Sunday, June 7

Does China want Asia as it's Backyard?

There are definite signals coming out of China that the period of late leader Deng Xiaoping’s direction “hide your strength, bide your time” is over, and the country’s economy, military and diplomacy is strong enough to show case its power projection capability. In early May, the Chinese Ambassador to the UK remarked to a group of university students that the international community recognized China was emerging as a world power, adding that people inside China, however, still recognize there were some weaknesses. What Ambassador Fu Ying conveyed was China will not stop here but pursue its power agenda till it becomes a super power like the USA, China has fixed US global power as its target, and is working towards it steadily.

In mid-April, the authentic Chinese Communist Party (CCP) controlled newspaper, the Global Times, commented that Asia was China’s “great backyard”. The commentary argued China must first dominate Asia and resolve major issues which could turn into “crises” and prevent them from reaching a point of explosion. Ignoring the Asian challenge could lead to its dislocation from the world order.


From 2004, when President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao took over full powers, becoming the Chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC), there have been several characteristic shifts in China’s domestic and foreign policies. That, however, does not mean that he wields supreme power. Far from it. He failed to place his nominee, Li Keqiang as the fifth generation Party General Secretary. As things stand today, Li would have been satisfied as the Premier of the People’s Republic of China. Hu’s predecessor Jiang Zemin and his Shanghai group managed to place Xi Jiping, a revolutionary’s son, representing the more liberal group as the next Secretary General in 2013.

But Hu Jintao succeeded in using ultra-nationalism as an important tool in shaping an apparently new strategic policy. Starting from a somewhat weak controlling position of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), he compromised with the PLA’s top hardliners to win them over. His initial projected theory of 2004 “Rise of China” drafted by his strategic advisor, gave the first insight into Hu’s strategic thinking.

The year 2004 may be a watershed year in China’s aggressive strategic vision in Asia. This vision envisaged a western line at the extremities of Asia in the west, to extreme geographic line of Asia Pacific region in the east, as China’s region of domination. The strategic debate argued that Deng Xiaoping’s strategic decision of 1991 had served its purpose, and China had achieved total power to establish its sphere of influence. That debate appears to have been co-opted in the country’s foreign policy, and is beginning to be shown to the world, particularly Asia, now.

China is no longer shy to show a glimpse of its military power and capability and project it if need be, in the Asian theatre. There are two demonstrated examples of its capability. One is its determination not to allow even US naval ships to poach in the vicinity of its territorial waters. An US naval survey ship was sharked by Chinese vessels, eliciting a response from the US navy to send warships in the area. The other is to emphatically consolidate claims on sea area.

Following the Philippines and Malaysian actions to affirm their claims on small parts of the Spratly group of islands in the South China sea, the PLA navy has dispatched two ships to patrol the area. They have also contested Malaysian and Philippino claims at the UN on these parts of the Spratly group, and reiterated their sovereignty on the entire group of islands and their adjoining areas. The Chinese claims are based on highly questionable historical incidents which negate claims of other parties like Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei, that are based on geographical realities recognized by the UN Laws of the Seas Convention.

China also claims sovereignty over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in the East China Sea currently occupied by Japan. Tension has flared up between the two countries several times over the past years. Recently, advanced Chinese monitoring capabilities apparently helped Chinese naval vessels to enter the Senkaku waters when they noticed the absence of Japanese patrols.

The South China Sea is reported to be rich in oil and gas resources. Equally important, it is the shortest route between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, also reported to be rich in gas resources, would extend China’s waters closer to Japan, and into the Pacific. These are potential crisis points the Global Times commentary referred to. China has made these claims non-negotiable, and its earlier position of joint development in both areas with other claimants, but under the condition of recognizing Chinese sovereignty, was not really meant for implementation. This was a ploy to buy time, and project a benign and friendly face of China. Beijing is apparently showing its real face under the mask.

The next question raised by the Global Times commentary is managing relations with the smaller countries of Asia. Mismanagement with these relationships have the potential to disturb China’s relations with the United States and Europe. The Asia Pacific region is the cynosure of global focus of the 21st century, and the western nations and Japan. They are not going to sit by and watch an arrogant China riding rough shod over the South and East Asian arc. USA’s relations with Vietnam and the Philippines are witnessing a new development, and Malaysia sans Mahathir and the newly restructuring Indonesia may not be amenable to Beijing’s dictates if they have reliable support. The word “reliable” is the crux for South East Asian stability.

China’s show of military power began this year with the 2009 White Paper on Defence published on January 20, coinciding with US President Barak Obama’s inauguration. The time was not coincidental. Revealing very little but giving enough for experts to draw their conclusions, the White Paper made it clear that China’s military surge was now unstoppable. It also made it clear that informization of its armed forces and cyber warfare technology were battle ready.

Although the White Paper did not mention building aircraft carriers, soon signals came from Chinese military officials that a final decision to build carriers had been taken. According to available reports three aircraft carriers of 60 thousand dwt are on the anvil along with support ships. The first carrier group is expected to be afloat by 2015 if not earlier. They are expected to carry Russian Sukhois, probably Su-35.

The Chinese naval exposition of April 23-25, to which India, Pakistan, the US and Russia among others were invited made an impressive display. Two indigenously built nuclear submarines were on public show for the first time. But they did not show their best – Type 093 and Type 094 nuclear capable submarines.

