC continues to send high-level representatives and delegations to Taiwan despite large protests, including one in November 2008 that trapped PRC representative Chen Yunlin in a hotel for hours. And in December 2009 the two sides signed three technical agreements, even after Taipei nixed a fourth proposal.
Beijing has even made limited concessions on Taiwan’s demand for international space, which Ma stated last year: “There is a clear link between cross-strait relations and our international space. We’re not asking for recognition; we only want room to breathe.” The two sides are conforming to a tacit “diplomatic truce” proposed by Ma shortly after his inauguration; neither has poached a diplomatic partner from the other since that time. In 2009, Beijing even withdrew its opposition to Taiwan’s efforts to secure observer status at the UN World Health Assembly. The Ma administration touted that development as a breakthrough, but his political opponents took him to task for the opacity of the process and for overstating the benefits Taiwan derived from the deal. In fact, the WHA decision was less a precedent-setting breakthrough than a one-off deal that could be revoked in the future – but the alternative was continued exclusion and isolation.
In sum, Beijing is so far tolerating the measured pace of cross-Strait engagement imposed by Taiwan’s domestic politics. PRC leaders seem confident that over time, their position will strengthen, so there is no need to push for faster progress now. The slow pace works well for Taiwan, too, where even baby steps make many people nervous. Still, there is a sobering side to this picture. If the process slows too much, PRC leaders may determine that no Taiwan leader, including Ma, is capable of delivering any of what Beijing is seeking and so lose patience. That would mean game over for the Ma Ying-jeou approach to cross-Strait rapprochement.
Read more!
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Sunday, March 14
Wednesday, November 18
After Kim Jong-il ?
On June 1, members of the South Korean National Assembly's Intelligence Committee received some clarity about who would replace Kim Jong-il as North Korea's leader. A high official in Seoul's National Intelligence Service informed them that Kim had designated his 26-year-old third son, Kim Jong-un, as his successor. According to the National Intelligence Service, Kim Jong-il had ordered the North's military, politicians, and officials in overseas missions to swear allegiance to Kim Jong-un after Pyongyang's May nuclear test. This succession plan wasn't entirely surprising. In his 2003 memoir, Kenji Fujimoto, the Kim family's longtime chef, predicted that Kim Jong-un would replace his father, explaining that he was Kim Jong-il's favorite. According to Kim Jong-il's Chef, Kim Jong-nam, the eldest son, lost his father's confidence after being deported from Japan for using a false passport in May 2001, and Kim Jong-chol, the second son, was seen too weak to lead.
A few months earlier, Kim Jong-il supposedly had appointed Kim Jong-un as inspector of the country's prominent National Defense Commission, which supervises Pyongyang's national defense and which Kim Jong-il chairs. The inspector is a low-level position, but Kim Jong-un's position is expected to soar--much as his father's did in the 1960s and the 1970s. (Kim Jong-il was named inspector of the Workers' Party in 1964, and eventually, he was appointed to its second highest position.) To further bolster his son's standing, prominent Kim family members were named to the commission at about the same time. Specifically, Jang Song-taek, Kim Jong-il's brother-in-law and a department director of the Workers' Party, became a member of the commission and appears to be Kim Jong-un's patron, and O Kuk-ryol, another department director of the Workers' Party, became the commission's vice chairman.
To say the least, Pyongyang has a unique political culture that's hard to understand by any outside standard. It is a pre-modern dynastic state founded in 1948 by Kim Jung-il's father, Kim Il-sung, who ruled the country for the next 46 years. As a result, most of its prominent political and military appointments are intertwined and based on family networks. For instance, Kim Kyung-hee, Kim Jong-il's younger sister, controls the country's Department of Light-Industry, which directs ministries in the cabinet related to the production of smaller industrial goods; her husband, Jang Song-taek, oversees an important department in the Workers' Party; and Kim Pyong-il, Kim Jong-il's half brother is ambassador to Poland. Meanwhile, Choe Ryong-hae, the chief secretary of the Workers' Party North Hwanghae Provincial Committee, is the son of a former minister of the North Korean Armed Forces; and Hong Sok-hyong, the chief secretary of the Workers' Party North Hamgyong Provincial Committee, is the son of a former vice prime minister.
Such familial networks extend across the North Korean government and help explain its recent provocative behavior--such as its April rocket launch, May nuclear test, and June threat to enrich uranium.
The country's elites constantly worry about the security of their positions if a successor were to arise from outside the Kim family. At the moment, their fears are particularly acute because Kim Jong-un's position isn't secure. His ascension to power has been rather quick, leaving little time to consolidate support, unlike Kim Jong-il who spent decades following a detailed succession plan outlined by his father. (Kim Jong-il's succession had three stages--first, in 1974, an informal decision was made that he would succeed his father; second, in 1980, he became a standing member of the Workers' Party Political Bureau; and finally, in 1993, he took his father's place as chairman of the National Defense Commission.) To ensure a smooth transition, the North's elite is willing to do whatever it takes to strengthen Kim Jong-un in the eyes of those in the country's government and military who aren't blood relatives. The result is a deliberately tense atmosphere intended to strengthen internal solidarity and bolster the succession. This tension will remain until Kim Jong-un is accepted by the military, Workers' Party, and cabinet.
In this way, it's not unlike the final moments of Kim Jong-il's ascension to power, where confrontation with the outside world was used to forge favorable conditions for domestic political change. In April 1993, a month before Kim Jong-il succeeded his father as National Defense Commission chairman, North Korea proclaimed a "state of semi-war" after disputes with the International Atomic Energy Agency and Washington concerning special inspections of its suspected nuclear sites. Two weeks later, the North declared it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The importance of the North's nuclear weapons.
If the North cannot secure long-term regime stability by manufacturing external strife to engender internal solidarity, it will do so by continuing its nuclear program. Although Pyongyang's nuclear activities date back to the 1950s, the 1994 Agreed Framework curbed its nuclear ambition with promises by the United States to provide light water reactors and by seemingly offering a path toward normalized U.S.-North Korean relations. But once George W. Bush took office and preemption became an official U.S. policy, the North renewed its push for nuclear weapons. And while U.S.-North Korean relations seemed to warm late in the Bush administration's tenure, in the summer of 2008 any and all perceived political gains disappeared when Pyongyang met its Six-Party Talks obligations and demolished the cooling tower at its Yongbyon nuclear site but the Bush team demanded still more concessions before it would fulfill its own obligations.
A few days later, Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke, and the regime's interest in nuclear weapons intensified. Now regime survival was the primary issue. In particular, the North's second nuclear test in May was interpreted by experts in South Korea as a sign that Pyongyang was determined to keep its nuclear capability unless it received a guarantee that the regime's future was secure. Moreover, after the U.N. Security Council issued a resolution condemning the nuclear test and expanding sanctions against the regime, Pyongyang vowed that it would never give up its nuclear program. Although the North's nuclear ambitions originally stemmed from external threats--e.g., the United States--it now has two additional functions: (1) to strengthen the regime's control over its people; and (2) to be used as a bargaining chip for continued international aid.
Ultimately, Pyongyang wants to be treated like Pakistan and India, both of whom possess nuclear weapons outside of the framework of the NPT while still maintaining normal relations with Washington. Pakistan, for instance, receives billions of dollars in U.S. aid despite its nuclear arsenal, and India's economic ties with the United States only grow stronger even as New Delhi remains firmly opposed to joining the nonproliferation regime in any formal sense. Last year, Washington even agreed to lift its 30-year moratorium on nuclear trade with India, allowing it to assist with New Delhi's civilian nuclear energy program. North Korea wants similar accommodations.
Whether or not it receives such a deal, history indicates that some sort of negotiations will restart eventually. In 1998, the North began talking with Washington about a missile moratorium even though it had just recently launched a long-range missile. Pyongyang also came back to the Six-Party Talks after another long-range missile launch in July 2006 and a nuclear test that October. The real difference today is the transition in leadership to Kim Jong-un. Because the 26-year-old isn't established domestically yet, he is probably more apt to rely on the military's support and back policies that it favors. To truly become a viable leader, though, he should focus on developing the country's economy, which is in shambles. Obviously, reengaging with the United States and South Korea would help achieve this end. (It's worth noting that unlike his father, Kim Jong-un was educated abroad, and therefore, he might be more open to negotiating with the international community.)
At the moment, the North appears interested in talking to Washington. In August, an official from Pyongyang's mission to the United Nations visited New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson to convey that the North wanted bilateral talks with Washington. This could be interpreted as evidence that Kim Jong-un has established himself in the domestic power structure.
How China and Russia fit in.
Beijing has been reluctant to comment on the North's leadership transition, hoping it can be accomplished without incident. This might explain why it strongly denied that Kim Jong-un had visited China in June, describing such reports as "a story like a 007 novel." Kim Jong-un's closest aide did visit China recently, however. It's likely that he was tasked with informing Beijing about the leadership change, as his visit coincided with Kim Jong-il's order for overseas North Korean officials to swear their allegiance to his son. Eventually, North Korea also will need Russia's help to facilitate Kim Jong-un's ascension.
Until now, Beijing and Moscow have tried to implement a balanced policy toward Pyongyang. But if the North remains reluctant to rejoin the Six-Party Talks or to take part in a meaningful dialogue with the United States, Chinese and Russian support will weaken. It's doubtful that North Korea could overcome such a split with its patrons, especially China. Beijing accounted for 73 percent of Pyongyang's annual foreign trade in 2008. China also provides enormous food and energy aid to the North. After North Korea's second nuclear test, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that Beijing was "resolutely opposed" to the test and demanded an end to any activity that might worsen the situation. Beijing is concerned that North Korea's aggression could cause Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea to develop either nuclear weapons of their own or elaborate missile defense programs--with the help of the United States, something that makes China particularly uncomfortable. In the meantime, Beijing is worried about the potential in North Korea for domestic tumult and the enormous influx of refugees it could bring. This helps explain China's reluctance to impose tough sanctions on North Korea.
In the context of succession, North Korea (and Kim Jong-un specifically) will need to rely on Beijing more than ever before, as it is the only economic and diplomatic partner Kim Jong-un has in the short-term--along with Russia, of course. Plus, Chinese and Russian support will be crucial to legitimizing him both domestically and internationally.
Barack Obama weighs in.
During its first year in office, the Obama administration has carefully watched the situation in North Korea. When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited the region in February, she specifically mentioned that a crisis was possible when the leadership transfer formally took place. Likewise, at a June conference hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, a U.S. official who was quoted anonymously said that he didn't believe North Korea would return to the Six-Party Talks until succession was settled. It would appear that the U.S. administration is taking a wait-and-see approach and adjusting its diplomatic strategies accordingly.
That could be part of the reason why the Obama administration has been sending contradictory messages to the North. On the one hand, it frequently talks about how it won't reward North Korea's provocative behavior; yet on the other hand, it states that it won't abandon diplomacy. An example of this helter-skelter approach in practice: In March, Washington offered to send its special representative for North Korea policy, Stephen Bosworth, to Pyongyang to discuss the nuclear issue. But once Pyongyang accepted, the United States reversed course, insisting that the North return to the Six-Party Talks first.
Obama must face one reality, however: It will take a long time to fully complete the leadership transfer from Kim Jong-il to Kim-Jong-un because the elder Kim's health isn't critical at the moment. (Kim Jong-il met with former U.S. President Bill Clinton in August for more than three hours, and he frequently visits industrial areas throughout the North.) Therefore, the current U.S. "wait-and-see" strategy could backfire, as Washington might be waiting for a very long time to see the younger Kim take control. In the meantime, the North Korean nuclear program could reach a point of no return.
Read more!
A few months earlier, Kim Jong-il supposedly had appointed Kim Jong-un as inspector of the country's prominent National Defense Commission, which supervises Pyongyang's national defense and which Kim Jong-il chairs. The inspector is a low-level position, but Kim Jong-un's position is expected to soar--much as his father's did in the 1960s and the 1970s. (Kim Jong-il was named inspector of the Workers' Party in 1964, and eventually, he was appointed to its second highest position.) To further bolster his son's standing, prominent Kim family members were named to the commission at about the same time. Specifically, Jang Song-taek, Kim Jong-il's brother-in-law and a department director of the Workers' Party, became a member of the commission and appears to be Kim Jong-un's patron, and O Kuk-ryol, another department director of the Workers' Party, became the commission's vice chairman.
To say the least, Pyongyang has a unique political culture that's hard to understand by any outside standard. It is a pre-modern dynastic state founded in 1948 by Kim Jung-il's father, Kim Il-sung, who ruled the country for the next 46 years. As a result, most of its prominent political and military appointments are intertwined and based on family networks. For instance, Kim Kyung-hee, Kim Jong-il's younger sister, controls the country's Department of Light-Industry, which directs ministries in the cabinet related to the production of smaller industrial goods; her husband, Jang Song-taek, oversees an important department in the Workers' Party; and Kim Pyong-il, Kim Jong-il's half brother is ambassador to Poland. Meanwhile, Choe Ryong-hae, the chief secretary of the Workers' Party North Hwanghae Provincial Committee, is the son of a former minister of the North Korean Armed Forces; and Hong Sok-hyong, the chief secretary of the Workers' Party North Hamgyong Provincial Committee, is the son of a former vice prime minister.
Such familial networks extend across the North Korean government and help explain its recent provocative behavior--such as its April rocket launch, May nuclear test, and June threat to enrich uranium.
The country's elites constantly worry about the security of their positions if a successor were to arise from outside the Kim family. At the moment, their fears are particularly acute because Kim Jong-un's position isn't secure. His ascension to power has been rather quick, leaving little time to consolidate support, unlike Kim Jong-il who spent decades following a detailed succession plan outlined by his father. (Kim Jong-il's succession had three stages--first, in 1974, an informal decision was made that he would succeed his father; second, in 1980, he became a standing member of the Workers' Party Political Bureau; and finally, in 1993, he took his father's place as chairman of the National Defense Commission.) To ensure a smooth transition, the North's elite is willing to do whatever it takes to strengthen Kim Jong-un in the eyes of those in the country's government and military who aren't blood relatives. The result is a deliberately tense atmosphere intended to strengthen internal solidarity and bolster the succession. This tension will remain until Kim Jong-un is accepted by the military, Workers' Party, and cabinet.
In this way, it's not unlike the final moments of Kim Jong-il's ascension to power, where confrontation with the outside world was used to forge favorable conditions for domestic political change. In April 1993, a month before Kim Jong-il succeeded his father as National Defense Commission chairman, North Korea proclaimed a "state of semi-war" after disputes with the International Atomic Energy Agency and Washington concerning special inspections of its suspected nuclear sites. Two weeks later, the North declared it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The importance of the North's nuclear weapons.
If the North cannot secure long-term regime stability by manufacturing external strife to engender internal solidarity, it will do so by continuing its nuclear program. Although Pyongyang's nuclear activities date back to the 1950s, the 1994 Agreed Framework curbed its nuclear ambition with promises by the United States to provide light water reactors and by seemingly offering a path toward normalized U.S.-North Korean relations. But once George W. Bush took office and preemption became an official U.S. policy, the North renewed its push for nuclear weapons. And while U.S.-North Korean relations seemed to warm late in the Bush administration's tenure, in the summer of 2008 any and all perceived political gains disappeared when Pyongyang met its Six-Party Talks obligations and demolished the cooling tower at its Yongbyon nuclear site but the Bush team demanded still more concessions before it would fulfill its own obligations.
A few days later, Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke, and the regime's interest in nuclear weapons intensified. Now regime survival was the primary issue. In particular, the North's second nuclear test in May was interpreted by experts in South Korea as a sign that Pyongyang was determined to keep its nuclear capability unless it received a guarantee that the regime's future was secure. Moreover, after the U.N. Security Council issued a resolution condemning the nuclear test and expanding sanctions against the regime, Pyongyang vowed that it would never give up its nuclear program. Although the North's nuclear ambitions originally stemmed from external threats--e.g., the United States--it now has two additional functions: (1) to strengthen the regime's control over its people; and (2) to be used as a bargaining chip for continued international aid.
Ultimately, Pyongyang wants to be treated like Pakistan and India, both of whom possess nuclear weapons outside of the framework of the NPT while still maintaining normal relations with Washington. Pakistan, for instance, receives billions of dollars in U.S. aid despite its nuclear arsenal, and India's economic ties with the United States only grow stronger even as New Delhi remains firmly opposed to joining the nonproliferation regime in any formal sense. Last year, Washington even agreed to lift its 30-year moratorium on nuclear trade with India, allowing it to assist with New Delhi's civilian nuclear energy program. North Korea wants similar accommodations.
Whether or not it receives such a deal, history indicates that some sort of negotiations will restart eventually. In 1998, the North began talking with Washington about a missile moratorium even though it had just recently launched a long-range missile. Pyongyang also came back to the Six-Party Talks after another long-range missile launch in July 2006 and a nuclear test that October. The real difference today is the transition in leadership to Kim Jong-un. Because the 26-year-old isn't established domestically yet, he is probably more apt to rely on the military's support and back policies that it favors. To truly become a viable leader, though, he should focus on developing the country's economy, which is in shambles. Obviously, reengaging with the United States and South Korea would help achieve this end. (It's worth noting that unlike his father, Kim Jong-un was educated abroad, and therefore, he might be more open to negotiating with the international community.)
At the moment, the North appears interested in talking to Washington. In August, an official from Pyongyang's mission to the United Nations visited New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson to convey that the North wanted bilateral talks with Washington. This could be interpreted as evidence that Kim Jong-un has established himself in the domestic power structure.
How China and Russia fit in.
Beijing has been reluctant to comment on the North's leadership transition, hoping it can be accomplished without incident. This might explain why it strongly denied that Kim Jong-un had visited China in June, describing such reports as "a story like a 007 novel." Kim Jong-un's closest aide did visit China recently, however. It's likely that he was tasked with informing Beijing about the leadership change, as his visit coincided with Kim Jong-il's order for overseas North Korean officials to swear their allegiance to his son. Eventually, North Korea also will need Russia's help to facilitate Kim Jong-un's ascension.
Until now, Beijing and Moscow have tried to implement a balanced policy toward Pyongyang. But if the North remains reluctant to rejoin the Six-Party Talks or to take part in a meaningful dialogue with the United States, Chinese and Russian support will weaken. It's doubtful that North Korea could overcome such a split with its patrons, especially China. Beijing accounted for 73 percent of Pyongyang's annual foreign trade in 2008. China also provides enormous food and energy aid to the North. After North Korea's second nuclear test, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that Beijing was "resolutely opposed" to the test and demanded an end to any activity that might worsen the situation. Beijing is concerned that North Korea's aggression could cause Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea to develop either nuclear weapons of their own or elaborate missile defense programs--with the help of the United States, something that makes China particularly uncomfortable. In the meantime, Beijing is worried about the potential in North Korea for domestic tumult and the enormous influx of refugees it could bring. This helps explain China's reluctance to impose tough sanctions on North Korea.
In the context of succession, North Korea (and Kim Jong-un specifically) will need to rely on Beijing more than ever before, as it is the only economic and diplomatic partner Kim Jong-un has in the short-term--along with Russia, of course. Plus, Chinese and Russian support will be crucial to legitimizing him both domestically and internationally.
Barack Obama weighs in.
During its first year in office, the Obama administration has carefully watched the situation in North Korea. When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited the region in February, she specifically mentioned that a crisis was possible when the leadership transfer formally took place. Likewise, at a June conference hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, a U.S. official who was quoted anonymously said that he didn't believe North Korea would return to the Six-Party Talks until succession was settled. It would appear that the U.S. administration is taking a wait-and-see approach and adjusting its diplomatic strategies accordingly.
That could be part of the reason why the Obama administration has been sending contradictory messages to the North. On the one hand, it frequently talks about how it won't reward North Korea's provocative behavior; yet on the other hand, it states that it won't abandon diplomacy. An example of this helter-skelter approach in practice: In March, Washington offered to send its special representative for North Korea policy, Stephen Bosworth, to Pyongyang to discuss the nuclear issue. But once Pyongyang accepted, the United States reversed course, insisting that the North return to the Six-Party Talks first.
Obama must face one reality, however: It will take a long time to fully complete the leadership transfer from Kim Jong-il to Kim-Jong-un because the elder Kim's health isn't critical at the moment. (Kim Jong-il met with former U.S. President Bill Clinton in August for more than three hours, and he frequently visits industrial areas throughout the North.) Therefore, the current U.S. "wait-and-see" strategy could backfire, as Washington might be waiting for a very long time to see the younger Kim take control. In the meantime, the North Korean nuclear program could reach a point of no return.
Read more!
Nuclear Notebook: Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons
An article by By Robert S. Norris & Hans M. Kristensen in Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in Nov 2009
By far the largest concentrations of nuclear weapons reside in Russia and the United States, which possess 96 percent of the total global inventory (91 percent if you count only operational nuclear weapons). In addition to the seven other countries with nuclear weapon stockpiles (Britain, China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan), five non-nuclear NATO allies (Belgium, Germany,Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey) host about 200 U.S. nuclear bombs at six air bases.
The United States.
At the end of the Cold War, the United States maintained thousands of nuclear weapons outside of its borders on land and on the high seas.2 Ever since, however, Washington has significantly consolidated its arsenal—a trend that is likely to continue. For example, the single remaining nuclear weapons storage facility in Germany is in stark contrast to the estimated 75 distinct nuclear weapons storage facilities that were located there in the mid-1980s. Today, U.S. weapons are stored at a total of 21 locations in 13 states and 5 European countries.
Russia.
We estimate that Russia stores nuclear weapons permanently at 48 domestic locations, a dramatic reduction compared to the roughly 500 storage facilities it used before the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Soviet Union’s collapse and the end
of the Cold War triggered a withdrawal of Soviet nuclear weapons from forward locations in Eastern Europe, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. In all, Moscow consolidated to less than 250 sites by the mid-1990s, fewer than 100 sites by 1997, and about 90 sites by 1998.
Since then, additional consolidation has taken place because of (1) the declared completion of the movement of all nonstrategic warheads to central storage locations by 2002; (2) consolidation of warhead production at two facilities; and (3) additional strategic force reductions under the Moscow Treaty.4 (Russia provides information about the location of deployed strategic nuclear weapons accountable
under the 1991 START treaty. The locations of other categories of nuclear weapons and their warheads, however, are not disclosed.)
Many sites that once stored weapons are still maintained because a nearby base—such as bases for Tu-22M Backfire and Su-24 Fencer bombers or Il-38 anti-submarine aircraft—continues to have a nuclear strike mission. The Russian Black Sea Fleet based in Ukraine also has a nuclear capability, but the weapons probably have been withdrawn to central storage in Russia. If the fleet relocates to Novorossiysk
when the lease of the Sevastopol area expires in 2017, a nuclear weapons storage facility might be built there as well.
Russian permanent nuclear weapon storage locations fall into three main categories: operational warheads at Strategic Rocket Force, air force, and navy bases; reserve/retired warheads at national-level storage sites; and warheads at assembly/disassembly factories.
One uncertainty when counting Russian nuclear weapons storage sites is whether the number includes overall sites or individual storage facilities co-located within a site. For example, the Defense Department’s Threat Reduction Program statement in 2000 indicated that Russia had 123 nuclear weapons storage locations where it has requested security assistance, apparently counting separately fenced
areas within large national storage facilities. As a result, a large storage site with eight separately fenced areas would have been counted as eight sites instead of one.6 Using similar counting methods, the National Nuclear Security Administration recently listed 73 Russian warhead sites, including 39 navy sites, 25 Strategic Rocket Force sites (on 11 bases), and nine 12th Main Directorate sites.7 Our best estimate is 48 permanent nuclear weapons storage sites, many of which include several individually fenced storage bunkers.