An important omission from the invitees list to the naval expositions was Japan. This may have some historical hangover. In a naval battle in 1894 the Chinese navy was totally routed by the Japanese navy. But it has current connotations, too. Despite the huge trade between the two countries, political relations have gone cold under Taro Aso’s Prime Ministership of Japan.

China has officially announced an air force exposition around November 11, this year in which new aircraft, missile, radars and other indigenously built military arms and equipment will be displayed to selected invitees. This is expected to showcase the PLA Air Force’s (PLAAF) reach beyond the immediate coast, and will also leave observers to calculate how the air force can work in co-ordination with the navy in coastal defence and informationized short duration strikes in crisis points or “hot spots” in its neighbourhood.

In the second half of this year, China will hold a massive two-month long PLA exercise that will involve 50,000 troops from four Military Regions (MRs). The largest ever military exercise by China, the exercise will mobilize more than 60,000 vehicles and large weapons and equipments over a terrain that will cover 50 thousand kilometers, and one-way travel for some units will be more than 2,400 kilometers. The Lanzou MR from western China’s Xinjiang will meet up with Shenyang, Jinan and Guangzhou MRs on the seaboard. The exercise is likely to include the Air Force and Army Aviation units. It is notable that the Chengdu MR which is responsible for the Eastern Sector of the Sino-Indian border, and the Nanjing MR which covers Taiwan, have been excluded from Kuayue-2009 (Stride 2009) exercise. But we will have to watch the directions as the drill, which is to be conducted under real battle conditions with live ammunitions, fixes target. The parameter leaves no doubt that the initial targets are East China sea and the South China sea.

Apparently with fast improvement of basic relations with Taiwan under the KMT government led by Ma Ying-Jeo, China has redirected forces on the South China sea territories to exercise sovereignty over this vital sea route. This would have significant implication for global shipping, both commercial and naval.

But China’s muscle flexing has not gone unnoticed. Vietnam has reached an agreement in principle to acquire six Russian kilo-class submarines from Russia for $1.8 billion. Hanoi has also spent $3.8 billion for the procurement of 17 SU-27 and four SU-30 multi role aircraft. With Russian collaboration Vietnam is building 10 Russian type Molnia class missile boats, and Moscow will also supply two Gepard 3.9 class frigates to Vietnam. Vietnamese navy officers have for the first time visited a US aircraft carrier.

Australia’s Defence White Paper 2009, focused on the rise of Chinese military power and approved a special military budget of more than $ 70 billion in the next 20 years to augment its air and naval capability with state of the art arms and equipment. Australia, while underscoring its interest in the region including around Indonesia, also sees a potential face off between China and growing India.

Japan’s navy and air force are no light weights either. The Chinese navy is the largest in Asia in terms of tonnage, but in terms of quality Japan may be having an edge over them. Tokyo is also quietly raising its military might, expanding the area of its operation, and its enhanced military treaty with the USA at the beginning of this decade is no less a formidable defence arrangement for China to deal with.

China has instigated a major arms race in Asia and the Asia Pacific region. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently declared in a pointed but unnamed message to China that the USA was both a trans Pacific and trans-Indian Ocean power and is not going to move out. China would also understand that Russia is an interested party in the region and has its own plans and strategies independent of China-US confrontation. Vietnam and the rest of old Indo-China have not been forgotten in the corridors of Moscow.

South Asia and India cannot remain unconcerned with these developments. Leaving aside Pakistan, China’s permanent and closest ally, the other countries in the region have been periodically trying to use China to counter India, without realizing the ultimate cost to themselves. The Maoists in Nepal have openly invited in Beijing to counter India, and statements from visiting Chinese leaders from Nepal’s soil have had a definite anti-India edge. The new government in Bangladesh under the Awami League has moved to a position of neutrality. In Sri Lanka, the Chinese have made large strides over the last few years, especially with the Mahinda Rajapaksa government.

In the sea-bordering countries of South Asia, China has been seeking strategic port facilities. It has built the Gwadar Deep Sea port in Pakistan at a cost of $2.2 billion. The Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka on the Indian Ocean Sea route is being built by China. President Rajapaksa comes from Hambantota. In Myanmar, the Chinese have Sittwe to Kunming and are building an oil and gas pipeline from South East China. A similar pipe line is to be built from Gwadar Port to Xinjiang. China has also been looking for a sea port facility in Bangladesh’s Chittagong area, to be connected with a link road through Myanmar to Kunming.

It is a fact that China is looking for security for its energy imports. Nobody can deny China having aircraft carriers for defence. But the strategic philosophy behind China’s military modernization has raised serious concerns all around. Beijing wants to establish its ownership in the near abroad, and overlordship over the Indian Ocean and Asia. It wants Asia as its backyard. This contains deadly ingredients for instability.

In this context, it would be pertinent what the Chief of US Pacific Command (PACOM) Admiral Timothy J. Keating told his Indian counterpart during a recent visit. Admiral Keating said a senior Chinese Admiral had informally suggested to him that the US allow the Chinese to keep the Indian Ocean, and the US keep the Pacific Ocean. Such off the record talks or problems by senior Chinese military officers are not idle talks. Such probes have generally proved to be correct in the past. Where does India stand?

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