Britain and France.
London and Paris have reduced the size of their arsenals and limited where their weapons are deployed. Britain only has one type of nuclear weapon, the Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), since nuclear-powered ballistic submarines located at two facilities in Scotland. Facilities that previously housed navy strike and depth bombs and air forcebombs have been closed. France has retained two types of nuclear weapons: SLBMs at a submarine base in Bretagne and air-to-surface missiles for aircraft located at three air force bases and one
naval base.
China, Pakistan, and India.
Beijing, Islamabad, and New Delhi are quantitatively and qualitatively increasing their arsenals and deploying weapons at more sites, yet the locations are difficult to pinpoint. For example, no reliable public information exists on where Pakistan or India produces its nuclear weapons. Thus, we have used commercial satellite images, expert studies, and local news reports and articles to make the assumption that nuclear weapons are likely to be at, or near, wherever nuclear-capable weapon systems are deployed.
Whereas many of the Chinese bases are known, this is not the case in Pakistan and India, where we have found no credible information that identifies permanent nuclear weapons storage locations. (Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are not believed to be fully operational under normal circumstances; India is thought to store its nuclear warheads and bombs in central storage locations rather than on bases with operational forces.) But, since all three countries are expanding their arsenals, new bases and storage sites probably are under construction.
Israel and North Korea.
Israel is a wild card because of the opacity of its nuclear weapons program. In other words, it’s difficult to know whether or not there are any changes in its nuclear arsenal. If so, they seem to be modest and probably rely on existing facilities. Either way, Israel’s nuclear weapons are not believed to be fully operational under normal circumstances. We are not aware of credible information on how North Korea
has weaponized its nuclear weapons capability, much less where those weapons are stored. We also take note that a recent U.S. Air Force intelligence report did not list any of North Korea’s ballistic missiles as nuclear-capable.
Read more!
Can Tiger attack Dragon?
There are scores of articles in every major newspaper and every major magazine comparing India with China on various economic progress indicators. There are even books written about Tiger of India pitted against Dragon of China. To those who base their opinions on such reports, articles and books, it looks as though India is posing a strong completion to China, when in fact every measurable economic indicator suggests that China is clearly leading India on all fronts. Moreover the gap between these two countries is only widening with each passing year. And yet, many Indian commentators continue to complacently believe that India has some edge somewhere when in fact none exists.
The tone of these reports and analysis comparing India with China suggest that India is actually inching towards China. That is not the case. In reality China is leaving behind India by a bigger margin every year. It is becoming tougher and tougher for India to catch up. In the last few years, Chinese have built the biggest dam on the planet, built the longest bridges, built the fastest cities, built their own planes, submarines, ships, magnetic trains, and even the highest railways while India continued to lay another layer of asphalt on its decrepit roads after each rainfall.
India is not even showing a promise of catching up. None of its policies suggest this. None of its initiatives give a glimmer of hope. Even the Indian industry is not thinking big. It is still content to play a small game.
Is English really India’s edge?
Indian commentators continue to tell us that all this China-leading-India comments are based in myth, because Indians have English which Chinese don’t have.
Is English really India’s edge? Only when India looks at itself as servicing the West using its BPOs then yes, English gives India the edge. However, if the competitor is bent on actually creating its own technology product industry to take on the West, does English still matter?
When was the last time a Japanese car company could not sell its cars because the makers were not good at English? When was the last time someone in Europe balked at buying a Sony Walkman because its makers couldn’t speak English? When it comes to China, how come their lack of good English not stop Huawei from becoming world #2 in telecom equipment? How come it did not stop Lenovo, Haier and ZTE from becoming leading global brands? Just to give a perspective to Indian readers – 2 telecom equipment companies of China, Huawei and ZTE put together made USD 30 Billion in 2008 while the entire IT-ITES industry of India put together made USD 58 Billion in 2008-09.
China is changing the rules of the games. It is taking on the West where the West has dominated so far, bringing the fight closer to the technology leaders, while India has conveniently told itself that it will not even play this game.
Indians are in self-denial. They foolishly believe everything Thomas Friedman tells them, and they are happy serving their European and American masters setting up BPOs, KPOs, LPOs, software services, helping them do their things in a cheap and cost-effective way, while Chinese are poised to take on these European and American masters head on. It’s as though the Chinese have completely overthrown their colonial inferiority complex.
For many years now, Indians gloated over the characterization that India is good at software services while China is good at manufacturing. This was a convenient characterization that only Indians believed because the books were written in English which only Indians could understand. Chinese blissfully unaware of what Friedman said were not constrained by this characterization and hence clearly violated all hierarchies.
Indians limited themselves to serving the West. When they looked in the mirror, they said, “I am an Indian. I am good at services. I should just stick to it”. That India is only good at software services became a cultural phenomenon with every major industry bigwig repeating it on various forums. Even Indian government fell into this trap where all incentives and subsidies were geared only to promote the software services companies. Go to a hardware park in India and compare it with a software park in India, you will recognize the step-motherly treatment meted out to the hardware companies.
India made no attempts at taking on China in manufacturing. Nor did they attempt to take on the West to go up the value chain to actually deliver technology and products. The Flat World theories told them that they can just concentrate on what they were good at, that is Software Services, KPOs, BPOs and LPOs, giving up on manufacturing forever thereby handing over the race on a silver platter to China, and giving up on technology products thereby continuing to serve the West.
China not only won the race in manufacturing and consolidated its position, it is now entering the technology product space, the domain held closely by the European, American and Japanese technology leaders. What more, it has started to beat these leaders at their own game. Huawei has recently won the contract to supply 3G equipment in Norway, the bastion of Nokia. While India made feeble attempts with C-DOT and ITI who are not even able to sell into BSNL, China has launched not one but two major telecom companies – Huawei and ZTE, that not only sells within their countries, they sell to BSNL also.
CK Prahlad in his closing comments at Nasscom Summit of February 2009 advised that Indian companies should foster more startups because they are the ones which bring vibrancy to the economy. His advice comes late, and even when it comes, it falls on deaf ears.
Infosys, TCS and Wipro, the giants of Indian software services which Thomas Friedman lauds, did not do much to sponsor or promote startups in India (barring few exceptions).
Their presence in India did not help any startup, except that many ex-employees went out and started companies on their own without any support or encouragement from these parent companies.
Meanwhile, China has launched extensive nationwide program to promote entrepreneurship in China. I was told that even a district head, equivalent to Indian District Collector, could invest up to half a million US dollars to a company that sets up shop in his district. Writing about China, a report says:
An analysis of documenting the tremendous growth of the Chinese entrepreneurial and cultural initiatives since the demise of Communist leader Mao Zedong reveals that this accounts for the Chinese economy’s double digit growth in the last couple of decades. [1]
It is clear to some countries that startups are essential for the growth in economy. Not so, thinks India. Indian has never believed in startups. They don’t think they add up to anything. The government is obsessed with giants because they look at them as employment provider – therefore the bigger the employer the better it is. Not a single major initiative has been taken in the last few years to promote startups in India. While the government boasts of loans to SMEs, when startups actually approach the banks, they feign ignorance of any such initiative.
All initiatives and decision making bodies in India are headed by people who have been good software services and therefore there is not a single policy that actually aids home grown brands, products and technologies. STPI still thinks that software is exported only as floppy, ftp or a CD. If you put that software in telecom equipment, a mobile handset, or a DVD player, then it does not recognize it as software and hence are not given the incentives. If Apple existed in India, there is not category for recognizing it. The prevailing mood is clear – you serve a foreign master you get the incentives; you try to become a master you don’t get any incentives.
Also, there are not many places a startup can raise funds in India. That’s why most startups continue to be family-owned or family-backed. First generation entrepreneurs find it impossible to raise money. The number of VC firms in India is limited while the government funds are small. Most government funds are small and therefore their mandate does not allow them to fund big ideas, while the miniscule few bigger size funds do not fund loss-making companies – which completely rules out startups.
China, on the other hand, is actively promoting startups through various forums and incentives. Though it is a communist country it hosts millions of entrepreneurs and VC firms which is aiding its economy.
China currently has over 200 million entrepreneurs and it houses 200 venture capital firms. The country accounts for 24.6% of the total entrepreneurship activities across the world, far ahead of Indian at 13.9% and the US at 14%, according to a survey by Global Entrepreneurship Monitor.
About 116 Chinese companies are listed on NASDAQ, as against 2568 US firms, Israel’s 63, and a handful from India, says the study. [1]
China is even popularizing entrepreneurship as a cultural attitude with various initiatives including TV programs.
…a Chinese reality TV show “Win in China” has received applications for entrepreneurial ventures from over 1,20,000 aspirants. Of these, 108 were chosen for prize money and working capital of $5 Million. [1]
Indians don’t know what to do. They are confused. They don’t know if they are socialist or capitalist. The reality is that they are clueless – they are neither capitalist nor socialist. China is both socialist and capitalist playing these two cards really well. The only floating hope for Indians has been their mastery of English. And the following observation should submerge that hope as well.
To give competition to India and other cost-effective English speaking countries like the Philippines, millions of Chinese students are learning English systematically. “China will become the largest English speaking geography in the world by the end of this year”, Compton added. [1]
What’s your opinion?
Read more!
Sunday, November 8
Elephant vs Dragon
Myanmar/Burma was once a part of British India. Does that make it ours again? Tibet once extended dominion over parts of China. Does that make China a part of Tibet today? Tibet once controlled parts of Arunachal Pradesh, albeit tenaciously and China today rules Tibet by force. Does that make parts of Arunachal Pradesh a part of China? Well, China indeed does think so. Logical? Yes and No.
No for the simple reason that such extrapolations and corollaries would confuse an already confused world. Logical, yes, because China is pricking India. Not just in Arunachal Pradesh , but elsewhere too. It is known to be stoking Maoist uprisings in Nepal--our neighbor. It is known to have supplied nuclear technology to Pakistan--our neighbor. It is supportive of the military Junta in Myanmar - our neighbor. It has close defence ties with Bangladesh, our neighbor. It is encircling India with a new sphere of influence. Why? Simple, the world is like its people. Countries are like people--groups of people, masses of people. Alone, a person would rule the world. Bring in two, and egos would begin to clash. Have three and politics will begin with one allying with the other of the remaining two. This is how humans behave and countries do. No one knows the future, yet everyone tries to control it. China is trying to control a future it knows will be an intensely competitive one. It will be competing against India for almost everything that matters. And it is trying to find friends and allies. And it is also trying to find issues and foes.
I don't want to sound nightmarish, but this is a blog and so I can say it. I believe that within our lifetimes we will see immense disturbance in the world we live in. Immense turmoil and upheaval, and all of it human engineered.
India is a rising power, but so is China. India is a democracy, China is a communist command economy with broad sweeps of capitalism washing over it creating a measure of discord amongst its people. China is progressing fast, India is progressing just a wee bit slower. But India is a free nation for its citizens. It is a democracy. China apparently is, but really is not. It is not a democracy. China has its problems of disparate growth with wealth concentrated in its eastern sea board. India has 1.2 billion people. China has 1.4 billion. Both nations are consuming ever increasing food, meat, energy and information. Already, everywhere in the world, there is competition between India and China for resources as both find themselves bidding for the same items on the world's markets. As both become prosperous, the pressures and demands will only increase. Today the one that has more money calls the shots. Tomorrow when both have loads of it and when mere money will not seem to matter, the games will begin. What we are seeing today is a mere prelude to it all. The same oil fields, the same mines, the same corporates, the same banks and both India and China out with their wallets.
And I shudder to think, that we think we have evolved and become more civilized. It was but 65 years back when the Second World War was raging and millions were dying brutal deaths in war and concentration camps. 65 years is not too long back and too little a time span to have changed fundamental human nature. We want things. We are materialistic. When we don't get things we tend to fight and when stakes are high we tend to kill. We are like that. Dangerous animals. Don't misunderstand forks and knives on well laid out tables with black liveried waiters for civilization. Perhaps we also like to masquerade.
So what am I trying to say here? Just that behind a complex interplay of politics lie simple fights for resources. Power is tempting because it provides access to resources, whatever they may be.
When China fumes over Dalai Lama's visit to Arunachal Pradesh, it is simply flexing muscles and asserting claims over resources if not indicating that it is capable of being a nuisance. But perhaps this time China has overplayed its cards. Tired of being quiet and hoping China will glower, hiss and then go away, India has realized that China will never let up. How can it? It needs to gobble up more and more of the worlds resources to keep itself going and growing. And so does India. For the first time the Tibet card is turning out to be hugely important. There are 1.2 lakh Tibetans in India, and the younger generation wants freedom. It wants China out of Tibet. Totally and completely. Tibet is the biggest buffer India could hope for between China and itself. Today China stands on India's borders using the Tibetan plateau. But Tibet even today is restive. It is not China. And as Tenzin Tsundue, the Tibetan writer and activist in Dharamshala who climbs hotel walls and displays Tibetan flags to ruffle Chinese visitors says, India has nurtured many Tibetans like him who have not seen Tibet ever, yet are aggressive supporters of complete freedom and willing to fight and die for their homeland. The Dalai Lamas presence at Tawang in Arunachal will be the best symbolism for India's territorial integrity. China will look on impotently as the Dalai Lama prays at the monastery that had welcomed him when he trekked into India in 1959.
President Obama has designated a special envoy to interface with the Dalai Lama. Why? Because he is important. Why? Because he exerts influence over Tibetans. So? He can swing the direction in which the Tibetan protest winds blow for China. So? He can be an important influence in keeping China in check. So? China can be prevented from focusing on destabilizing other countries, because it will need to fear its own destabilization. So? Americans will find a balance of powers developing and keeping each other busy, in this case India and China. So? America continues to exert influence over both as they balance each other. And influence gets you money. And resources. See, we come back to the same thing...resources?
The Tibetan movement is focused and clear. The Muslim-dominated Uighur movement is still nebulous and disparate. China also wants to use the present situation to create an Indian bogey. When internal unrest threatens to loom, create the bogey of an external threat to unite its own people. Taiwan is too small a threat, Japan is farther away, with Russia there are no serious issues, India is the best bet to project as a threat. So claims over Arunachal, India's protests, China's counter protests, the Dalai Lama somewhere in between - part of the great game. After all we are humans. Lets not forget that.
So what will happen? Obviously, I don't know! But what I do know is--the games have begun. The world will compete and then fight. Again. I don't think we can wish it away. What do you think?
Read more!
No for the simple reason that such extrapolations and corollaries would confuse an already confused world. Logical, yes, because China is pricking India. Not just in Arunachal Pradesh , but elsewhere too. It is known to be stoking Maoist uprisings in Nepal--our neighbor. It is known to have supplied nuclear technology to Pakistan--our neighbor. It is supportive of the military Junta in Myanmar - our neighbor. It has close defence ties with Bangladesh, our neighbor. It is encircling India with a new sphere of influence. Why? Simple, the world is like its people. Countries are like people--groups of people, masses of people. Alone, a person would rule the world. Bring in two, and egos would begin to clash. Have three and politics will begin with one allying with the other of the remaining two. This is how humans behave and countries do. No one knows the future, yet everyone tries to control it. China is trying to control a future it knows will be an intensely competitive one. It will be competing against India for almost everything that matters. And it is trying to find friends and allies. And it is also trying to find issues and foes.
I don't want to sound nightmarish, but this is a blog and so I can say it. I believe that within our lifetimes we will see immense disturbance in the world we live in. Immense turmoil and upheaval, and all of it human engineered.
India is a rising power, but so is China. India is a democracy, China is a communist command economy with broad sweeps of capitalism washing over it creating a measure of discord amongst its people. China is progressing fast, India is progressing just a wee bit slower. But India is a free nation for its citizens. It is a democracy. China apparently is, but really is not. It is not a democracy. China has its problems of disparate growth with wealth concentrated in its eastern sea board. India has 1.2 billion people. China has 1.4 billion. Both nations are consuming ever increasing food, meat, energy and information. Already, everywhere in the world, there is competition between India and China for resources as both find themselves bidding for the same items on the world's markets. As both become prosperous, the pressures and demands will only increase. Today the one that has more money calls the shots. Tomorrow when both have loads of it and when mere money will not seem to matter, the games will begin. What we are seeing today is a mere prelude to it all. The same oil fields, the same mines, the same corporates, the same banks and both India and China out with their wallets.
And I shudder to think, that we think we have evolved and become more civilized. It was but 65 years back when the Second World War was raging and millions were dying brutal deaths in war and concentration camps. 65 years is not too long back and too little a time span to have changed fundamental human nature. We want things. We are materialistic. When we don't get things we tend to fight and when stakes are high we tend to kill. We are like that. Dangerous animals. Don't misunderstand forks and knives on well laid out tables with black liveried waiters for civilization. Perhaps we also like to masquerade.
So what am I trying to say here? Just that behind a complex interplay of politics lie simple fights for resources. Power is tempting because it provides access to resources, whatever they may be.
When China fumes over Dalai Lama's visit to Arunachal Pradesh, it is simply flexing muscles and asserting claims over resources if not indicating that it is capable of being a nuisance. But perhaps this time China has overplayed its cards. Tired of being quiet and hoping China will glower, hiss and then go away, India has realized that China will never let up. How can it? It needs to gobble up more and more of the worlds resources to keep itself going and growing. And so does India. For the first time the Tibet card is turning out to be hugely important. There are 1.2 lakh Tibetans in India, and the younger generation wants freedom. It wants China out of Tibet. Totally and completely. Tibet is the biggest buffer India could hope for between China and itself. Today China stands on India's borders using the Tibetan plateau. But Tibet even today is restive. It is not China. And as Tenzin Tsundue, the Tibetan writer and activist in Dharamshala who climbs hotel walls and displays Tibetan flags to ruffle Chinese visitors says, India has nurtured many Tibetans like him who have not seen Tibet ever, yet are aggressive supporters of complete freedom and willing to fight and die for their homeland. The Dalai Lamas presence at Tawang in Arunachal will be the best symbolism for India's territorial integrity. China will look on impotently as the Dalai Lama prays at the monastery that had welcomed him when he trekked into India in 1959.
President Obama has designated a special envoy to interface with the Dalai Lama. Why? Because he is important. Why? Because he exerts influence over Tibetans. So? He can swing the direction in which the Tibetan protest winds blow for China. So? He can be an important influence in keeping China in check. So? China can be prevented from focusing on destabilizing other countries, because it will need to fear its own destabilization. So? Americans will find a balance of powers developing and keeping each other busy, in this case India and China. So? America continues to exert influence over both as they balance each other. And influence gets you money. And resources. See, we come back to the same thing...resources?
The Tibetan movement is focused and clear. The Muslim-dominated Uighur movement is still nebulous and disparate. China also wants to use the present situation to create an Indian bogey. When internal unrest threatens to loom, create the bogey of an external threat to unite its own people. Taiwan is too small a threat, Japan is farther away, with Russia there are no serious issues, India is the best bet to project as a threat. So claims over Arunachal, India's protests, China's counter protests, the Dalai Lama somewhere in between - part of the great game. After all we are humans. Lets not forget that.
So what will happen? Obviously, I don't know! But what I do know is--the games have begun. The world will compete and then fight. Again. I don't think we can wish it away. What do you think?
Read more!
Monday, October 12
Way out from Af-Pak Strategy
THE KEY to getting out of Afghanistan without turning Kabul over to the Taliban lies in replacing the failed US “Af-Pak’’ strategy with a new regional approach in which India, Iran, Russia, and China - all opposed to a Taliban takeover - join with the United States and NATO in stabilizing the country.
The “Af-Pak’’ strategy is based on the false premise that Pakistan and the United States are both opposed to Islamist influence in Afghanistan. In reality, Pakistan has long supported the Taliban insurgents there for what it considers a compelling strategic reason: to counter the influence of India in Kabul.
Despite this, the United States continues to give military aid and $800 million in annual cash subsidies to the Pakistan Army, supposedly for the express purpose of fighting the Taliban.
Until this pretense is ended, the United States will remain mired in a stalemate with Pakistan-supplied Taliban fighters. Equally important, Islamabad will be increasingly emboldened to demand the exclusion of Indian influence from Afghanistan as the price for cooperation there. Given India’s strong opposition to Islamist forces, this would directly conflict with US interests and goals.
Defenders of aid to Pakistan argue that its Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, the ISI, has given the CIA valuable information about Al Qaeda. Another compelling reason for US reluctance to threaten a cutoff of subsidies and aid is that Islamabad could counter by denying transit through Pakistan to supply US forces in Afghanistan.
“With one hand, they threaten to prevent you from prosecuting the war unless you pay them off,’’ Said Jawad, the Afghan ambassador to the United States, said. “With the other, they help the Taliban to make sure that the war keeps going on and the aid keeps flowing.’’
To escape from this trap, the United States should make three policy changes:
First, the administration should make clear that it recognizes the right of India, as the preeminent South Asian power, to be a major player in Kabul. The spokesman of the Pakistan armed forces, Major General Athar Abbas, criticizing the “overinvolvement of Indians in Afghanistan’’ in a July CNN interview, specifically warned against any Indian role in training the Afghan Army. But such a role could be a valuable supplement to the current faltering US-NATO training efforts. Indian aid to Kabul has so far been limited to $1.2 billion in economic aid.
Second, the Obama administration should seek Pakistan’s help in negotiating peace agreements with local Taliban factions, following up earlier Saudi Arabian initiatives. To get Taliban participation, such agreements would have to include a timetable for phased withdrawal of most US forces from all but the major cities and highways of Afghanistan.
Third, local peace agreements should be linked to a larger peace process negotiated at regional conferences attended by India, Iran, Russia, and China, in addition to the United States, NATO, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.
India feels encircled by ISI-supported Islamist forces operating out of Bangladesh and Nepal as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Shi’ite-majority Iran opposes the Sunni Taliban, and China, facing an Islamist uprising in Sinkiang, is increasingly wary of Taliban rule in Kabul. Bringing these nations into Afghan affairs would offset Pakistani support for the Taliban so that its influence remains confined to its strongholds in the ethnically Pashtun south and east and it does not become dominant in Kabul.
A peace process that leads to a phased withdrawal of most US forces would end the dependence of the United States on Pakistani supply lines. It would then be possible, at last, for the United States to use its enormous aid leverage in Islamabad effectively.
If the Al Qaeda leadership is still in Pakistan, and if ISI provides actionable intelligence that facilitates its destruction, then the existing US payoffs to the army should continue. But if Al Qaeda is no longer centered in Pakistan, as some suspect, or if ISI is unable to provide actionable intelligence, then the United States should restrict its aid to Islamabad to large-scale economic assistance focused on development and education. Maintaining friendly ties with Pakistan as a major Third World country and a nuclear weapons state should continue to be a US priority. But the tail should no longer wag the dog.
Source: Boston - Selig S. Harrison, author of “Out of Afghanistan’’ and “In Afghanistan’s Shadow,’’ is director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy
Read more!
The “Af-Pak’’ strategy is based on the false premise that Pakistan and the United States are both opposed to Islamist influence in Afghanistan. In reality, Pakistan has long supported the Taliban insurgents there for what it considers a compelling strategic reason: to counter the influence of India in Kabul.
Despite this, the United States continues to give military aid and $800 million in annual cash subsidies to the Pakistan Army, supposedly for the express purpose of fighting the Taliban.
Until this pretense is ended, the United States will remain mired in a stalemate with Pakistan-supplied Taliban fighters. Equally important, Islamabad will be increasingly emboldened to demand the exclusion of Indian influence from Afghanistan as the price for cooperation there. Given India’s strong opposition to Islamist forces, this would directly conflict with US interests and goals.
Defenders of aid to Pakistan argue that its Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, the ISI, has given the CIA valuable information about Al Qaeda. Another compelling reason for US reluctance to threaten a cutoff of subsidies and aid is that Islamabad could counter by denying transit through Pakistan to supply US forces in Afghanistan.
“With one hand, they threaten to prevent you from prosecuting the war unless you pay them off,’’ Said Jawad, the Afghan ambassador to the United States, said. “With the other, they help the Taliban to make sure that the war keeps going on and the aid keeps flowing.’’
To escape from this trap, the United States should make three policy changes:
First, the administration should make clear that it recognizes the right of India, as the preeminent South Asian power, to be a major player in Kabul. The spokesman of the Pakistan armed forces, Major General Athar Abbas, criticizing the “overinvolvement of Indians in Afghanistan’’ in a July CNN interview, specifically warned against any Indian role in training the Afghan Army. But such a role could be a valuable supplement to the current faltering US-NATO training efforts. Indian aid to Kabul has so far been limited to $1.2 billion in economic aid.
Second, the Obama administration should seek Pakistan’s help in negotiating peace agreements with local Taliban factions, following up earlier Saudi Arabian initiatives. To get Taliban participation, such agreements would have to include a timetable for phased withdrawal of most US forces from all but the major cities and highways of Afghanistan.
Third, local peace agreements should be linked to a larger peace process negotiated at regional conferences attended by India, Iran, Russia, and China, in addition to the United States, NATO, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.
India feels encircled by ISI-supported Islamist forces operating out of Bangladesh and Nepal as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Shi’ite-majority Iran opposes the Sunni Taliban, and China, facing an Islamist uprising in Sinkiang, is increasingly wary of Taliban rule in Kabul. Bringing these nations into Afghan affairs would offset Pakistani support for the Taliban so that its influence remains confined to its strongholds in the ethnically Pashtun south and east and it does not become dominant in Kabul.
A peace process that leads to a phased withdrawal of most US forces would end the dependence of the United States on Pakistani supply lines. It would then be possible, at last, for the United States to use its enormous aid leverage in Islamabad effectively.
If the Al Qaeda leadership is still in Pakistan, and if ISI provides actionable intelligence that facilitates its destruction, then the existing US payoffs to the army should continue. But if Al Qaeda is no longer centered in Pakistan, as some suspect, or if ISI is unable to provide actionable intelligence, then the United States should restrict its aid to Islamabad to large-scale economic assistance focused on development and education. Maintaining friendly ties with Pakistan as a major Third World country and a nuclear weapons state should continue to be a US priority. But the tail should no longer wag the dog.
Source: Boston - Selig S. Harrison, author of “Out of Afghanistan’’ and “In Afghanistan’s Shadow,’’ is director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy
Read more!
Sunday, June 7
Does China want Asia as it's Backyard?
There are definite signals coming out of China that the period of late leader Deng Xiaoping’s direction “hide your strength, bide your time” is over, and the country’s economy, military and diplomacy is strong enough to show case its power projection capability. In early May, the Chinese Ambassador to the UK remarked to a group of university students that the international community recognized China was emerging as a world power, adding that people inside China, however, still recognize there were some weaknesses. What Ambassador Fu Ying conveyed was China will not stop here but pursue its power agenda till it becomes a super power like the USA, China has fixed US global power as its target, and is working towards it steadily.
In mid-April, the authentic Chinese Communist Party (CCP) controlled newspaper, the Global Times, commented that Asia was China’s “great backyard”. The commentary argued China must first dominate Asia and resolve major issues which could turn into “crises” and prevent them from reaching a point of explosion. Ignoring the Asian challenge could lead to its dislocation from the world order.
From 2004, when President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao took over full powers, becoming the Chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC), there have been several characteristic shifts in China’s domestic and foreign policies. That, however, does not mean that he wields supreme power. Far from it. He failed to place his nominee, Li Keqiang as the fifth generation Party General Secretary. As things stand today, Li would have been satisfied as the Premier of the People’s Republic of China. Hu’s predecessor Jiang Zemin and his Shanghai group managed to place Xi Jiping, a revolutionary’s son, representing the more liberal group as the next Secretary General in 2013.
But Hu Jintao succeeded in using ultra-nationalism as an important tool in shaping an apparently new strategic policy. Starting from a somewhat weak controlling position of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), he compromised with the PLA’s top hardliners to win them over. His initial projected theory of 2004 “Rise of China” drafted by his strategic advisor, gave the first insight into Hu’s strategic thinking.
The year 2004 may be a watershed year in China’s aggressive strategic vision in Asia. This vision envisaged a western line at the extremities of Asia in the west, to extreme geographic line of Asia Pacific region in the east, as China’s region of domination. The strategic debate argued that Deng Xiaoping’s strategic decision of 1991 had served its purpose, and China had achieved total power to establish its sphere of influence. That debate appears to have been co-opted in the country’s foreign policy, and is beginning to be shown to the world, particularly Asia, now.
China is no longer shy to show a glimpse of its military power and capability and project it if need be, in the Asian theatre. There are two demonstrated examples of its capability. One is its determination not to allow even US naval ships to poach in the vicinity of its territorial waters. An US naval survey ship was sharked by Chinese vessels, eliciting a response from the US navy to send warships in the area. The other is to emphatically consolidate claims on sea area.
Following the Philippines and Malaysian actions to affirm their claims on small parts of the Spratly group of islands in the South China sea, the PLA navy has dispatched two ships to patrol the area. They have also contested Malaysian and Philippino claims at the UN on these parts of the Spratly group, and reiterated their sovereignty on the entire group of islands and their adjoining areas. The Chinese claims are based on highly questionable historical incidents which negate claims of other parties like Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei, that are based on geographical realities recognized by the UN Laws of the Seas Convention.
China also claims sovereignty over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in the East China Sea currently occupied by Japan. Tension has flared up between the two countries several times over the past years. Recently, advanced Chinese monitoring capabilities apparently helped Chinese naval vessels to enter the Senkaku waters when they noticed the absence of Japanese patrols.
The South China Sea is reported to be rich in oil and gas resources. Equally important, it is the shortest route between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, also reported to be rich in gas resources, would extend China’s waters closer to Japan, and into the Pacific. These are potential crisis points the Global Times commentary referred to. China has made these claims non-negotiable, and its earlier position of joint development in both areas with other claimants, but under the condition of recognizing Chinese sovereignty, was not really meant for implementation. This was a ploy to buy time, and project a benign and friendly face of China. Beijing is apparently showing its real face under the mask.
The next question raised by the Global Times commentary is managing relations with the smaller countries of Asia. Mismanagement with these relationships have the potential to disturb China’s relations with the United States and Europe. The Asia Pacific region is the cynosure of global focus of the 21st century, and the western nations and Japan. They are not going to sit by and watch an arrogant China riding rough shod over the South and East Asian arc. USA’s relations with Vietnam and the Philippines are witnessing a new development, and Malaysia sans Mahathir and the newly restructuring Indonesia may not be amenable to Beijing’s dictates if they have reliable support. The word “reliable” is the crux for South East Asian stability.
China’s show of military power began this year with the 2009 White Paper on Defence published on January 20, coinciding with US President Barak Obama’s inauguration. The time was not coincidental. Revealing very little but giving enough for experts to draw their conclusions, the White Paper made it clear that China’s military surge was now unstoppable. It also made it clear that informization of its armed forces and cyber warfare technology were battle ready.
Although the White Paper did not mention building aircraft carriers, soon signals came from Chinese military officials that a final decision to build carriers had been taken. According to available reports three aircraft carriers of 60 thousand dwt are on the anvil along with support ships. The first carrier group is expected to be afloat by 2015 if not earlier. They are expected to carry Russian Sukhois, probably Su-35.
The Chinese naval exposition of April 23-25, to which India, Pakistan, the US and Russia among others were invited made an impressive display. Two indigenously built nuclear submarines were on public show for the first time. But they did not show their best – Type 093 and Type 094 nuclear capable submarines.
An important omission from the invitees list to the naval expositions was Japan. This may have some historical hangover. In a naval battle in 1894 the Chinese navy was totally routed by the Japanese navy. But it has current connotations, too. Despite the huge trade between the two countries, political relations have gone cold under Taro Aso’s Prime Ministership of Japan.
China has officially announced an air force exposition around November 11, this year in which new aircraft, missile, radars and other indigenously built military arms and equipment will be displayed to selected invitees. This is expected to showcase the PLA Air Force’s (PLAAF) reach beyond the immediate coast, and will also leave observers to calculate how the air force can work in co-ordination with the navy in coastal defence and informationized short duration strikes in crisis points or “hot spots” in its neighbourhood.
In the second half of this year, China will hold a massive two-month long PLA exercise that will involve 50,000 troops from four Military Regions (MRs). The largest ever military exercise by China, the exercise will mobilize more than 60,000 vehicles and large weapons and equipments over a terrain that will cover 50 thousand kilometers, and one-way travel for some units will be more than 2,400 kilometers. The Lanzou MR from western China’s Xinjiang will meet up with Shenyang, Jinan and Guangzhou MRs on the seaboard. The exercise is likely to include the Air Force and Army Aviation units. It is notable that the Chengdu MR which is responsible for the Eastern Sector of the Sino-Indian border, and the Nanjing MR which covers Taiwan, have been excluded from Kuayue-2009 (Stride 2009) exercise. But we will have to watch the directions as the drill, which is to be conducted under real battle conditions with live ammunitions, fixes target. The parameter leaves no doubt that the initial targets are East China sea and the South China sea.
Apparently with fast improvement of basic relations with Taiwan under the KMT government led by Ma Ying-Jeo, China has redirected forces on the South China sea territories to exercise sovereignty over this vital sea route. This would have significant implication for global shipping, both commercial and naval.
But China’s muscle flexing has not gone unnoticed. Vietnam has reached an agreement in principle to acquire six Russian kilo-class submarines from Russia for $1.8 billion. Hanoi has also spent $3.8 billion for the procurement of 17 SU-27 and four SU-30 multi role aircraft. With Russian collaboration Vietnam is building 10 Russian type Molnia class missile boats, and Moscow will also supply two Gepard 3.9 class frigates to Vietnam. Vietnamese navy officers have for the first time visited a US aircraft carrier.
Australia’s Defence White Paper 2009, focused on the rise of Chinese military power and approved a special military budget of more than $ 70 billion in the next 20 years to augment its air and naval capability with state of the art arms and equipment. Australia, while underscoring its interest in the region including around Indonesia, also sees a potential face off between China and growing India.
Japan’s navy and air force are no light weights either. The Chinese navy is the largest in Asia in terms of tonnage, but in terms of quality Japan may be having an edge over them. Tokyo is also quietly raising its military might, expanding the area of its operation, and its enhanced military treaty with the USA at the beginning of this decade is no less a formidable defence arrangement for China to deal with.
China has instigated a major arms race in Asia and the Asia Pacific region. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently declared in a pointed but unnamed message to China that the USA was both a trans Pacific and trans-Indian Ocean power and is not going to move out. China would also understand that Russia is an interested party in the region and has its own plans and strategies independent of China-US confrontation. Vietnam and the rest of old Indo-China have not been forgotten in the corridors of Moscow.
South Asia and India cannot remain unconcerned with these developments. Leaving aside Pakistan, China’s permanent and closest ally, the other countries in the region have been periodically trying to use China to counter India, without realizing the ultimate cost to themselves. The Maoists in Nepal have openly invited in Beijing to counter India, and statements from visiting Chinese leaders from Nepal’s soil have had a definite anti-India edge. The new government in Bangladesh under the Awami League has moved to a position of neutrality. In Sri Lanka, the Chinese have made large strides over the last few years, especially with the Mahinda Rajapaksa government.
In the sea-bordering countries of South Asia, China has been seeking strategic port facilities. It has built the Gwadar Deep Sea port in Pakistan at a cost of $2.2 billion. The Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka on the Indian Ocean Sea route is being built by China. President Rajapaksa comes from Hambantota. In Myanmar, the Chinese have Sittwe to Kunming and are building an oil and gas pipeline from South East China. A similar pipe line is to be built from Gwadar Port to Xinjiang. China has also been looking for a sea port facility in Bangladesh’s Chittagong area, to be connected with a link road through Myanmar to Kunming.
It is a fact that China is looking for security for its energy imports. Nobody can deny China having aircraft carriers for defence. But the strategic philosophy behind China’s military modernization has raised serious concerns all around. Beijing wants to establish its ownership in the near abroad, and overlordship over the Indian Ocean and Asia. It wants Asia as its backyard. This contains deadly ingredients for instability.
In this context, it would be pertinent what the Chief of US Pacific Command (PACOM) Admiral Timothy J. Keating told his Indian counterpart during a recent visit. Admiral Keating said a senior Chinese Admiral had informally suggested to him that the US allow the Chinese to keep the Indian Ocean, and the US keep the Pacific Ocean. Such off the record talks or problems by senior Chinese military officers are not idle talks. Such probes have generally proved to be correct in the past. Where does India stand?
Read more!
In mid-April, the authentic Chinese Communist Party (CCP) controlled newspaper, the Global Times, commented that Asia was China’s “great backyard”. The commentary argued China must first dominate Asia and resolve major issues which could turn into “crises” and prevent them from reaching a point of explosion. Ignoring the Asian challenge could lead to its dislocation from the world order.
From 2004, when President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao took over full powers, becoming the Chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC), there have been several characteristic shifts in China’s domestic and foreign policies. That, however, does not mean that he wields supreme power. Far from it. He failed to place his nominee, Li Keqiang as the fifth generation Party General Secretary. As things stand today, Li would have been satisfied as the Premier of the People’s Republic of China. Hu’s predecessor Jiang Zemin and his Shanghai group managed to place Xi Jiping, a revolutionary’s son, representing the more liberal group as the next Secretary General in 2013.
But Hu Jintao succeeded in using ultra-nationalism as an important tool in shaping an apparently new strategic policy. Starting from a somewhat weak controlling position of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), he compromised with the PLA’s top hardliners to win them over. His initial projected theory of 2004 “Rise of China” drafted by his strategic advisor, gave the first insight into Hu’s strategic thinking.
The year 2004 may be a watershed year in China’s aggressive strategic vision in Asia. This vision envisaged a western line at the extremities of Asia in the west, to extreme geographic line of Asia Pacific region in the east, as China’s region of domination. The strategic debate argued that Deng Xiaoping’s strategic decision of 1991 had served its purpose, and China had achieved total power to establish its sphere of influence. That debate appears to have been co-opted in the country’s foreign policy, and is beginning to be shown to the world, particularly Asia, now.
China is no longer shy to show a glimpse of its military power and capability and project it if need be, in the Asian theatre. There are two demonstrated examples of its capability. One is its determination not to allow even US naval ships to poach in the vicinity of its territorial waters. An US naval survey ship was sharked by Chinese vessels, eliciting a response from the US navy to send warships in the area. The other is to emphatically consolidate claims on sea area.
Following the Philippines and Malaysian actions to affirm their claims on small parts of the Spratly group of islands in the South China sea, the PLA navy has dispatched two ships to patrol the area. They have also contested Malaysian and Philippino claims at the UN on these parts of the Spratly group, and reiterated their sovereignty on the entire group of islands and their adjoining areas. The Chinese claims are based on highly questionable historical incidents which negate claims of other parties like Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei, that are based on geographical realities recognized by the UN Laws of the Seas Convention.
China also claims sovereignty over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in the East China Sea currently occupied by Japan. Tension has flared up between the two countries several times over the past years. Recently, advanced Chinese monitoring capabilities apparently helped Chinese naval vessels to enter the Senkaku waters when they noticed the absence of Japanese patrols.
The South China Sea is reported to be rich in oil and gas resources. Equally important, it is the shortest route between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, also reported to be rich in gas resources, would extend China’s waters closer to Japan, and into the Pacific. These are potential crisis points the Global Times commentary referred to. China has made these claims non-negotiable, and its earlier position of joint development in both areas with other claimants, but under the condition of recognizing Chinese sovereignty, was not really meant for implementation. This was a ploy to buy time, and project a benign and friendly face of China. Beijing is apparently showing its real face under the mask.
The next question raised by the Global Times commentary is managing relations with the smaller countries of Asia. Mismanagement with these relationships have the potential to disturb China’s relations with the United States and Europe. The Asia Pacific region is the cynosure of global focus of the 21st century, and the western nations and Japan. They are not going to sit by and watch an arrogant China riding rough shod over the South and East Asian arc. USA’s relations with Vietnam and the Philippines are witnessing a new development, and Malaysia sans Mahathir and the newly restructuring Indonesia may not be amenable to Beijing’s dictates if they have reliable support. The word “reliable” is the crux for South East Asian stability.
China’s show of military power began this year with the 2009 White Paper on Defence published on January 20, coinciding with US President Barak Obama’s inauguration. The time was not coincidental. Revealing very little but giving enough for experts to draw their conclusions, the White Paper made it clear that China’s military surge was now unstoppable. It also made it clear that informization of its armed forces and cyber warfare technology were battle ready.
Although the White Paper did not mention building aircraft carriers, soon signals came from Chinese military officials that a final decision to build carriers had been taken. According to available reports three aircraft carriers of 60 thousand dwt are on the anvil along with support ships. The first carrier group is expected to be afloat by 2015 if not earlier. They are expected to carry Russian Sukhois, probably Su-35.
The Chinese naval exposition of April 23-25, to which India, Pakistan, the US and Russia among others were invited made an impressive display. Two indigenously built nuclear submarines were on public show for the first time. But they did not show their best – Type 093 and Type 094 nuclear capable submarines.
An important omission from the invitees list to the naval expositions was Japan. This may have some historical hangover. In a naval battle in 1894 the Chinese navy was totally routed by the Japanese navy. But it has current connotations, too. Despite the huge trade between the two countries, political relations have gone cold under Taro Aso’s Prime Ministership of Japan.
China has officially announced an air force exposition around November 11, this year in which new aircraft, missile, radars and other indigenously built military arms and equipment will be displayed to selected invitees. This is expected to showcase the PLA Air Force’s (PLAAF) reach beyond the immediate coast, and will also leave observers to calculate how the air force can work in co-ordination with the navy in coastal defence and informationized short duration strikes in crisis points or “hot spots” in its neighbourhood.
In the second half of this year, China will hold a massive two-month long PLA exercise that will involve 50,000 troops from four Military Regions (MRs). The largest ever military exercise by China, the exercise will mobilize more than 60,000 vehicles and large weapons and equipments over a terrain that will cover 50 thousand kilometers, and one-way travel for some units will be more than 2,400 kilometers. The Lanzou MR from western China’s Xinjiang will meet up with Shenyang, Jinan and Guangzhou MRs on the seaboard. The exercise is likely to include the Air Force and Army Aviation units. It is notable that the Chengdu MR which is responsible for the Eastern Sector of the Sino-Indian border, and the Nanjing MR which covers Taiwan, have been excluded from Kuayue-2009 (Stride 2009) exercise. But we will have to watch the directions as the drill, which is to be conducted under real battle conditions with live ammunitions, fixes target. The parameter leaves no doubt that the initial targets are East China sea and the South China sea.
Apparently with fast improvement of basic relations with Taiwan under the KMT government led by Ma Ying-Jeo, China has redirected forces on the South China sea territories to exercise sovereignty over this vital sea route. This would have significant implication for global shipping, both commercial and naval.
But China’s muscle flexing has not gone unnoticed. Vietnam has reached an agreement in principle to acquire six Russian kilo-class submarines from Russia for $1.8 billion. Hanoi has also spent $3.8 billion for the procurement of 17 SU-27 and four SU-30 multi role aircraft. With Russian collaboration Vietnam is building 10 Russian type Molnia class missile boats, and Moscow will also supply two Gepard 3.9 class frigates to Vietnam. Vietnamese navy officers have for the first time visited a US aircraft carrier.
Australia’s Defence White Paper 2009, focused on the rise of Chinese military power and approved a special military budget of more than $ 70 billion in the next 20 years to augment its air and naval capability with state of the art arms and equipment. Australia, while underscoring its interest in the region including around Indonesia, also sees a potential face off between China and growing India.
Japan’s navy and air force are no light weights either. The Chinese navy is the largest in Asia in terms of tonnage, but in terms of quality Japan may be having an edge over them. Tokyo is also quietly raising its military might, expanding the area of its operation, and its enhanced military treaty with the USA at the beginning of this decade is no less a formidable defence arrangement for China to deal with.
China has instigated a major arms race in Asia and the Asia Pacific region. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently declared in a pointed but unnamed message to China that the USA was both a trans Pacific and trans-Indian Ocean power and is not going to move out. China would also understand that Russia is an interested party in the region and has its own plans and strategies independent of China-US confrontation. Vietnam and the rest of old Indo-China have not been forgotten in the corridors of Moscow.
South Asia and India cannot remain unconcerned with these developments. Leaving aside Pakistan, China’s permanent and closest ally, the other countries in the region have been periodically trying to use China to counter India, without realizing the ultimate cost to themselves. The Maoists in Nepal have openly invited in Beijing to counter India, and statements from visiting Chinese leaders from Nepal’s soil have had a definite anti-India edge. The new government in Bangladesh under the Awami League has moved to a position of neutrality. In Sri Lanka, the Chinese have made large strides over the last few years, especially with the Mahinda Rajapaksa government.
In the sea-bordering countries of South Asia, China has been seeking strategic port facilities. It has built the Gwadar Deep Sea port in Pakistan at a cost of $2.2 billion. The Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka on the Indian Ocean Sea route is being built by China. President Rajapaksa comes from Hambantota. In Myanmar, the Chinese have Sittwe to Kunming and are building an oil and gas pipeline from South East China. A similar pipe line is to be built from Gwadar Port to Xinjiang. China has also been looking for a sea port facility in Bangladesh’s Chittagong area, to be connected with a link road through Myanmar to Kunming.
It is a fact that China is looking for security for its energy imports. Nobody can deny China having aircraft carriers for defence. But the strategic philosophy behind China’s military modernization has raised serious concerns all around. Beijing wants to establish its ownership in the near abroad, and overlordship over the Indian Ocean and Asia. It wants Asia as its backyard. This contains deadly ingredients for instability.
In this context, it would be pertinent what the Chief of US Pacific Command (PACOM) Admiral Timothy J. Keating told his Indian counterpart during a recent visit. Admiral Keating said a senior Chinese Admiral had informally suggested to him that the US allow the Chinese to keep the Indian Ocean, and the US keep the Pacific Ocean. Such off the record talks or problems by senior Chinese military officers are not idle talks. Such probes have generally proved to be correct in the past. Where does India stand?
Read more!
Thursday, December 4
Globalization and Clashes of Economic Powers - US and China - Part 1
The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship
China held to its hybrid model of a state-directed economic system throughout 2008 as it consolidated its position as one of the world’s fastest-growing countries. Alone among the world’s major economies, China refuses to allow the renminbi (RMB), its currency, to respond to free market movements. China’s leaders instead keep the currency trading at an artificially low level in order to suppress export prices—a deliberate violation of the rules of the International Monetary Fund, of which it is a member. As a result of this and other factors, China’s current account surplus with the United States and the rest of the world soared and added to China’s record foreign exchange reserves of nearly $2 trillion when this Report was completed, up from $1.43 trillion at the publication of the Commission’s Report a year ago. China began employing thisforeign exchange in new ways. Rather than using it to improve the standard of living for the Chinese people through education, health care, or pension systems, China began investing the money through new overseas investment vehicles, including an official sovereign wealth fund, the China Investment Corporation. Despite statements by Chinese leaders that they seek only financial gain from diversifying their investments into equity stakes in western companies,there are increasing suspicions that China intends to use its cash to gain political advantage globally and to lock up supplies of scarce resources around the world. Other Chinese government economic policies harmed the United States, China’s trading partners, and its own citizens. China made scant progress in reining in the rampant counterfeiting and piracy that deprive legitimate foreign businesses operating in China of their intellectual property, while they provide an effective subsidy to Chinese companies that make use of stolen software and other advanced technology. Chinese regulators failed to prevent the domestic sale and export of consumer goods tainted with industrial chemicals and fraudulent ingredients. In one case examined by the Commission, China’s lax controls on the production and handling of its seafood exports led to a partial U.S. ban for health reasons on imported Chinese seafood. Yet, thanks to artificially low prices partly resulting from an array of subsidies to its seafood industry, China has become the largest exporter of seafood to the United States.
The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship’s Current Status and Significant Changes During 2008
* China’s trade surplus with the United States remains large, despite the global economic slowdown. The U.S. trade deficit in goods with China through August 2008 was $167.7 billion, which represents an increase of 2.4 percent over the same period in 2007. Since China joined the WTO in 2001, the United States has accumulated a $1.16 trillion goods deficit with China and, as a result of the persistent trade imbalance, by August 2008 China had accumulated nearly $2 trillion in foreign currency reserves. China’s trade relationship with the United States continues to be severely unbalanced.
* The U.S. current account deficit causes considerable anxiety among both economists and foreign investors who worry that future taxpayers will find it increasingly difficult to meet both principal and interest payments on such a large debt. The total debt burden already is having a significant impact on economic growth, which will only increase in severity.
* China’s currency has strengthened against the U.S. dollar by more than 18.5 percent since the government announced in July 2005 it was transitioning from a hard peg to the dollar to a ‘‘managed float.’’ Starting in July 2008, however, the rate of the RMB’s appreciation has slowed, and there are some indications this may be due to the Chinese government’s fear that a strong RMB will damage China’s exports. China’s RMB remains significantly undervalued.
* China continues to violate its WTO commitments to avoid trade distorting measures. Among the trade-related situations in China that are counter to those commitments are restricted market access for foreign financial news services, books, films and other media; weak intellectual property protection; sustained use of domestic and export subsidies; lack of transparency in regulatory processes; continued emphasis on implementing policies that protect and promote domestic industries to the disadvantage of foreign competition; import barriers and export preferences; and limitations on foreign investment or ownership in certain sectors of the economy.
* Over the past year, China has adopted a battery of new laws and policies that may restrict foreign access to China’s markets and protect and assist domestic producers. These measures include new antimonopoly and patent laws and increased tax rebates to textile manufacturers. The full impact of these laws is not yet known, particularly whether they will help or hinder fair trade and investment.
* In 2008, China emerged as a stronger power within the WTO as it took a more assertive role in the Doha Round of multilateral trade talks, working with India and other less-developed nations to insist on protection for subsistence farmers.
China’s Capital Investment Vehicles and Implications for the U.S. Economy and National Security
* The significant expansion of the Chinese government’s involvement in the international economy in general and in the U.S. economy in particular has concerned many economists and government officials due to uncertainty about the Chinese government’s and the Chinese Communist Party’s motivations, strategies, and possible impacts on market stability and national security. At the same time, cash-strapped U.S. firms have welcomed the investments, viewing them as stable and secure sources of financing in the wake of the credit crunch.
* China’s government uses a number of state-controlled investment vehicles among which it chooses depending on its particular investment purposes and strategies; most widely known among such vehicles are China Investment Corporation (CIC), the State Administration for Foreign Exchange (SAFE), and China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC).
* Some aspects of China Investment Corporation’s mandate follow China’s industrial policy planning and promotion of domestic industries by, for example, investing in natural resources and emerging markets that are relevant for the advancement of China’s value-added industries. CIC and SAFE form just one part of a complex web of state-owned banks, state-owned companies and industries, and pension funds, all of which receive financing and instructions from the central government, promote a state-led development agenda, and have varying levels of transparency. Many of their investment activities contravene official assurances that they are not being managed to wield political influence.
* Regulations governing investments by sovereign wealth funds, especially disclosure requirements pertaining to their transactions and ownership stakes, are still in development, both in the multilateral arena and in the United States. There is concern that the Chinese government can hide its ownership of U.S. companies by using stakes in private equity vehicles like hedge or investment funds.
* China’s foreign exchange reserves continue to grow, while its management of the exchange rate has given it monopoly control on outward flows of investment. This strongly suggests that China will have a very substantial and long-term presence in the U.S. economy through equity stakes; loans; mergers and acquisitions; ownership of land, factories, and companies; and other forms of investment.Research and Development, Technological Advances in Some Key Industries, and Changing Trade Flows with China.
* China has been pursuing a government policy designed to make China a technology superpower and to enhance its exports. Some of its tactics violate free market principles—specifically its use of subsidies and an artificially low RMB value to attract foreign investment. Foreign technology companies, such as U.S. and European computer,aerospace, and automotive firms, have invested heavily in research and development and production facilities in China, sharing or losing technology and other know-how. Chinese manufacturers have benefitted from this investment. The U.S. government has not established any effective policies or mechanisms at the federal level to retain research and development facilities within its borders.
* China’s trade surplus in advanced technology products is growing rapidly, while the United States is running an ever-larger deficit in technology trade. China also is pursuing a strategy of creating an integrated technology sector to reduce its dependence on manufacturing inputs.
* China seeks to become a global power in aerospace and join the United States and Europe in producing large passenger aircraft. China also seeks to join the United States, Germany, and Japan as major global automobile producers. So far as China competes fairly with other nations, this need not be a concern. But China’s penchant for using currency manipulation, industrial subsidies, and intellectual property theft to gain an advantage violates international norms.
China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests
China’s record of proliferating weapons of mass destruction or effect has improved in recent years, and the nation has played a significant role in some important nonproliferation activities such as the Six-Party Talks intended to denuclearize North Korea. However, the United States continues to have concerns about the commitment of China’s leadership to nonproliferation and to enforcing the strengthened nonproliferation laws and procedures the nation has established and about China’s refusal to participate in some international nonproliferation agreements and regimes. The United States also is concerned that the nuclear power technology China is selling to other nations may result in nuclear proliferation.
China increasingly is devising unique interpretations of agreements or treaties to which it is a party that have the effect of expanding the territory over which it claims sovereignty and rationalizing such expansions, particularly outward from its coast and upward into outer space. This development, coupled with its military modernization, its development of impressive but disturbing
capabilities for military use of space and cyber warfare, and its demonstrated employment of these capabilities, suggest China is intent on expanding its sphere of control even at the expense of its Asian neighbors and the United States and in contravention of international consensus and formal treaties and agreements. These tendencies quite possibly will be exacerbated by China’s growing need for natural resources to support its population and economy that it cannot obtain domestically. The United States should watch these trends closely and act to protect its interests where they are threatened.
China’s Proliferation Policies and Practices
* China has made progress in developing nonproliferation policies and mechanisms to implement those policies. Although it is apparent that China is making some meaningful efforts to establish a culture and norms supporting some aspects of nonproliferation within its bureaucracy and industry, gaps remain in the policies, the strength of government support for them, and their enforcement.
* Although China has acceded to numerous international agreements on nonproliferation and has cooperated with the United States on some nonproliferation issues (e.g., the Six-Party Talks),China has been reluctant to participate fully in U.S.-led nonproliferation efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and in multilateral efforts to persuade Iran to cease its uranium enrichment and other nuclear development activities.
* China’s support for multilateral negotiations with North Korea can help to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula, open North Korea to dialogue, and improve bilateral relations among the countries participating in the process—which may be crucial ingredients for peace and cooperation in northeast Asia and beyond.
* Experts have expressed concerns that China’s sales or transfers of nuclear energy technology to other nations may create conditions for proliferation of nuclear weapons expertise, technology, and related materials. These activities also could feed the insecurities of other nations and cause them to pursue their own nuclear weapons development efforts. This could lead to an increase in the number of nations possessing nuclear weapons capability.
China’s Views of Sovereignty and Methods of Controlling Access to its Territory
* China’s leaders adamantly resist any activity they perceive to interfere with China’s claims to territorial sovereignty. At times this priority conflicts with international norms and practices.
* Some experts within China are attempting to assert a view that China is entitled to sovereignty over outer space above its territory, contrary to international practice. If this becomes Chinese policy, it could set the stage for conflict with the United States and other nations that expect the right of passage for their spacecraft.
* China has asserted sovereignty over the seas and airspace in an Exclusive Economic Zone that extends 200 miles from its coastal baseline. This already has produced disputes with the United States and other nations and brings the prospect of conflict in the future.
* Any assertions by Chinese officials of sovereignty in the maritime,air, and outer space domains are not just a bilateral issue between the United States and China. The global economy is dependent upon the fundamental principles of freedom of navigation of the seas and air space, and treatment of outer space as a global ‘‘commons’’ without borders. All nations that benefit from the use of these domains would be adversely affected by the encroachment of Chinese sovereignty claims.
* China’s efforts to alter the balance of sovereignty rights are part of its overall access control strategy and could have an impact on the perceived legitimacy of U.S. military operations in the region, especially in times of crisis.
* China is building a legal case for its own unique interpretation of international treaties and agreements. China is using ‘‘lawfare’’ and other tools of national power to persuade other nations to accept China’s definition of sovereignty in the maritime, air, and space domains.
The Nature and Extent of China’s Space and Cyber Activities and their Implications for U.S. Security
* China continues to make significant progress in developing space capabilities, many of which easily translate to enhanced military capacity. In China, the military runs the space program, and there is no separate, distinguishable civilian program. Although some Chinese space programs have no explicit military intent, many space systems—such as communications, navigation, meteorological, and imagery systems—are dual use in nature.
* The People’s Liberation Army currently has sufficient capability to meet many of its space goals. Planned expansions in electronic and signals intelligence, facilitated in part by new, space-based assets, will provide greatly increased intelligence and targeting capability. These advances will result in an increased threat to U.S. military assets and personnel.
* China’s space architecture contributes to its military’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capability. This increased capability allows China to project its limited military power in the western and southern Pacific Ocean and to place U.S. forces at risk sooner in any conflict. Cyber space is a critical vulnerability of the U.S. government and economy, since both depend heavily on the use of computers and their connection to the Internet. The dependence on the Internet makes computers and information stored on those computers vulnerable.
* China is likely to take advantage of the U.S. dependence on cyber space for four significant reasons. First, the costs of cyber operations are low in comparison with traditional espionage or military activities. Second, determining the origin of cyber operations and attributing them to the Chinese government or any other operator is difficult. Therefore, the United States would be hindered in responding conventionally to such an attack. Third, cyber attacks can confuse the enemy. Fourth, there is an underdeveloped legal framework to guide responses.
* China is aggressively pursuing cyber warfare capabilities that may provide it with an asymmetric advantage against the United States. In a conflict situation, this advantage would reduce current U.S. conventional military dominance.
Read more!
China held to its hybrid model of a state-directed economic system throughout 2008 as it consolidated its position as one of the world’s fastest-growing countries. Alone among the world’s major economies, China refuses to allow the renminbi (RMB), its currency, to respond to free market movements. China’s leaders instead keep the currency trading at an artificially low level in order to suppress export prices—a deliberate violation of the rules of the International Monetary Fund, of which it is a member. As a result of this and other factors, China’s current account surplus with the United States and the rest of the world soared and added to China’s record foreign exchange reserves of nearly $2 trillion when this Report was completed, up from $1.43 trillion at the publication of the Commission’s Report a year ago. China began employing thisforeign exchange in new ways. Rather than using it to improve the standard of living for the Chinese people through education, health care, or pension systems, China began investing the money through new overseas investment vehicles, including an official sovereign wealth fund, the China Investment Corporation. Despite statements by Chinese leaders that they seek only financial gain from diversifying their investments into equity stakes in western companies,there are increasing suspicions that China intends to use its cash to gain political advantage globally and to lock up supplies of scarce resources around the world. Other Chinese government economic policies harmed the United States, China’s trading partners, and its own citizens. China made scant progress in reining in the rampant counterfeiting and piracy that deprive legitimate foreign businesses operating in China of their intellectual property, while they provide an effective subsidy to Chinese companies that make use of stolen software and other advanced technology. Chinese regulators failed to prevent the domestic sale and export of consumer goods tainted with industrial chemicals and fraudulent ingredients. In one case examined by the Commission, China’s lax controls on the production and handling of its seafood exports led to a partial U.S. ban for health reasons on imported Chinese seafood. Yet, thanks to artificially low prices partly resulting from an array of subsidies to its seafood industry, China has become the largest exporter of seafood to the United States.
The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship’s Current Status and Significant Changes During 2008
* China’s trade surplus with the United States remains large, despite the global economic slowdown. The U.S. trade deficit in goods with China through August 2008 was $167.7 billion, which represents an increase of 2.4 percent over the same period in 2007. Since China joined the WTO in 2001, the United States has accumulated a $1.16 trillion goods deficit with China and, as a result of the persistent trade imbalance, by August 2008 China had accumulated nearly $2 trillion in foreign currency reserves. China’s trade relationship with the United States continues to be severely unbalanced.
* The U.S. current account deficit causes considerable anxiety among both economists and foreign investors who worry that future taxpayers will find it increasingly difficult to meet both principal and interest payments on such a large debt. The total debt burden already is having a significant impact on economic growth, which will only increase in severity.
* China’s currency has strengthened against the U.S. dollar by more than 18.5 percent since the government announced in July 2005 it was transitioning from a hard peg to the dollar to a ‘‘managed float.’’ Starting in July 2008, however, the rate of the RMB’s appreciation has slowed, and there are some indications this may be due to the Chinese government’s fear that a strong RMB will damage China’s exports. China’s RMB remains significantly undervalued.
* China continues to violate its WTO commitments to avoid trade distorting measures. Among the trade-related situations in China that are counter to those commitments are restricted market access for foreign financial news services, books, films and other media; weak intellectual property protection; sustained use of domestic and export subsidies; lack of transparency in regulatory processes; continued emphasis on implementing policies that protect and promote domestic industries to the disadvantage of foreign competition; import barriers and export preferences; and limitations on foreign investment or ownership in certain sectors of the economy.
* Over the past year, China has adopted a battery of new laws and policies that may restrict foreign access to China’s markets and protect and assist domestic producers. These measures include new antimonopoly and patent laws and increased tax rebates to textile manufacturers. The full impact of these laws is not yet known, particularly whether they will help or hinder fair trade and investment.
* In 2008, China emerged as a stronger power within the WTO as it took a more assertive role in the Doha Round of multilateral trade talks, working with India and other less-developed nations to insist on protection for subsistence farmers.
China’s Capital Investment Vehicles and Implications for the U.S. Economy and National Security
* The significant expansion of the Chinese government’s involvement in the international economy in general and in the U.S. economy in particular has concerned many economists and government officials due to uncertainty about the Chinese government’s and the Chinese Communist Party’s motivations, strategies, and possible impacts on market stability and national security. At the same time, cash-strapped U.S. firms have welcomed the investments, viewing them as stable and secure sources of financing in the wake of the credit crunch.
* China’s government uses a number of state-controlled investment vehicles among which it chooses depending on its particular investment purposes and strategies; most widely known among such vehicles are China Investment Corporation (CIC), the State Administration for Foreign Exchange (SAFE), and China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC).
* Some aspects of China Investment Corporation’s mandate follow China’s industrial policy planning and promotion of domestic industries by, for example, investing in natural resources and emerging markets that are relevant for the advancement of China’s value-added industries. CIC and SAFE form just one part of a complex web of state-owned banks, state-owned companies and industries, and pension funds, all of which receive financing and instructions from the central government, promote a state-led development agenda, and have varying levels of transparency. Many of their investment activities contravene official assurances that they are not being managed to wield political influence.
* Regulations governing investments by sovereign wealth funds, especially disclosure requirements pertaining to their transactions and ownership stakes, are still in development, both in the multilateral arena and in the United States. There is concern that the Chinese government can hide its ownership of U.S. companies by using stakes in private equity vehicles like hedge or investment funds.
* China’s foreign exchange reserves continue to grow, while its management of the exchange rate has given it monopoly control on outward flows of investment. This strongly suggests that China will have a very substantial and long-term presence in the U.S. economy through equity stakes; loans; mergers and acquisitions; ownership of land, factories, and companies; and other forms of investment.Research and Development, Technological Advances in Some Key Industries, and Changing Trade Flows with China.
* China has been pursuing a government policy designed to make China a technology superpower and to enhance its exports. Some of its tactics violate free market principles—specifically its use of subsidies and an artificially low RMB value to attract foreign investment. Foreign technology companies, such as U.S. and European computer,aerospace, and automotive firms, have invested heavily in research and development and production facilities in China, sharing or losing technology and other know-how. Chinese manufacturers have benefitted from this investment. The U.S. government has not established any effective policies or mechanisms at the federal level to retain research and development facilities within its borders.
* China’s trade surplus in advanced technology products is growing rapidly, while the United States is running an ever-larger deficit in technology trade. China also is pursuing a strategy of creating an integrated technology sector to reduce its dependence on manufacturing inputs.
* China seeks to become a global power in aerospace and join the United States and Europe in producing large passenger aircraft. China also seeks to join the United States, Germany, and Japan as major global automobile producers. So far as China competes fairly with other nations, this need not be a concern. But China’s penchant for using currency manipulation, industrial subsidies, and intellectual property theft to gain an advantage violates international norms.
China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests
China’s record of proliferating weapons of mass destruction or effect has improved in recent years, and the nation has played a significant role in some important nonproliferation activities such as the Six-Party Talks intended to denuclearize North Korea. However, the United States continues to have concerns about the commitment of China’s leadership to nonproliferation and to enforcing the strengthened nonproliferation laws and procedures the nation has established and about China’s refusal to participate in some international nonproliferation agreements and regimes. The United States also is concerned that the nuclear power technology China is selling to other nations may result in nuclear proliferation.
China increasingly is devising unique interpretations of agreements or treaties to which it is a party that have the effect of expanding the territory over which it claims sovereignty and rationalizing such expansions, particularly outward from its coast and upward into outer space. This development, coupled with its military modernization, its development of impressive but disturbing
capabilities for military use of space and cyber warfare, and its demonstrated employment of these capabilities, suggest China is intent on expanding its sphere of control even at the expense of its Asian neighbors and the United States and in contravention of international consensus and formal treaties and agreements. These tendencies quite possibly will be exacerbated by China’s growing need for natural resources to support its population and economy that it cannot obtain domestically. The United States should watch these trends closely and act to protect its interests where they are threatened.
China’s Proliferation Policies and Practices
* China has made progress in developing nonproliferation policies and mechanisms to implement those policies. Although it is apparent that China is making some meaningful efforts to establish a culture and norms supporting some aspects of nonproliferation within its bureaucracy and industry, gaps remain in the policies, the strength of government support for them, and their enforcement.
* Although China has acceded to numerous international agreements on nonproliferation and has cooperated with the United States on some nonproliferation issues (e.g., the Six-Party Talks),China has been reluctant to participate fully in U.S.-led nonproliferation efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and in multilateral efforts to persuade Iran to cease its uranium enrichment and other nuclear development activities.
* China’s support for multilateral negotiations with North Korea can help to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula, open North Korea to dialogue, and improve bilateral relations among the countries participating in the process—which may be crucial ingredients for peace and cooperation in northeast Asia and beyond.
* Experts have expressed concerns that China’s sales or transfers of nuclear energy technology to other nations may create conditions for proliferation of nuclear weapons expertise, technology, and related materials. These activities also could feed the insecurities of other nations and cause them to pursue their own nuclear weapons development efforts. This could lead to an increase in the number of nations possessing nuclear weapons capability.
China’s Views of Sovereignty and Methods of Controlling Access to its Territory
* China’s leaders adamantly resist any activity they perceive to interfere with China’s claims to territorial sovereignty. At times this priority conflicts with international norms and practices.
* Some experts within China are attempting to assert a view that China is entitled to sovereignty over outer space above its territory, contrary to international practice. If this becomes Chinese policy, it could set the stage for conflict with the United States and other nations that expect the right of passage for their spacecraft.
* China has asserted sovereignty over the seas and airspace in an Exclusive Economic Zone that extends 200 miles from its coastal baseline. This already has produced disputes with the United States and other nations and brings the prospect of conflict in the future.
* Any assertions by Chinese officials of sovereignty in the maritime,air, and outer space domains are not just a bilateral issue between the United States and China. The global economy is dependent upon the fundamental principles of freedom of navigation of the seas and air space, and treatment of outer space as a global ‘‘commons’’ without borders. All nations that benefit from the use of these domains would be adversely affected by the encroachment of Chinese sovereignty claims.
* China’s efforts to alter the balance of sovereignty rights are part of its overall access control strategy and could have an impact on the perceived legitimacy of U.S. military operations in the region, especially in times of crisis.
* China is building a legal case for its own unique interpretation of international treaties and agreements. China is using ‘‘lawfare’’ and other tools of national power to persuade other nations to accept China’s definition of sovereignty in the maritime, air, and space domains.
The Nature and Extent of China’s Space and Cyber Activities and their Implications for U.S. Security
* China continues to make significant progress in developing space capabilities, many of which easily translate to enhanced military capacity. In China, the military runs the space program, and there is no separate, distinguishable civilian program. Although some Chinese space programs have no explicit military intent, many space systems—such as communications, navigation, meteorological, and imagery systems—are dual use in nature.
* The People’s Liberation Army currently has sufficient capability to meet many of its space goals. Planned expansions in electronic and signals intelligence, facilitated in part by new, space-based assets, will provide greatly increased intelligence and targeting capability. These advances will result in an increased threat to U.S. military assets and personnel.
* China’s space architecture contributes to its military’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capability. This increased capability allows China to project its limited military power in the western and southern Pacific Ocean and to place U.S. forces at risk sooner in any conflict. Cyber space is a critical vulnerability of the U.S. government and economy, since both depend heavily on the use of computers and their connection to the Internet. The dependence on the Internet makes computers and information stored on those computers vulnerable.
* China is likely to take advantage of the U.S. dependence on cyber space for four significant reasons. First, the costs of cyber operations are low in comparison with traditional espionage or military activities. Second, determining the origin of cyber operations and attributing them to the Chinese government or any other operator is difficult. Therefore, the United States would be hindered in responding conventionally to such an attack. Third, cyber attacks can confuse the enemy. Fourth, there is an underdeveloped legal framework to guide responses.
* China is aggressively pursuing cyber warfare capabilities that may provide it with an asymmetric advantage against the United States. In a conflict situation, this advantage would reduce current U.S. conventional military dominance.
Read more!
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
